UC-NRLF 

$B    MS    071 

THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF 
MALEBRANCHE 


BY 

WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY,  A.  M. 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

OP  CORNELL  UNIVERSITY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


1921 


EXCHANGE 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF 
MALEBRANCHE 


BY 


WILLIAM  CURTIS  SWABEY,  A.  M. 

U 


A  THESIS 

PRESENTED  TO  THE  FACULTY  OF  THE  GRADUATE  SCHOOL 

OF  CORNELL  UNIVERSITY  FOR  THE  DEGREE  OF 

DOCTOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY 


1921 


PRESS  OF 

GULFPORT  PRINTING  CO. 
HOUSTON,  TEXAS 


PREFACE. 

In  the  following  pages,  I  have  attempted  merely 
to  give  an  accurate  historical  account  of  the  main 
philosophical  opinions  of  Father  Malebranche;  the 
perhaps  more  important  task  of  making  a  critical  ap- 
praisal of  the  truth  of  these  opinions  has  been  largely 
left  to  some  future  date.  It  is,  at  any  rate,  clear  that 
the  system  of  Malebranche,  as  a  chapter  in  the  history 
of  the  Platonic  tradition,  deserves  more  consideration 
than  it  has  hitherto  received.  I  must  take  this  occa- 
sion to  express  my  gratitude  to  my  teachers  at  Cornell 
University,  and  especially  to  Professor  J.  E.  Creigh- 
ton,  without  whose  kindly  encouragement  this  disser- 
tation would  never  have  been  completed. 

THE  AUTHOR. 


478422 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PACK 

CHAPTER  I.     INTRODUCTION 5 

CHAPTER  II.     MALEBRANCHE  's  PSYCHOLOGY 12 

The  Faculties  of  the  Mind 13 

The  Senses 16 

The   Imagination 19 

Our  Lack  of  an  Idea  of  the  Soul 25 

CHAPTER  III.     MALEBRANCHE 's  PSYCHOLOGY  (Cont.) 29 

The  Natural  Inclinations 29 

The  Passions 30 

CHAPTER  IV.    MALEBRANCHE  's  THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE 34 

The  Argument  for  Vision  in  God 34 

Malebranche  and  St.  Augustine 43 

Malebranche  and  Locke 43 

Malebranche  and  Berkeley 45 

Malebranche  and  Arnauld 46 

CHAPTER  V.     MALEBRANCHE 's  METHODOLOGY 49 

Aids  to  Attention 49 

Rules  of  Method 51 

CHAPTER  VI.    MALEBRANCHE 's  METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY.  .57 

Mind  and  Body 57 

Intelligible  Extension  and  the  Existence  of  God 59 

Occasionalism    64 

Image  and  Meaning 66 

Existence  of  Bodies 67 

CHAPTER  VII.    MALEBRANCHE  's  METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY 

(Continued)    71 

The  Divine  Omnipotence 71 

The  Attributes  of  God 73 

The  Theory  of  Providence 76 

The  Explanation  of  Evil 77 77 

Divine  Will  and  Divine  Reason 78 

CHAPTER  VIII.    MALEBRANCHE 's  SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS 81 

Love  of  the  Eternal  Order 81 

Force  of  Mind 87 

Liberty  of  Mind 89 

Obedience  to  Order.  .  .  .91 


THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE. 

CHAPTER  I :   INTRODUCTION. 

Bouillier,  in  his  splendid  Histoire  de  la  philosophic  cartesi- 
enne,  declares  that  Malebranche  is  the  greatest  metaphysician 
of  France  after  Descartes.1  Few  would  contest  this  statement.2 
Now  Malebranche  was  a  member  of  the  Congregation  of  the 
Oratory  of  Jesus.  This  latter  may  be  described  as  an  associa- 
tion of  priests,  devoted  to  prayer,  study  and  teaching.3  Its  mem- 
bers were  not  monks,  and  it  had  neither  secret  constitution  nor 
solemn  vows,  other  than  those  of  the  priesthood  itself.3  They 
were  simply  priests  united  by  a  common  love  of  piety  and  sci- 
ence, living  in  common  according  to  the  ideals  of  the  primitive 
church.  Upon  entering  the  Oratory,  a  priest  did  not  renounce 
his  liberty,  but  was  always  as  free  to  leave  as  he  had  been  to 
enter;  and  each  of  the  members  preserved  a  certain  independ- 
ence, being  permitted  to  devote  himself  to  the  study  for  which 
he  felt  most  inclination.4  The  Oratory  was  distinguished  by  a 
happy  combination  of  philosophy,  science,  scholarship  and  the- 
ology.4 Its  liberal  spirit  is  seen  in  the  rule  which  dispensed  a 
member  who  showed  some  special  aptitude  for  study  from  all 
other  duties.4 

The  famous  ecclesiastic,  Bossuet,  declared,  in  his  Oraison 
Funebre  du  P.  Bourgoing,  speaking  of  Cardinal  de  Berulle,  that 
his  ' '  great  love  for  the  Church  inspired  him  to  form  a  company 
to  which  he  desired  to  give  no  other  spirit  than  that  of  the 
Church,  nor  other  rules  than  the  canons,  nor  other  superiors 
than  the  bishops,  nor  other  bonds  than  charity,  nor  other  solemn 
oaths  than  those  of  baptism  and  priesthood,  a  company  where  a 
holy  liberty  creates  a  holy  obligation,  where  there  is  obedience 
without  dependence  and  government  without  command,  where 
all  authority  is  in  gentleness  and  where  respect  is  not  aided  by 
fear;  a  company  in  which  a  charity  that  banishes  fear  works  a 
great  miracle  and  in  which  with  no  yoke  charity  is  able,  not  only 
to  captivate,  but  also  to  annihilate  self-will ;  a  company  in  which 
to  form  true  priests  they  are  lead  to  the  source  of  truth,  where 

1  Bouillier,  op.  cit.,  Ed.  of  1854,  Vol.  II,  p.  32.     Henceforth  referred  to  as  Bouil- 
lier simply.     Unless  otherwise  stated,  the  references  are  all  to  Vol.  II. 

2  J.  Simon,  in  his  able  Introduction  to  his  edition  to  the  Oeuvres  de  Malebranche 
(XLIII),  says:    "Ce  fou  de  Malebranche  est  une  de  nos  grandes  gloires  nationales ;  ses 
visions  metaphysiques  sont  une  ecole  de  sagesse  et  de  profonde  philosophie,  et  plaise 
a  Dieu  pour  I'honneur  de  la  philosophie  et  le   progres  de  I'esprit  humain,   qu'U  nous 
pui-sse  nditre  des.  reveurs  comme  lui!" 

3  Bouillier,  p.  4. 
*   Bouillier,  p.  5. 


6  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

they  have  always  at  hand  the  holy  books  to  seek  in  them  without 
rest  the  letter  by  the  mind,  the  spirit  by  prayer,  depth  by  re- 
treat, etc."5 

As  Bouillier  remarks,  Bossuet's  praise  marks  the  difference 
between  the  Jesuits  and  the  Oratory.5  And  just  as  these  two 
societies  were  opposed  in  spirit,  so  they  were  opposed  in  philoso- 
phy. Cardinal  de  Berulle  gave  the  Oratory  its  initial  tendency.8 
His  admiration  was,  in  the  first  place,  for  St.  Augustine,  a  fact 
which  made  the  Oratory  always  open  to  suspicion  of  Jansenism.8 
And,  through  St.  Augustine,  the  Oratory  came  to  esteem  Plato 
more  than  Aristotle  even  before  the  time  of  Descartes.6  Thus 
certain  of  the  early  Fathers  of  the  Congregation  sought  to  in- 
troduce the  Platonic  doctrine.  Father  Fournenc  was  the  author 
of  a  complete  course  of  philosophy  which  appeared  in  1665  in 
which  he  declared  his  intention  of  uniting  the  spirit  of  Plato 
with  the  true  philosophy  of  Aristotle.6  But  when  the  Cartesian 
philosophy  came  into  vogue  the  original  Platonic  tendency  of 
the  Oratory  was  at  first  forgotten.7 

However  much  influence  de  Berulle  may  have  exerted  to  the 
advantage  of  Plato,  his  friendship  and  admiration  for  Descartes 
were  even  more  influential  in  determining  the  philosophical  ten- 
dency of  the  Oratory.  As  Baillet  tells  us  in  his  Vie  de  Descartes 
the  discourse  of  Descartes  on  a  certain  occasion  so  impressed  the 
Cardinal  that  the  latter  sought  private  conference  with  him,  and 
gave  him  great  encouragement  in  his  project  of  philosophical 
reform.7  However,  it  was  not  de  Berulle  who  actually  intro- 
duced the  study  of  Descartes  into  the  Oratory  so  much  as  Fa- 
thers Gibieuf  and  La  Barde,  who  were  zealous  partisans  of  Des- 
cartes.7 And  the  friendship  of  the  Oratory  was  undoubtedly 
one  of  the  causes  of  the  success  of  Descartes'  philosophy. 

-Now  Malebranche  was  not  without  predecessors  in  the  Ora- 
tory in  uniting  the  spirit  of  Descartes  with  that  of  Augustine 
and  Plato  j  nevertheless  his  philosophy  was  the  most  brilliant  and 
successful  performance  of  this  feat.  Father  Andre  Martin,  who 
is  known  under  the  pseudonym  of  Ambrosius  Victor,  seems  to 
have  been  his  immediate  precursor  and  master.8  Andre  Martin 
was  a  professor  of  philosophy  at  the  college  d' Angers  and  was 
one  of  the  first  to  introduce  the  doctrine  of  Descartes  into  philo- 
sophical teaching.9  This  latter  proceeding  aroused  the  authori- 
ties of  the  college  to  the  extent  that  he  was  ordered  to  confine 
his  teaching  to  the  doctrine  of  Aristotle.9  Later  in  his  life  he 
was  suspected  of  Jansenism  and  for  that  reason  suspended  from 
the  chair  of  philosophy  at  Saumur.10  In  his  Philosophia  Chris- 

Bouillier,  p.  6. 
Bouillier,  p.  7. 
Bouillier,  p.  8. 
Bouillier,  p.  10. 
Bouillier,  p.  10. 
10  Bouillier,  p.  11. 


INTRODUCTION  7 

tiana,  published  under  the  name  of  Ambrosius  Victor,  he  de- 
velops his  views  at  length,  claiming  the  authority  of  Augustine ; 
this  work  is  the  most  noteworthy  predecessor  of  the  Recherche 
de  la  verite.10  In  this  Philosophia  Christiana,  Andre  Martin  ex- 
pounds the  doctrine  of  St.  Augustine  concerning  God,  man,  ani- 
mals, and  concerning  many  other  topics,  but  it  is  not  difficult 
to  see  that  it  is  always  Descartes  who  is  speaking  through  Augus- 
tine.10 Thus  in  his  Sanctus  Augustinus  de  anima  bestiarum  he 
claims  to  find  many  arguments  in  Augustine  that  support  the 
Cartesian  theory  of  animal  automatism.10  But  Andre  Martin  is 
above  all  the  precursor  of  Malebranche  in  the  way  in  which  he 
emphasizes  Augustine's  version  of  Platonism  in  regard  to  the 
eternal  truths  and  the  divine  ideas.10  He  held  that  there  were, 
in  the  divine  mind,  ideas  of  all  creatures,  just  as  in  the  mind  of 
an  artist  there  is  an  idea  of  his  work;  and  that  God  does  not 
draw  his  knowledge  of  his  creatures  from  his  creatures  them- 
selves but  from  his  own  ideas  of  them.11  We  say  that  we  behold 
creatures,  but  in  truth  we  behold  their  ideas  in  God,  although 
their  ideas  have  neither  extension  nor  figure.11  And,  lastly, 
among  the  Oratorians  before  the  time  of  Malebranche  who  were 
followers  of  Descartes,  we  have  the  learned  Father  Poisson,  who 
was  a  commentator  on  the  Discourse  on  Method  and  the  geometry 
of  Descartes.12  Thus  the  Oratory  was  always  characterized  by 
an  idealistic  tendency  and  preferred  Plato  to  Aristotle,  St.  Au- 
gustine to  St.  Thomas.12  Descartes  was  only  received  by  the  Ora- 
tory with  an  intermixture  of  elements  borrowed  from  Plato  and 
Augustine,  for,  even  before  Malebranche,  the  Oratory  inclined 
to  the  doctrine  of  a  divine  reason  enlightening  men,  i.  e.,  to  the 
notion  of  vision  in  God,  and  to  the  tendency  to  justify  faith  by 
reason.12 

The  contrast  between  the  Oratory  and  the  Society  of  Jesus 
is  very  striking,  and  may  be  compared  to  the  medieval  conflict 
between  Franciscans  and  Dominicans.13  The  Oratory  represents 
the  spirit  of  rationalism  or  idealism ;  the  Jesuits  that  of  empiri- 
cism. The  first  society  favored  Plato  and  Descartes ;  the  second, 
Aristotle  and  Gassendi.13  Indeed,  as  Bouillier  says,  the  historic 
mission  of  the  Congregation  of  the  Oratory  seems  to  have  been 
to  have  defended  throughout  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  cen- 
turies the  principles  of  Platonic  idealism.13 

Now,  Nicolas  Malebranche  was  born  in  Paris  in  1638,  of  a 
Nicolas  Malebranche,  a  secretary  to  the  king,  and  of  Catherine 
de  Lauzon,  whose  brother  was  vice-regent  of  Canada.14  He  was 
the  last  of  ten  children,  according  to  Adry,  and  of  thirteen,  ac- 

10  Bouillier,  p.  11. 
«  Bouillier,  p.  12. 

11  Bouillier,  p.   13. 
18  Bouillier,  p.  14. 


Maleliran 


13  Bouillier,  p.  14. 

14  In  regard  to  Malebranche' s  life,  I  am  following  the  later  account  giren  in  Joly, 
•branche,  Paris,  1901,  henceforth  referred  to  as  Joly.     See  Joly.  p.  1. 


8  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

cording  to  Andre.  His  constitution  and  physical  frame  were 
very  defective;  he  suffered  from  curvature  of  the  spine  and  a 
very  narrow  chest.15  From  an  early  age,  according  to  Andre, 
he  felt  a  desire  to  withdraw  from  the  world.15  At  sixteen  years 
he  followed  the  course  of  the  college  de  la  Marched6  There  he 
studied  under  a  certain  M.  Rouillard,  a  peripatetic,  who,  how- 
ever, succeeded  only  in  disgusting  him  writh  the  scholastic  sys- 
tem.16 He  hoped  for  more  satisfaction  in  the  theology  of  the 
Sorbonne,  which  he  studied  for  three  years.  But  he  found  this 
study  equally  unsatisfactory.17  Feeling  a  profound  need  of  re- 
tirement, and  having  lost  his  mother  and  his  father,  the  one 
shortly  after  the  other,  he  took,  in  1660,  steps  to  enter  the  Con- 
gregation of  the  Oratory.18  At  first  he  applied  himself  to  works 
of  erudition  and  historical  criticism,  but  without  success.19  Up 
to  the  age  of  twenty-six,  in  spite  of  a  rather  vivid  interest  in  St. 
Augustine,20  he  could  not  be  said  to  have  found  his  philosoph- 
ical vocation.21  H)ne  day  he  happened  upon  Descartes'  post- 
humous and  incomplete  Treatise  on  Man  in  which  Descartes  en- 
deavors to  give  a  mechanistic  account  of  the  human  constitution ; 
he  was  so  fascinated  with  the  clarity  and  connection  of  ideas 
that,  as  he  said,  he  was  frequently  obliged  to  interrupt  his 
reading  by  reason  of  the  violent  palpitations  of  his  hearp^2 

•*  Malebranche  thus  became  a  philosopher  and  a  Cartesian  at 
the  same  time;  he  now  abandoned  Greek,  Hebrew,  and  history, 
and  for  ten  years  buried  himself  in  the  philosophy  of  Descartes, 
which  he  was  interested  in  reconciling  with  that  of  Augustine.22- 
He  then  produced  the  first  volume  of  his  Recherche  de  la  verite 
(1675),  covering  Sense,  Imagination,  and  Understanding.23  In 
the  course  of  the  next  year  (1676),  he  published  the  second  vol- 
ume, covering  the  Natural  Inclinations,  the  Passions,  and  Meth- 
od.23 The  Recherche  de  la  verite  was  highly  successful  and  the 
Oratory  voted  its  author  thanks  and  congratulations.24 

In  1677  he  published  his  Conversations  metaphysiques  et 
chretiennes.25  In  1680  appeared  his  Traite  de  la  nature  et  de 
la  grace,  which  is  his  most  important  work  from  a  specifically 
theological  standpoint.25  This  work  was  the  occasion  of  his  great 
quarrel  with  Arnauld.25  In  1684,  he  published  his  Traite  de 
morale,  which  we  shall  review  in  this  study.  In  1684,  we  have 

15  Cf.  Andre,  La  vie  de  Malebranche  avec  I'histoire  de  ses  ouvrages,  Bibliotheque 
Oratorienne,  1886.     Joly,  p.  2. 

Joly,  p.  2. 

Cf.  Andre,  op.  cit.,  p.  6. 

Joly,  p.  4. 

Bouillier,  p.  15. 

Joly,  p.  14. 

Bouillier,  p.  15. 

22  Bouillier,  p.  15,  and  Joly,  p.  14. 

28  Bouillier,  p.   16.     A  Latin  translation  of  the  Sixth  Book  of  the  Recherche  was 
put  on  the  Index  along  with  certain  other  of  Malebranche's  works ;  see  Joly,  p.  40. 

24  Bouillier,  p.  16,  and  Joly,  p.  23f. 

25  Joly,  p.  27f.     It  was  condemned  at  Rome  in  1690;   Bouillier,  p.   17. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

his  Meditations  metaphysiques  et  chretiennes,  which,  although 
relatively  important,  is  yet  not  of  any  crucial  significance.  In 
1688,  we  have  the  Entretiens  sur  la  metaphysique  et  sur  la  re- 
ligion.26 This  work,  which  we  take  as  the  basis  of  our  account 
of  Malebraiiche  's  metaphysics,  as  Bouillier  says,  "contient  toute 
la  doctrine  de  Malebranche  dans  son  plus  haute  et  son  dernier 
developpement."26  In  1697,  we  have  the  Traite  de  V amour  de 
Dieu,  in  1708,  the  Entretiens  dfun  philosophe  chinois  sur  I' exist- 
ence et  la  nature  de  Dieu,  and  in  1715,  the  very  year  of  his 
death,  we  have  Reflexions  sur  la  premotion  physique.27 

These  various  writings  brought  him  in  the  course  of  his  life 
into  many  controversies,  all  of  which  were  distasteful  to  him, 
for  his  genius  was  more  dogmatic  and  constructive  than  polemi- 
cal in  character.28  His  love  of  repose  was  his  dominant  passion, 
but  he  was  forced  to  spend  the  greater  part  of  his  life  in  contro- 
versies of  various  sorts.  Of  these  struggles,  the  longest  and 
keenest  was  with  the  great  Jansenist  and  Port  Royal  leader, 
Antoine  Arnauld.29  In  this  controversy,  as  Victor  Cousin  point- 
ed out,  Malebranche  has  the  timidity  and  obstinacy  of  the  re- 
cluse.30 He  repeats  his  arguments  without  variation  rather  than 
analyzes  the  thoughts  of  his  opponent.30  His  greatness  lay  in 
constructive  thinking  rather  than  in  dialectic. 

Malebranche 's  literary  style  was  one  great  cause  of  his  suc- 
cess, Fontenelle,  Bayle,  Andre,  Daguesseau,  Arnauld,  Bossuet, 
Diderot  and  Voltaire  are  mentioned  by  Bouillier  as  having  spe- 
cifically praised  the  style  of  Malebranche.31  The  same  author 
remarks  that  Malebranche  joins  to  the  "  perfume  of  spiritual- 
ity," or  " mystical  grace,"  the  vivid  and  sharp  style  of  Pascal 
and  La  Bruyere.32  In  fact,  the  beauty  of  his  style  does  consist 
in  his  way  of  combining  the  abstract  and  the  concrete,  in  his 
happy  faculty  of  giving  a  kind  of  substantial  existence  to  the 
objects  of  the  most  abstruse  thought. 

Malebranche  was,  like  Descartes,  at  the  same  time,  meta- 
physician, mathematician  and  physicist.32  wHe  throughout,  like 
Plato  himself,  rests  his  thought  upon  mathematical  examples/ 
He  was  a  friend  of  the  Marquise  de  THopital,  the  famous  math- 
ematician, and  explained  the  latter 's  analysis  of  the  infinitely 
small  to  the  young  Mairan,  who  later  carried  on  with  him  a  very 
important  philosophical  correspondence.32  He  had  a  controver- 
sy with  Leibniz  on  the  laws  of  motion  and  with  very  honorable 
good  faith  modified  his  views  in  the  last  edition  of  the  Recherche 

28  Bouillier,  p.  17.     Joly,  p.  37f. 

27  Bouillier,  p.  17.     It  is  greatly  to  be  desired  that  the  proposal,  which  D.  Roustan 
so  ably  defends  (Pour  une  edition  de  Malebranche,  Revue  de  metaphysique  et  de  mo- 
rale. Vol.  XXIII,  p.  163 )  be  realized ! 

28  Bouillier,  p.  17. 

29  Joly,  p.  77f. 

30  Bouillier,  p.  18. 

31  Bouillier,  p.  19. 

32  Bouillier,  p.  21. 


10  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

de  la  verite.32  In  the  field  of  physics  he  modified  Descartes'  the- 
ory of  the  vortices.32  In  1699,  he  was  made  an  honorary  mem- 
ber of  the  Academy  of  Science,  and  in  the  Academy  had  a  long 
controversy  with  Regis,  whom  the  student  of  Descartes  will  re- 
member, on  the  subject  of  the  apparent  size  of  the  moon  on  the 
horizon,  which  terminated  to  his  advantage  in  a  statement  signed 
by  the  most  prominent  mathematicians  of  the  Academy.33  But 
he  did  not  esteem  as  highly  the  empirical  sciences,  such  as  chem- 
istry or  astronomy,  as  he  did  mathematics  and  mathematical 
physics.33  As  he  says  in  the  Preface  to  the  Recherche  de  la  ver- 
ite :  * '  Men  are  not  born  to  become  astronomers  or  chemists,  and 
to  pass  their  lives  attached  to  a  telescope  or  a  furnace  and  then 
draw  useless  conclusions  from  their  laborious  observations."34 
He  had  still  less  admiration  for  historical  science,  for  erudition, 
for  the  study  and  criticism  of  language.35  On  the  other  hand, 
he  had  a  very  vivid  interest  in  insects.35 

For  Malebranche,  all  philosophy  before  the  time  of  Des- 
cartes was  barbarism,  while  for  Descartes  Malebranche  had  only 
profound  admiration  and  veneration.36  He  says  in  the  Re- 
cherche37 :  l '  Those  who  read  the  works  of  this  learned  man  feel 
a  secret  joy  in  being  born  in  a  century  and  in  a  country  fortu- 
nate enough  to  spare  us  the  trouble  of  seeking  in  past  centuries, 
among  pagans,  at  the  extremities  of  the  earth,  among  barbarians 
and  foreigners,  a  teacher  to  instruct  us  in  the  truth."  But,  as 
Bouillier  says,  Malebranche  makes  only  slight  mention  of  Plato, 
while  he  often  cites  Aristotle,  whom  he  regarded  as  the  ''prince 
of  false  philosophers. ' >38  He  had  no  higher  opinion  of  the  great 
philosophers  of  the  School,  with  the  exception  of  Augustine, 
who,  indeed,  is  hardly  to  be  considered  a  scholastic.39 

Malebranche  passed  the  greater  part  of  his  life  in  Paris  in 
a  cell  of  the  Saint-Honore  Oratory,  absorbed  in  meditation,  as 
we  may  say,  upon  divine  things.39  He  pleasantly  refers  to  him- 
self in  the  Entretiens  sur  la  metaphysique  as  a  meditatif,  as  a 
taciturne  meditatif.40  In  spite  of  his  withdrawal  from  the  life 

88  Bouillier,  p.  22. 

84  Op.  cit.,  p.  XV. 

35  Bouillier,  p.  23.     Cf.  Joly,  46f.     On  Malebranche's  scientific  work,  consult  fur- 
ther, 

C.  Henry,  Malebranche  d'apres  des  manuscritti  intdits  la  bibliotheque  nationals, 
Revue  Philosophique,  p.  410  of  Vol.  II,  1887. 

Lechelas,  L'oeuvre  scientifique  de  Malebranche,  Revue  Philosophique,  1884,  p.  293. 

P.  Duhem,  L'Optique  de  Malebranche,  Revue  de  mltaphysique  et  de  morale.  Vol. 
XXIII,  p.  37. 

36  But  cf.  M.   Blondel,   L'Anti-carttsianisme  de  Malebranche,  Revue  de  metaphy- 
sique et  de  morale,  Vol.   XXIII,  p.   1.     A  very  skillful  comparison  of  Descartes  and 
Malebranche  is  made   in   this   article.      The  essential   difference  between  the   scientific 
spirit  of  Descartes  and  the  religious  spirit  of  Malebranche  is  brought  out,  the  differ- 
ence between  "methode  scientifique  et  rationale  d'une  part,  methode  ascetique  et  spec- 
ulative d'autre  part."     Cf.  18ff.     Bouillier,  p.  25. 

87  Op.  cit.,  Ed.  of  Jules  Simon,  Vol.  II,  p.  478. 

88  Bouillier,  p.  25. 

89  Bouillier,  p.  26. 

40  Entretiens,  Ed.  of  Jules  Simon,  p.  95. 


INTRODUCTION  n 

of  the  world,  he  soon  became  famous  through  his  writings,  not 
only  in  France,  but  in  foreign  countries  as  well.41  Fontanelle 
tells  us  that  very  few  foreign  savants  came  to  Paris  without  vis- 
iting him.42  Lord  Quadrington,  who  died  vice-regent  of  Jamaica, 
spent  two  or  three  hours  every  morning  with  Malebranche  for 
two  years  studying  his  philosophy.42  The  Prince  of  Conde  was 
an  enthusiastic  admirer.42  Although  of  frail  constitution,  a 
severe  manner  of  living  gave  him  fairly  good  health  throughout 
his  life ;  he  was  seventy-seven  years  old,  when  in  1715,  after  an 
illness  of  four  months,  he  was  overtaken  by  death.42 
Let  us  now  turn  to  his  doctrine. 


41  Bouillier,  p.  27. 
48  Bouillier,  p.  28. 


12  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 


CHAPTER  II:    MALEBRANCHE 's  PSYCHOLOGY. 

Cassirer  has  called  attention  to  the  psychological  aspect  of 
Malebranche 's  teaching.  "The  well  known  story,"  says  this 
learned  historian  of  the  theory  of  knowledge,  "which  tells  us 
that  it  was  the  reading  of  Descartes'  Traite  de  Vhomme  that 
aroused  Malebranche  to  his  philosophical  calling  is  very  signifi- 
cant in  this  respect.  It  is  in  fact  from  physiology,  and  from  the 
physiological  psychology  which  is  necessarily  connected  with  the 
former,  that  he  takes  his  start.  It  is  with  this  problem  that  he 
achieves  his  peculiar  historical  originality.  .  .  .  The  analysis 
of  the  problem  of  perception  led  to  results  which  precede  and 
make  possible  the  doctrine  of  Berkeley.  Not  the  Englishmen, 
but  Malebranche,  is  the  first  true  psychologist  in  the  history  of 
modern  philosophy."1 

It  is  from  this  point  of  view  that  we  can  understand  the 
structure  of  the  Recherche  de  la  verite.2  This  work  is  an  elab- 
orate exposure  of  the  errors  to  which  the  human  mind  is  liable. 
Book  I  discusses  the  senses,  Book  II,  the  imagination,  Book  III, 
the  pure  understanding,  Book  IV,  the  inclinations,  Book  V,  the 
passions,  while,  finally,  Book  VI  deals  with  the  general  problem 
of  scientific  and  philosophical  method.  All  of  these  topics  are 
discussed  with  regard  to  the  problem  of  the  psychological  expla- 
nation of  error.  Malebranche  thus  combines  the  metaphysical 
theory  of  mind — the  problem  of  the  relation  of  mental  and  cor- 
poreal substances — with  the  empirically  psychological  considera- 
tion of  mind.  We  shall  later  see  how  his  great  doctrine,  that  we 
see  all  things  in  God,  is  a  necessary  deduction  from  this  dualistic 
metaphysics.  But  for  the  present  let  us  be  content  to  trace  our 
way  through  the  Recherche  de  la  verite.  We  shall  find  that  it 
possesses  a  peculiarly  rich  content  from  the  psychological  point 
of  view.  As  Bouillier  exclaims:  "What  a  knowledge  of  the  hu- 
man heart,  what  profound  and  delicate  observation,  what  por- 
traits and  characters  of  admirable  finesse  and  striking  truth, 
what  piquant  strokes  in  this  description  of  all  our  mental  ills ! ' ': 
It  is  in  this  psychological  regard  that  we  shall  first  examine  it. 
Later  on  we  shall  give  more  especial  attention  to  the  epistemo- 
logical  and  metaphysical  issues  which  Malebranche  cannot  re- 
frain from  discussing  even  in  the  Recherche. 

1  Erkenntnteproblem,  Ed.  2,  Vol.  I,  p.  554. 

2  For  the  Recherche  de  la  vMte  I  am  using  the  Jules  Simon  edition. 

3  Bouillier,  p.  89. 


MALEBRANCHE  'S  PSYCHOLOGY  13 

The  Faculties  of  the  Mind. 

Let  us  consider,  first  of  all,  Book  I,  Des  sens.  Malebranche 
begins  with  a  general  characterization  of  understanding  and 
will.  The  human  spirit  is  a  simple  and  unextended  being  and  , 
is  in  no  way  composed  of  parts.  Nevertheless  it  is  customary  to 
distinguish  two  faculties,  understanding  and  will.4  But  these 
ideas  are  very  abstract  and  do  not  fall  under  the  imagination; 
it  is,  therefore,  better  to  express  them  by  a  comparison  with 
matter,  although,  to  be  sure,  this  comparison  with  matter  is  not 
"entierement  juste."5  Matter  possesses  two  faculties  or  prop- 
erties ;  the  first  is  that  of  receiving  different  figures ;  the  second 
is  that  of  being  moved.  In  the  same  way  the  human  spirit  has 
two  faculties:  Understanding,  which  is  the  capacity  of  receiv- 
ing ideas ;  the  second,  which  is  the  will,  is  the  capacity  of  re- 
ceiving different  inclinations  or  of  willing  different  things.5  Now 
matter  can  receive  two  sorts  of  figures.  One  sort  are  entirely 
exterior,  like  the  roundness  of  a  bit  of  wax;  the  other  sort  are  • 
interior,  like  the  figures  of  the  minute  parts  of  which  the  wax  is 
composed.  The  first  are  figures  in  the  strict  sense ;  the  second 
may  be  called  configurations.5  Now  there  are  two  sorts  of  per- 
ceptions of  the  soul  which  correspond  to  these  two  sorts  of  modi- 
fications of  bodies;  on  the  one  hand  we  have  pure  perceptions 
which  may  be  considered  as  superficial  to  the  soul,  on  the  other 
hand  we  have  the  more  sensible  perceptions,  of  which  pleasure 
and  pain,  light  and  color,  taste  and  odor  are  examples.  Now. 
says  Malebranche,  we  shall  see  that  these  sensible  perceptions  - 
are  nothing  but  modifications  of  the  soul ;  thus  as  long  as  we  do 
not  transcend  sensible  perceptions,  we  do  not  transcend  the 
states  of  our  own  consciousness.6 

The  faculty  of  receiving  ideas  and  modifications,  like  the 
capacity  of  matter  of  receiving  both  figures  and  configurations, 
is  entirely  passive.  In  both  cases  we  deal  with  a  wholly  receptive 
faculty.7  This  theory  of  the  essential  passivity  of  understanding 
plays  an  important  role  in  Malebranche 's  epistemology.  As 
Bouillier  has  remarked,  Malebranche 's  very  use  of  a  physical 
analogy  in  his  explanation  of  the  nature  of  mind  shows  a  tend- 
ency to  deny  the  mind  all  activity  and  causal  efficacy.8  It  would, 
however,  be  well  not  to  push  this  criticism  too  far. 

The  same  analogy  between  the  faculties  of  the  mind  and 
the  properties  of  matter  holds  in  the  case  of  will  that  holds  in 
the  case  of  understanding.9  Just  as  God  is  the  cause  of  all  the 
movements  of  bodies  so  he  is  the  cause  of  all  the  natural  in- 

Recherche,  I,  p.  2. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  3. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  4. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  5. 
Bouillier,  p.  36. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  7. 


14  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

clinations.  In  the  same  way  that  all  movements  take  place  in  a 
straight  line,  if  there  are  no  foreign  and  special  causes  which 
determine  them  and  change  them  into  curves  by  their  opposi- 
tion ;  in  the  same  way,  all  the  inclinations  that  we  have  from 
God  are  "straight"  (droites]  and  they  would  have  no  other  end 
than  the  possession  of  the  good  and  of  the  truth  were  there  not 
a  foreign  cause  that  determines  the  impression  of  nature  towards 
bad  ends.9  This  special  foreign  factor  is  our  freedom  or  liberty. 
Malebranche  defines  his  terms  as  follows :  * '  Hence  by  this  word 
Willy  I  here  designate  the  impression10  or  natural  movement 
which  carries  us  toward  the  indeterminate  and  general  good; 
and  by  the  word  Liberty  I  understand  nothing  else  than  the 
power  which  the  mind  has  of  turning  this  impression  towards 
objects  which  please  us,  and  thus  bringing  it  about  that  our  nat- 
ural inclinations  are  directed  upon  some  particular  object,  while 
these  inclinations  were  previously  directed  toward  the  good  in 
general,  or  the  universal  good,  that  is  to  say,  toward  God,  who  is 
the  sole  general  good,  since  it  is  he  alone  who  includes  within 
himself  all  goods."11  Later  he  tells  us  that  liberty  is  the  power 
to  compare  goods  and  to  love  them  in  proportion  as  they  are 
lovable  and  to  relate  them  to  the  all-inclusive  good,  God.12  Thus 
in  the  midst  of  a  system  which  inclines  toward  an  extreme  abso- 
lutism, or  over-emphasis  of  the  omnipotence  of  God,  we  find 
Malebranche  maintaining  that  the  individual  is  yet  in  principle 
free.13  In  regard  to  the  active  side  of  mind,  then,  we  may  say 
that  Malebranche  regards  it  as  a  play  of  inclinations  which  have 
the  divine  being  as  both  efficient  and  final  cause — in  terms  of 
Aristotle 's  metaphysics — and  yet  as  affording  room  for  a  certain 
spontaneity  or  liberty  on  the  part  of  the  mind  itself.14 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Descartes  regarded  judgment  as 
a  function  of  will  rather  than  of  understanding.  Judgment  is 
an  expression  of  free  choice,  otherwise  the  responsibility  for 
human  error  would  fall  back  upon  the  divine  creator.  "Where- 
upon, ' '  says  Descartes,  * '  regarding  myself  more  closely  and  con- 
sidering what  are  my  errors  (for  they  alone  testify  to  there  be- 
ing any  imperfection  in  me)  I  answer  that  they  depend  on  a 
combination  of  two  causes,  to-wit,  on  the  faculty  of  knowledge 
that  rests  in  me,  and  on  the  power  of  choice  or  of  free  will — 
that  is  to  say,  on  the  understanding  and  at  the  same  time  on  the 
will.  For  by  the  understanding  alone  I  neither  assert  nor  deny 

10  Malebranche  uses  this  word  as  meaning  impetus  rather  than  sensation. 

11  Recherche,  I,  p.  8f.     Of.  Bouillier,  pp.  76,  77,  78. 

12  Recherche,  I,  p.  10. 

18  As  Bouillier  has  pointed  out,  Malebranche  always  endeavors  to  maintain  the 
freedom  of  the  indiridual,  especially  in  the  Traite  de  la  nature  et  de  la  grace  and  in 
the  Traite  de  Morale,  Bouillier,  p.  79.  Indeed,  Arnauld,  the  Jansenist,  accused  Male- 
branche of  Pelagianism,  Bouillier,  p.  79.  Nevertheless,  says  Bouillier,  it  is  only  by 
means  of  a  grave  contradiction  that  Malebranche  admits  freedom.  Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  80. 

14  On  this  point,  cf.  Olle-Laprune,  La  philosophic  de  Malebranche,  Vol.  I,  p.  287f. 


MALEBRANCHE'S  PSYCHOLOGY  15 

anything,  but  apprehend  the  ideas  of  things  as  to  which  I  can 
form  a  judgment.  But  no  error  is  properly  speaking  found  in 
it,  provided  the  word  error  is  taken  in  its  proper  signification. 
.  .  .  I  likewise  cannot  complain  that  God  has  given  me  a  free 
choice  or  a  will  which  is  sufficient,  ample,  and  perfect,  since  as 
a  matter  of  fact,  I  am  conscious  of  a  will  so  extended  as  to  be 
subject  to  no  limitations.  .  .  .  From  all  this  I  recognize  that 
the  power  of  will  which  I  have  received  from  God  is  not  of  itself 
the  source  of  my  errors — for  it  is  very  ample  and  very  perfect 
of  its  kind — any  more  than  is  the  power  of  understanding,  for 
since  I  understand  nothing  but  by  the  power  which  God  has 
given  me  for  understanding,  there  is  no  doubt  that  all  I  under- 
stand, I  understand  as  I  ought,  and  it  is  not  possible  that  I  err 
in  this.  Whence  then  come  my  errors?  They  come  from  the 
sole  fact  that  since  the  will  is  much  wider  in  its  range  and  com- 
pass than  the  understanding,  I  do  not  restrain  it  within  the 
same  bounds,  but  extend  it  also  to  things  which  I  do  not  under- 
stand, and  as  the  will  is  of  itself  indifferent  to  these  it  easily 
falls  into  error  and  sin  and  chooses  the  evil  for  the  good,  or  the 
false  for  the  true."15  This  element  of  voluntarism  which  thus 
occurs  in  the  heart  of  Descartes'  rationalistic  philosophy  is  also 
found  in  Malebranche.  "The  understanding  merely  perceives 
and  it  is  will  alone  that  judges  and  reasons,  in  voluntarily  rest- 
ing in  that  which  the  understanding  presents  to  it. '  '16  It  is  by 
painstaking  critical  analysis  that  any  proposition  comes  to  be 
evident  to  us.  When  we  have  made  it  evident  to  ourselves,  we 
forget  the  effort  or  volitional  activity  that  was  necessary  to 
make  it  evident.  But  when  there  is  something  obscure  in  the 
material  under  consideration,  or  when  we  have  not  made  the 
principles  involved  clear  and  logically  transparent  to  ourselves, 
then  we  are  free  to  withhold  our  assent.  It  is  this  freedom  to 
doubt  all  that  does  not  fully  satisfy  the  intellect,  all  that  is 
not  logically  manifest,  that  is  the  basis  of  the  possibility  of  true 
knowledge.  It  is  because  we  can  doubt  of  that  which  is  obscure 
and  ambiguous  that  we  can  elevate  ourselves  into  the  realm  of 
pure  deductive  truth.  Thus  this  voluntaristic  theory  of  judg- 
ment means,  for  both  Descartes  and  Malebranche,  in  the  first 
place,  the  ability  that  the  mind  possesses  of  obtaining  absolute, 
logically  coercive,  truth.  It  is  the  opposite  of  any  voluntaristic 
theory  of  judgment  that  would  reduce  all  truth  to  the  arbitrary 
choice  of  the  individual.  We  may  note  that  Spinoza,  with  per- 
haps greater  clarity  of  vision,  denies  Descartes'  notion  that 
judgment  is  an  act  of  will,  and  declares  in  the  Ethics  that  "there  > 
is  in  the  mind  no  volition  or  affirmation  and  negation  save  that 
which  the  idea,  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  idea,  involves."17  That  is, 

16  Meditation  IV,  Philosophical  Works  of  Descartes,  Trans,  by  Haldane  and  Ross, 
Vol.  I,  p.   174. 

16  Recherche,  I,  p.  12.     Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  88f. 

17  Ethics,  Part  II,  Prop.  XLIX. 


16  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

the  truth  affirms  itself  in  the  mind  without  any  arbitrary  act  of 
will.  The  note  to  this  Proposition  is  a  thorough  criticism  of  the 
Cartesian  and  Malebranchian  view.  This  liberty  of  the  mind, 
i.  e.,  this  ability  to  doubt  all  that  is  not  logically  coercive,  is 
what  renders  potent  the  two  maxims  which  are  of  central  sig- 
nificance in  Malebranche 's  system:  (1)  One  should  never  give 
complete  assent  save  to  propositions  which  appear  so  evidently 
true  that  one  cannot  deny  them  without  feeling  an  inner  pain 
and  the  secret  reproaches  of  reason;18  and  (2)  One  should  never 
absolutely  love  a  good  if  one  can  refrain  from  loving  it  without 
remorse.18  It  is  on  these  rigorous  maxims  that  Malebranche 's 
system  is  founded.  He  sought  a  system  of  truth  which  would 
stand  upon  unyielding  logical  ground,  and  an  object  for  his 
love  that  would  maintain  itself  against  all  foreign  attractions. 
How  closely  he  was  here  allying  himself  with  Descartes  is  evi- 
dent when  we  compare  these  maxims  with  those  of  Descartes' 
methodology.  In  the  Discourse  on  Method  Descartes  lays  down 
four  rules  of  method  of  which  the  first  is :  "To  accept  nothing 
as  true  which  I  do  not  clearly  recognize  to  be  so ;  that  is  to  say, 
carefully  to  avoid  precipitation  and  prejudice  in  judgments 
and  to  accept  in  them  nothing  more  than  what  was  presented 
to  my  mind  so  clearly  and  distinctly  that  I  could  have  no  occa- 
sion to  doubt  it."19  In  this  principle  we  have  the  basic  idea 
from  which  all  exact  science  springs,  the  criterion  of  logical  co- 
erciveness.  We  shall  see  how  Malebranche 's  maxims  unfold 
themselves  in  his  philosophy  as  a  whole. 

The  Senses. 

But  let  us  continue  our  account  of  Malebranche 's  psychol- 
ogy as  expounded  in  the  Recherche.  After  the  general  and  pre- 
liminary discussions  which  we  have  just  reviewed,  he  enters  up- 
on a  more  detailed  consideration  of  the  errors  which  spring  from 
the  senses;  here  his  psychology  comes  clearly  to  light.  In  the 
first  place,  we  may  note  that  Malebranche  holds  throughout  to 
the  theory  that  none  of  the  sensible  qualities  are  properties  of 
external  things  themselves,  but  that  they  are  all  modifications 
of  the  mind  itself.20  The  Tenth  Chapter  of  the  Recherche,  Book 
I,  establishes  this  point.  It  is  true,  he  says,  that  the  judgments 
that  we  make  concerning  extension,  figure,  and  movement  of 
bodies,  involve  some  truth,  but  the  same  is  not  true  in  regard  to 
light,  color,  taste,  and  all  other  sensible  qualities;  for  here  the 
truth  is  never  met  with.21 

This  theory  Malebranche  supports  by  reference  to  the  meta- 
physical difference  between  mind  and  matter.  He  supposes  that 

18  Recherche,  I,  p.  17. 

19  Philosophical  Works.     Trans,  of  Haldane  and  Ross,  Vol.  I,  p.  92. 

20  On  this  point  cf.  Bouillier,  pp.  36-37,  88f. 

21  Recherche,  I,  p.  83. 


MALEBRANCHE 'S  PSYCHOLOGY  17 

we  are  able  to  distinguish  the  soul  from  the  body  by  positive 
attributes  and  by  the  properties  that  belong  to  these  two  sub- 
stances. Body  is  only  extension  in  length,  breadth,  and  depth 
and  all  its  properties  are  exhausted  in  rest  and  motion,  and  in 
an  infinity  of  different  figures;  for  it  is  clear  (1)  that  the  idea 
of  extension  represents  a  substance,  since  one  can  think  of  ex- 
tension without  thinking  of  anything  else;  and  (2)  that  this  idea 
can  only  represent  relations  of  distance,  either  successive  or  per- 
manent, that  is,  either  motions  or  figures.  The  soul,  on  the  con- 
trary, is  the  *  *  I "  that  thinks,  that  feels,  that  wills ;  it  is  the  sub- 
stance in  which  are  found  all  the  modifications  of  which  I  have 
an  inner  feeling  (sentiment  interieur)  and  which  can  only  exist 
in  the  soul  that  feels  them.22  Having  laid  down  this  fundamen- 
tal metaphysical  distinction,  Malebranche  proceeds  as  follows: 
The  sense-organs  are  composed  of  minute  fibers  which  originate 
in  the  brain,  and  extend  hence  into  all  our  members  and  finally 
end  in  the  exterior  parts  of  the  body.  If  these  nerve  fibers  are 
externally  stimulated,  we  have  normal  perception;  if  they  are 
internally  stimulated,  from  the  brain  itself,  we  have  the  phe- 
nomena of  dreams.23  The  final  paragraph  of  this  crucial  chap- 
ter clarifies  the  whole  doctrine  by  distinguishing  four  phases  in 
the  process  of  perception.  In  the  first  place,  we  have  the  action 
of  the  object,  in  the  case  of  heat,  for  example,  the  movement  of 
the  small  particles  of  wood  against  the  hand.  Secondly,  we 
have  the  passion,  or  being  acted  upon  of  the  organ  of  sense,  for 
example,  the  agitation  of  the  fibers  of  the  hand,  which  agitation 
is  communicated  to  the  brain.  Thirdly,  we  have  the  passion,  or 
sensation,  of  the  soul ;  and,  lastly,  the  judgment  of  the  soul,  by 
which  we  place  the  sensation  in  its  objective  context.24 

This  last  phase  of  the  process  is  precisely  where  the  illusion 
of  sense  arises.  For  this  judgment  is  merely  a  jugement  naturel, 
a  sensation  composee.25  In  other  words,  it  is  a  natural  belief 
that  holds  that  sensible  qualities  belong  to  external  objects.  Nev- 
ertheless, this  natural  or  instinctive  belief  is  not  theoretically 
trustworthy.  The  senses  and  our  natural  belief  in  the  inde- 
pendent reality  of  their  content  are  helpful  from  the  standpoint 
of  the  welfare  of  our  bodies.  They  are  pragmatically  valuable. 
The  explanation  of  our  habit  of  projecting  our  sensations  into 
an  external  world  can  ultimately  only  be  on  teleological  grounds. 
This  explanation  is  given  in  Chapter  XX,  Book  I,  of  the  Re- 
cherche, but  in  more  detail  in  the  Entretiens  sur  la  metaphy- 
sique.  Thus,  explains  Theodore,  in  the  latter,  it  is  evident  that 
God,  desiring  to  unite  minds  and  bodies,  had  to  establish  as  an 
occasional  cause  of  the  confused  knowledge  we  have  of  the  pres- 

22  Recherche,  I,  p.  84. 

23  Recherche,  I,  p.  85. 

24  Recherche,  I,  p.  90. 

25  Recherche,  I,  p.  90. 


18  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBKANCHE 

ence  of  objects  and  of  their  properties  in  relation  to  us,  not  our 
attention,  which  merits  clear  and  distinct  knowledge,  but  vari- 
ous disturbances  of  these  same  bodies.  He  had  to  give  us  dis- 
tinct witnesses,  not  of  the  nature  and  properties  of  the  bodies 
that  surround  us,  but  of  the  relation  which  they  bear  to  our  own 
body,  that  we  can  work  with  success  for  the  conservation  of  life, 
without  being  incessantly  attentive  to  our  needs.  He  had  to 
give  us  short  proofs  of  that  which  has  reference  to  the  body,  to 
convince  us  promptly  with  vivid  proofs  that  would  effectively 
determine  us,  with  sure  proofs  that  no  one  would  think  of  con- 
tradicting, in  order  the  more  surely  to  preserve  us.  But  these 
proofs  are  essentially  confused  in  character  and  are  certain  not 
with  regard  to  the  relations  between  objects,  in  which  consists 
truth,  but  with  regard  to  our  bodies  in  their  actual  disposition.26 
It  is  the  divine  foresight  that  explains  the  persistent  and  uni- 
versal illusion  in  which  the  mass  of  mankind  grope,  for  it  is  by 
means  of  this  illusion  that  we  find  our  way  through  the  world 
of  bodies. 

But  let  us  return  to  our  study  of  the  psychology  of  the  Re- 
cherche. It  is  this  objectification  of  sensible  qualities  that  is  the 
greatest  error  arising  from  sense.27  But  Malebranche  does  not 
rest  here.  Our  sense  of  sight  perpetually  deceives  us  as  to  the 
size  of  objects,  and  is  blind  to  everything  smaller  than  a  certain 
size.  It  is  essentially  inexact.28  It  is  from  the  senses  that  there 
arises  the  false  philosophy  of  scholasticism.29 

Let  us  assume  that  sensible  qualities  exist  in  bodies  them- 
selves. Then  it  is  indubitable  that  what  I  sense  in  honey  differs 
essentially  from  what  I  sense  in  salt.  The  whiteness  of  salt  dif- 
fers beyond  doubt  more  than  merely  in  degree  from  the  color  of 
honey,  and  the  sweetness  of  honey  differs  in  the  same  way  from 
th  piquant  taste  of  salt.  Consequently,  according  to  this  argu- 
ment, it  is  necessary  that  there  be  an  essential  difference  be- 
tween honey  and  salt;  since  everything  that  I  sense  in  the  one 
does  not  differ  merely  as  a  matter  of  more  or  less  from  what  I 
sense  in  the  other,  but  differs  in  essence.  Since  then  honey  and 
salt  and  other  natural  bodies  differ  essentially  from  each  other, 
it  follows  that  they  deceive  themselves  who  try  to  make  us  be- 
lieve that  the  whole  difference  that  is  found  between  bodies  con- 
sists in  differences  of  configuration  of  the  small  bodies  that  com- 
pose them.  It  is  necessary  then  that  some  other  substance  be 
found  that,  being  joined  to  the  primary  matter  which  is  common 
to  all  bodies,  bring  it  about  that  they  differ  essentially  from 
each  other.  This  will  be  the  second  step  and  the  discovery  of 
substantial  forms,  those  fecund  substances  which  produce  every- 

28  Entretien*,  p.   85.     Jules  Simon  edition. 

27  Cf.  Joly,  p.  215ff. 

28  Recherche,  I,  pp.  42-69. 

29  Recherche,  I,  pp.  125-134. 


MALEBKANCHE  'S  PSYCHOLOGY  19 

thing  that  we  see  in  nature  and  that  only  exist  in  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  philosopher.30  Thus  arises  the  whole  medieval  world 
of  substances,  essences,  and  substantial  forms.  It  rests  upon  the 
illusion  of  the  objective  and  independent  existence  of  sensible 
qualities.  In  this  Malebranche  has  laid  his  finger  upon  the  rad- 
ical difference  between  the  medieval  system  of  the  universe  and 
that  explained  in  modern  science.  On  the  one  hand  reliance  is 
placed  on  the  immediate  appearance  of  things  to  the  senses ;  on 
the  other,  upon  pure  mathematics  together  with  critically  ana- 
lyzed experience.31 

The  senses  are  the  source,  not  only  of  theoretical  illusions, 
but  of  moral  illusions  as  well.  The  excessive  attention  that  the 
mass  of  mankind  give  to  sensuous  good  comes  from  the  same 
source.  We  believe  that  "all  those  agreeable  tastes  which  de- 
light us  at  feasts,  those  sounds  which  flatter  the  ear,  and  those 
other  pleasures  that  we  feel  are,  undoubtedly,  contained  in  the 
sensible  objects,  or  at  least  these  objects  cause  us  to  feel  them."32 
The  truth  is,  in  terms  of  Malebranche 's  system,  that  sensuous 
objects  neither  contain  the  pleasures  nor  produce  them;  they 
are  contained  in  the  soul  as  its  modifications  and  are  produced 
by  the  one  truly  efficient  cause  in  the  universe,  the  divine  will.33 
The  error  of  the  Epicureans  consists  in  just  this :  That  they  re- 
gard sensible  things  as  the  causes  of  our  pleasures  and  as  there- 
fore worthy  of  love.34  The  error  of  Stoicism  rests  on  the  same 
assumption.  They  place  pleasures  and  pains  in  the  outer  ob- 
jects and  insist  that  the  soul  should  seek  its  own  good.  They 
thus  reach  the  false  conclusion  that  pain  is  not  an  evil,  nor  pleas- 
ure a  good.  The  true  ethical  point  of  view  comes  to  light  only 
when  we  regard  pleasures  and  pains  as  states  of  the  soul  itself, 
and  as  flowing  from  the  one  supreme  good,  the  divine  being. 

These  remarks  may  suffice  to  give  us  a  notion  of  Male- 
branche's  psychology  of  the  senses  and  of  his  theory  of  the  illu- 
sion-generating character  of  the  same.35  Like  Plato  he  believed 
that  the  first  requisite  for  profound  philosophical  and  scientific 
views  was  distrust  of  the  senses  and  of  all  the  information  they 
offer,  and  confidence  in  the  ability  of  pure  thought  to  master 
the  world. 

The  Imagination. 

Let  us  now  examine  his  critique  of  imagination. 

This  fills  the  second  book  of  the  Recherche.™  Malebranche 
begins  by  distinguishing  the  faculties  of  imagination  and  sense 
from  the  point  of  view  of  physiological  psychology.  The  agita- 
tion of  the  minute  fibers  of  the  nerves  cannot  pass  to  the  brain 

80  Recherche,  I,  p.  127. 

81  Cf.  Cassirer,  Erkenntnisproblem,  I,  p.  203ff.  and  many  other  places. 

82  Recherche,  I,  p.  130. 
88  Recherche,  I,  p.  132. 
34  Recherche,  I,  p.  133. 
85  Bouillier,  pp.  36-37. 

88  On  Malebranche's  doctrine  of  imagination  cf.  Bouillier,  p.  90. 


20  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

without  the  soul  perceiving  something;  if  the  agitation  com- 
mences by  an  impression  that  an  object  makes  on  the  exterior 
surface  of  our  nerve  fibers,  the  soul  feels  and  judges  that  what 
she  feels  is  outside,  that  is,  that  she  perceives  an  object  as 
present.  But  if  only  the  inner  fibers  are  agitated  by  the  move- 
ments of  the  animal  spirits,  or  in  some  other  manner,  the  soul 
imagines,  and  judges  that  what  she  imagines  is  not  without  but 
within  the  brain,  that  is,  she  perceives  an  object  as  absent.37 
Imagination  is  akin  to  sense-perception.  The  difference  is  a  dif- 
ference in  vivacity.37  Two  phases  of  imagination  may  be  dis- 
tinguished, the  active  and  the  passive.  The  first  is  under  con- 
trol of  the  will ;  the  second  is  more  under  control  of  the  animal 
spirits  and  the  fibers  of  the  brain.38  "Imagination,  then,"  says 
Malebranche,  "consists  solely  in  the  power  that  the  soul  pos- 
sesses of  forming  images  of  objects,  by  imprinting  them  in  the 
brain ;  the  stronger  and  more  distinct  the  vestiges  of  the  animal 
spirits  are  the  more  distinctly  and  strongly  will  the  soul  imag- 
ine its  objects."39  It  is  the  difference  in  the  force  of  the  animal 
spirits  and  the  definiteness  of  their  imprint  on  the  brain  that 
explains  the  observable  difference  in  the  imaginations  of  differ- 
ent men.39  Malebranche  proceeds  to  point  out  the  various  faf- 
tors  that  can  influence  the  imagination.  Wine  is  one  of  the  first 
agencies  mentioned.  Malebranche  quotes  Horace : 

Quid  non  ebrietas  designat?   operta  recludit: 
Spes  jiibet  esse  ratas:  in  praelia  trudit  inermem: 
Sollicitis  animis  onus  eximit:  addocet  artis. 
Fecundi  calices  quern  non  fecere  disertum, 
Contracta  quern  non  in  paupertate  solutum?40 

The  air  that  one  breathes  has  an  influence  on  the  imagina- 
tion. This  is  manifest  in  the  different  mental  characteristics  of 
persons  of  different  countries.  The  Gascons,  for  example,  have 
a  much  more  vivid  imagination  than  the  Normans.  People  of 
Rouen  and  of  Dieppe  and  the  Picardians  all  differ  from  each 
other,  and  still  more  from  the  Low  Normans,  although  they  are 
sufficiently  close  to  each  other.  But  if  we  consider  men  who 
live  in  more  widely  separated  countries,  we  meet  still  greater 
differences,  such  as  those  between  an  Italian,  a  Fleming  and  a 
Dutchman.  And  lastly  there  are  places  renowned  in  all  times 
for  the  wisdom  of  their  inhabitants,  like  Therma  and  Athens; 
and  other  places  are  renowned  for  stupidity,  like  Thebes  and 
Abdera.41  The  imagination  is  affected  by  the  nerves  that  go 
to  the  heart  and  lungs,  viscera,  etc.  Each  image  is  correlated 


37  Recherche, 
88  Recherche, 

39  Recherche, 

40  Recherche, 

41  Recherche, 


p.  151.  Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  40f. 
p.  152. 
p.  153. 
p.  158. 
p.  162. 


MALEBRANCHE 'S  PSYCHOLOGY  21 

with  a  ''trace  dn  cerveau,"  with  a  cerebral  trace,  and  memory 
is  to  be  explained  by  the  mutual  connection  between  these  cere- 
bral traces.  To  understand  memory,  according  to  Malebranche, 
it  is  sufficient  to  understand  this  truth:  "That  all  our  differ- 
ent perceptions  are  attached  to  changes  that  take  place  in  the 
principal  part  of  the  brain  in  which  the  soul  more  especially 
resides.  .  .  .  For,  in  the  same  way  that  the  branches  of  a  tree, 
which  have  remained  bent  in  a  certain  fashion  for  some  time, 
retain  some  facility  for  being  bent  again  in  the  same  manner, 
so  the  fibers  of  the  brain,  having  once  received  impressions  from 
the  movements  of  the  animal  spirits  and  the  action  of  objects, 
retain  for  a  long  time  a  facility  for  receiving  these  same  dispo- 
sitions. Now  memory  consists  only  in  this  facility,  since  one 
only  thinks  of  the  same  things  when  the  brain  receives  the  same 
impressions. ' '  In  very  similar  terms,  Malebranche  explains 
habit.42 

It  does  not  fall  within  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  follow 
Malebranche 's  psychology  of  imagination  into  its  details.  We 
may  note,  however,  discussions  of  the  "communication  between 
the  brain  of  a  mother  and  that  of  her  (unborn)  child,"43  of 
' '  changes  that  take  place  in  the  imagination  of  a  child  in  issuing 
from  the  womb  of  his  mother,  by  conversation  with  its  nurse,  its 
mother,  and  other  persons."44 

Several  chapters  are  devoted  to  the  various  types  of  imag- 
ination. These  chapters  reveal  the  keen  analyst  of  human  na- 
ture. Of  women  he  says:  "It  is  for  them  to  decide  as  to  the 
fashions,  to  judge  as  to  language,  to  discern  the  correct  air  and 
fine  manners.  They  have  more  knowledge,  skill,  and  finesse 
than  men  concerning  such  things.  Whatever  depends  on  taste 
is  in  their  field,  but  ordinarily  they  are  incapable  of  penetrating 
to  truths  a  little  difficult  of  discovery.  Whatever  is  abstract  is 
incomprehensible  to  them.  They  cannot  avail  themselves  of 
their  imagination  to  develop  complicated  and  embarrassed  ques- 
tions. ...  In  short,  the  manner  and  not  the  reality  is  enough 
to  exhaust  the  capacity  of  their  minds,  because  the  least  objects 
produce  great  movements  in  the  delicate  fibers  of  their  brains, 
and  consequently  necessarily  excite  in  their  souls  feelings  suffi- 
ciently vivacious  and  great  enough  to  occupy  them  complete- 
ly."45 Of  course,  Malebranche  is  obliged  to  admit  that  there 
may  be  exceptions  to  this  generalization.  There  are  femmes  sa- 
vanies,  courageous  women,  women  capable  of  everything,  and 
there  can  be  found,  on  the  other  hand,  men  who  are  soft  and 
effeminate,  incapable  of  understanding  anything  and  incapable 

42  Recherche,  I,  p.   182ff.     Cf.  Joly,  p.  225ff. 
48  Recherche,  I,  p.  189. 

44  Recherche,  I,  p.  212. 

45  Recherche,  I,  p.  222. 


22  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

of  doing  anything.46  A  man's  mind  is  at  its  prime  between  the 
ages  of  thirty  and  fifty.  Then  his  cerebral  fibers  are  of  the  right 
consistency;  sufficiently  firm  to  assure  intellectual  self-mastery, 
and  not  so  firm  as  to  prevent  all  new  forms  of  cerebral  modifi- 
cation.47 But  men  are  not  only  confirmed  in  their  views  when 
they  have  reached  the  age  of  forty  or  fifty  years.  They  are 
subject  to  new  errors;  they  believe  themselves  capable  of  judg- 
ing of  everything,  as  indeed  they  ought  to  be.  They  decide  with 
presumption  and  consult  only  their  prejudices,  for  men  do  not 
reason  of  things  save  by  relation  to  the  ideas  that  are  the  most 
familiar  to  them.  A  peripatetic  thinks  first  of  the  four  elements 
and  the  four  qualities,  while  a  philosopher  of  another  school  re- 
lates everything  to  other  principles.48  As  is  explained  at  length49 
the  animal  spirits  ordinarily  flow  in  the  traces  of  the  most  fa- 
miliar ideas,  which  brings  it  about  that  we  do  not  judge  sanely 
of  things. 

Studious  persons  are  especially  subject  to  error.50  They  are 
lovers  of  authority.  It  is  difficult  to  understand,  says  Male- 
branche,  how  it  happens  that  people  who  have  minds  prefer  to 
use  the  minds  of  others  in  the  search  for  truth  rather  than  the 
mind  that  God  gave  them.  There  is  beyond  doubt  infinitely  more 
pleasure  and  honor  in  guiding  oneself  by  one's  own  eyes  than 
by  those  of  others;  and  a  man  who  has  good  eyes  would  never 
think  of  closing  them  or  of  tearing  them  out  in  the  hope  of  hav- 
ing a  guide.  Sapientis  oculi,  in  capite  ejus,  stultus  in  tenebris 
ambulat.  Why  does  the  fool  walk  in  darkness?  It  is  because 
he  only  sees  by  the  eyes  of  others  and  to  see  only  in  this  manner 
is  properly  speaking  not  to  see  at  all.  The  use  of  the  mind  is 
to  the  use  of  the  eyes  what  the  mind  is  to  the  eyes ;  as  the  mind 
is  infinitely  higher  than  the  eyes,  so  the  use  of  the  mind  is  ac- 
companied by  much  more  solid  satisfactions  and  by  a  very  dif- 
ferent contentment  than  light  and  colors  afford  sight.  Men, 
however,  always  avail  themselves  of  their  eyes  to  guide  them- 
selves, and  very  rarely  avail  themselves  of  their  minds  to  dis- 
cover truth.51 

Malebranche  suggests  a  number  of  causes  of  this  natural 
weakness  of  the  mind.  In  the  first  place  we  have  man's  nat- 
ural laziness.  Secondly,  the  inability  of  men  in  meditation 
owing  to  lack  of  practice  in  youth,  when  the  cerebral  fibers  are 
plastic.  Thirdly,  man's  lack  of  love  for  abstract  truth,  which 
is  the  foundation  of  all  that  we  can  know  ici-bas.  Fourthly, 
our  love  of  pleasant  and  sensible  probabilities,  mere  casual  plaus- 

46  Recherche,  I,  p.  223. 

47  Recherche,  I,  p.  225. 

48  Recherche,  I,  p.  226. 

49  Recherche,  I,  p.  230-234. 

60  Recherche,  I,  p.  235. 

61  Recherche,  I,  p.  237. 


MALEBEANCHE  'S  PHYCHOLOGY  23 

ibilities.  Fifthly,  our  stupid  vanity  which  makes  us  desire  to 
appear  learned,  for  they  are  called  learned  who  have  read  the 
most.  Sixthly,  we  imagine,  without  reason,  that  the  ancients 
were  more  enlightened  than  we  can  be,  and  that  where  they 
have  failed  no  one  can  succeed.  Seventhly,  because  of  a  false 
reverence  mixed  with  a  stupid  curiosity  as  to  distant  things,  old 
things,  things  that  come  from  afar  or  from  unknown  countries, 
or  from  obscure  books.  Eighthly,  because  when  we  admire  a 
new  opinion  and  a  new  author  we  are  afraid  that  their  fame 
will  outshine  our  own,  while  one  has  nothing  to  fear  when  one 
pays  homage  to  the  ancients.  In  the  ninth  place,  it  is  falsely 
believed  that  because  it  is  wrong  to  make  innovations  in  reli- 
gious faith,  it  is  wrong  to  make  changes  in  science.  A  tenth 
cause  of  undue  conservatism  in  science  and  philosophy  is  the 
fact  that  we  live  in  a  time  in  which  the  knowledge  of  ancient 
opinions  is  in  vogue  and  few  can  rise  above  what  is  customary. 
And  lastly,  because  men  act  only  according  to  their  interests, 
and  even  those  who  perceive  the  error  and  vanity  of  their  ways 
do  not  cease  to  apply  themselves  to  these  same  studies  because 
of  the  honors  and  dignities  that  are  attached  to  them.  This 
''terrific"  attack  on  the  spirit  of  scholasticism  and  of  erudition 
was  characteristic  of  Malebranche.  He  loved  the  pure  truths 
of  reason,  the  eternal  ideas  in  the  mind  of  God,  so  well  that  he 
had  little  use  for  the  truths  of  history  and  scholarship.  He  de- 
velops the  same  theme  in  chapters  on  "Two  bad  effects  of  read- 
ing."52 "That  people  ordinarily  grow  stubborn,  concerning 
whom  their  aim  is  to  know  what  he  said  without  caring  as  to 
what  they  should  believe."53  Another  chapter  is  "On  the  pre- 
occupation of  commentators."54  It  is  refreshing  to  a  historical 
student  to  find  at  last  an  equally  penetrating  paragraph  on  ' '  The 
invention  on  new  systems,"  in  which  it  comes  to  light  that  nov- 
elty is  not  always  preferable.55 

Malebranche 's  analysis  of  the  psychology  of  imagination  is 
so  penetrating  that  it  is  difficult  not  to  examine  it  more  com- 
pletely than  considerations  of  time  and  space  permit  us  in  the 
present  study.56  A  special  division  of  the  book  of  the  Recherche 
on  Imagination  is  devoted  to  the  contagious  communication  of 
strong  imaginations.  Strong  imaginations  are  extremely  influ- 
ential and  dominate  weaker  imaginations.  Thus  those  who  have 
strong  and  vigorous  imaginations  are  very  frequently  the  cause 
of  the  general  errors  that  are  spread  among  mankind.57  God 
has  united  the  human  race  by  certain  natural  bonds,  which  con- 

62  Recherche,  I,  p.  241. 
68  Recherche,  I,  p.  245 
M  Recherche,  I,  p.  252. 
M  Recherche,  I,  p.  262. 
M  Of.  Bouillier,  p.  94. 
87  Recherche,  I,  p.  278. 


24  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBKANCHE 

sist  in  a  certain  disposition  of  men  to  imitate  those  with  whom 
they  converse,  to  make  the  same  judgments-  and  enter  into  the 
same  passions  with  them.58  This  disposition  to  imitate  has  it- 
self two  causes.  The  first  is  the  desire  for  a  high  place  in  the 
opinions  of  others;  the  second  cause  of  the  disposition  to  imi- 
tate is  this  influence  exerted  by  stronger  imaginations  over 
weaker  imaginations.59 

Malebranche  distinguishes  a  strong  as  opposed  to  a  weak 
imagination  in  terms  of  cerebral  structure.  He  has  a  strong 
and  vigorous  imagination  whose  brain  has  a  constitution  which 
renders  it  capable  of  extremely  deep  vestiges  and  traces.60  An 
imagination  of  this  sort  is  capable  of  so  completely  occupying 
the  soul  that  it  can  think  of  nothing  save  the  images  presented 
by  this  imagination.61  People  endowed  with  strong  imagina- 
tions in  this  sense  are  not  capable  of  judging  sanely  of  compli- 
cated things.  The  capacity  of  their  minds  is  exhausted  by  ideas 
which  are  connected  with  deep  cerebral  traces,  and  they  are 
not  at  liberty  to  think  of  many  things  at  the  same  time.62  These 
people  are  always  visionaries.  They  are  always  in  excess;  they 
elevate  unworthy  things,  magnify  small  things,  make  distant 
things  seem  near.63  Nothing  appears  to  them  as  it  is.  They  are 
vehement  in  their  passions,  obstinate  in  their  opinions,  always 
satisfied  with  themselves.63  They  have  great  facility  in  talking 
in  a  manner  that  is  strong  and  vivid  although  not  natural.  Their 
thoughts,  being  connected  with  deep  cerebral  traces,  are  accom- 
panied by  vivid  emotion.64  The  look  of  their  countenances,  the 
tone  of  their  voices,  and  the  turn  of  their  words  animate  their 
expressions  and  cause  those  who  hear  them  to  be  attentive  and 
to  receive  mechanically  their  ideas.  When  a  man  is  penetrated 
with  what  he  has  to  say,  he  penetrates  others,  and  an  impas« 
sioned  man  always  moves  those  who  hear  him.  Persons  of  this 
sort  of  imagination  ordinarily  speak  only  of  easy  subjects  that 
are  within  the  reach  of  every  one;  they  only  treat  of  great  and 
difficult  matters  in  a  vague  and  commonplace  way,  without  ven- 
turing to  enter  into  detail  and  without  attaching  themselves  to 
principles.  Such  people  are  ordinarily  the  enemies  of  reason 
and  of  good  sense  by  reason  of  the  pettiness  of  their  minds  and 
of  the  visions  to  which  they  are  subject.65 

The  influence  of  imagination  over  imagination  is  seen  in 
the  case  of  children  and  parents,  daughters  and  mothers,  serv- 


58  Recherche, 

,  p.  279. 

68  Recherche, 

,  p.  280. 

60  Recherche, 

,p.  281. 

81  Recherche, 

,p.  281. 

62  Recherche, 

,p.  283. 

68  Recherche, 

,p.  285. 

64  Recherche, 

,p.  286. 

05  Recherche, 

,p.  288. 

MALEBRANCHE  'S  PSYCHOLOGY  25 

ants  and  masters,  pupils  and  teachers,  courtiers  and  kings.66 
But  it  comes  clearly  to  light  in  the  influence  of  great  authors. 
And  here  Malebranche  displays  again  keen  and  vivid  insight. 
His  characterizations  of  the  relatively  small  number  of  authors 
with  whom  he  was  familiar  are  admirable.  Tertullian,  he  says, 
was  in  truth  a  man  of  profound  erudition,  but  he  had  more 
memory  than  judgment,  more  penetration  and  extent  of  imag- 
ination than  penetration  and  extent  of  intellect.67  The  imagina- 
tion of  Seneca  was  no  better  ordered  than  that  of  Tertullian  to 
carry  him  into  a  country  that  is  unknown  to  him,  where  never- 
theless he  moves  with  the  same  assurance  that  he  would  have  if 
he  knew  where  he  was  and  where  he  was  going.  Provided  he 
makes  great  strides,  and  strides  in  regular  cadence,  he  imagines 
that  he  is  greatly  advancing;  but  he  is  like  those  who,  in  danc- 
ing, always  finish  where  they  began.68  Montaigne  is  not  to  be 
regarded  as  a  man  who  reasons  but  as  a  man  who  amuses  him- 
self, as  a  man  who  tries  to  please  rather  than  to  instruct.  If 
those  who  read  him  could  merely  amuse  themselves  with  him, 
he  would  not  be  injurious;  but  the  mind  cannot  draw  pleasure 
from  the  reading  of  an  author  without  imitating  his  feelings. 
It  is  not  only  dangerous  to  read  Montaigne  because  of  the  pleas- 
ure one  is  insensibly  led  to  take  in  his  sentiments;  but  because 
this  pleasure  is  criminal,  for  it  is  born  of  concupiscence  and  does 
nothing  but  fortify  the  passions.69  The  easy  skepticism  of  Mon- 
taigne, with  its  worldly  point  of  view,  was  thus  deeply  repug- 
nant to  the  Oratorian. 

This  remarkable  portrayal  of  the  secret  workings  of  the 
imagination  terminates  in  the  injunction  to  seek  to  deliver  our- 
selves from  the  illusions  of  sense  and  imagination,  and  from  the 
illusions  generated  by  the  imaginations  of  other  men  in  our 
minds.  Let  us  reject  with  care  all  the  confused  ideas  that  we 
have  by  reason  of  our  dependence  on  our  bodies  and  only  admit 
the  clear  and  evident  ideas  that  the  spirit  receives  from  the 
union  that  it  necessarily  has  with  the  Word  (Logos),  or  eternal 
wisdom  and  truth.70  Malebranche 's  psychological  insight  has 
that  clarity  and  profundity  that  are  the  natural  right  of  the 
meditative  man,  who  lives,  perhaps,  more  or  less  as  a  recluse, 
and  yet  perceives  in  his  own  self  the  universal  motives  of  hu- 
man life.71 

Our  Lack  of  an  Idea  of  the  Soul. 

The  Third  Book  of  the  Recherche  is  on  the  * '  Understanding 
or  Pure  Spirit."  The  major  part  of  this  discussion  we  shall 

66  Recherche,  I,  p.  289. 

67  Recherche,  I,  p.  301. 
88  Recherche,  I,  p.  304. 

69  Recherche,  I,  p. 319. 

70  Recherche,  p.  388. 

71  Of.  Joly.  p.  222. 


26  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

consider  later  under  the  head  of  Theory  of  Knowledge.  There 
is  but  one  point  that  here  deserves  attention.  <QAnd  to  under- 
stand this  point  we  must  turn  again  to  Descartes.  In  the  doc- 
trine of  the  cogito  ergo  sum  the  consciousness  of  thought  of  its 
own  activity  is  made  the  starting-point  of  philosophy.  Our 
clearest  idea  is  an  idea  of  our  self.  In  the  Principles  of  Phil- 
osophy, for  example,  Descartes  explains  "How  we  may  know 
our  mind  better  than  our  body. "  "  But, ' '  he  says,  *  *  in  order  to 
understand  how  the  knowledge  which  we  possess  of  our  mind 
not  only  precedes  that  which  we  have  our  body  but  is  also  more 
evident,  it  must  be  observed  that  it  is  very  manifest  by  the  nat- 
ural light  which  is  in  our  souls,  that  no  qualities  or  properties 
pertain  to  nothing;  and  that  where  some  are  perceived  there 
must  necessarily  be  some  thing  or  substance  on  which  they  de- 
pend. And  the  same  light  shows  us  that  we  know  a  thing  or 
substance  so  much  the  better  the  more  properties  we  observe 
in  it.  And  we  certainly  observe  many  more  qualities  in  our 
mind  than  in  any  other  thing,  inasmuch  as  there  is  nothing 
that  excites  us  to  knowledge  of  whatever  kind  which  does  not 
even  more  certainly  compel  us  to  a  consciousness  of  our  thought. 
To  take  an  example,  if  I  persuaded  myself  that  there  is  an  earth 
because  I  touch  or  see  it,  by  that  very  same  fact  and  by  a  yet 
stronger  reason,  I  should  be  persuaded  that  my  thought  exists; 
because  it  may  be  that  I  think  I  touch  the  earth  even  though 
there  is  possibly  no  earth  existing  at  all,  but  it  is  not  possible 
that  I  who  form  this  judgment  and  my  mind  which  judges  thus, 
should  be  non-existent;  and  so  in  other  cases."72  The  soul  is 
thus  its  own  clearest  object. 

Ak>w  Malebranche  holds  that  although  we  have  a  superior 
consciousness  of  the  existence  of  the  soul  as  compared  to  our 
consciousness  of  the  existence  of  matter,  we  have  on  the  other 
hand  a  superior  consciousness  of  the  essence  of  matter  as  com- 
pared to  our  consciousness  of  the  essence  of  the  soul.  We  are 
more  certain  that  the  soul  is  than  that  the  body  is;  but  we  are 
more  certain  as  to  what  the  body  is  than  as  to  what  the  soul  is. 
Malebranche  does  not  believe,  as  he  tells  us,  that  after  having 
given  the  matter  serious  thought  it  is  possible  to  doubt  that  the 
essence  of  the  mind  consists  in  thought,  in  the  same  way  that 
the  essence  of  matter  consists  in  extension;  and  that  according 
to  different  modifications  of  thought  the  mind  now  wills  and 
now  imagines,  or  assumes  other  particular  forms,  in  the  same 
way  as,  according  to  different  modifications  of  extension,  matter 
is  now  water,  now  wood,  now  fire  or  has  some  other  of  an  infinity 
of  possible  particular  forms.73  Thus  we  are  capable  of  knowing 
that  the  essence  of  mind  is  thought,  but  only  in  a  general  way. 

72  Philosophical  Works,  Haldane  and  Ross,  Vol.  I,  p.  223. 
78  Recherche,  I,  p.  341. 


MALEBRANCHE  'S  PSYCHOLOGY  27 

do  not  possess  the  ''idea"  of  the  soul.74i>We  do  not  behold 
the  soul  in  God.74  We  only  know  the  soul  by  conscience,  by  sen- 
timent interieur,  that  is,  by  inner  experience.74^  For  that  reason 
the  knowledge  we  have  of  it  is  imperfect.  Had  we  never  felt 


pain,  heat,  light,  etc.,  we  should  not  know  that  our  soul  was 
capable  of  these  feelings.  Were  it  true,  on  the  contrary,  that 
we  beheld  in  God  the  idea  of  our  soul,  we  should  be  able  to  de- 
duce from  it  all  the  properties  of  which  it  is  capable,  just  as  we 
can  deduce  from  the  idea  of  extension  all  the  modifications  it  is 
capable  of  assuming.74  If  we  knew  nothing  of  matter  save  some 
twenty  or  thirty  figures  we  should  know  practically  nothing; 
we  may  say  that  we  are  capable  of  knowing,  the  nature  of  mat- 
ter because  we  can  evolve  an  infinity  of  mathematical  forms  out 
of  the  idea  of  extension.  But  we  have  no  deductive  knowledge 
of  the  possible  modifications  of  the  soul.  \Nevertheless,  adds 
Malebranche,  our  sentiment  interieur  demonstrates  the  Immor- 
tality, Spirituality  and  Liberty  of  the  soul./ 

This  same  point  is  made  in  the  Entretiens.  Theodore  urges 
that  some  truth  must  be  contained  in  our  mental  states  as  men- 
tal states.  "For  it  is  a  truth  that  I  now  have  much  joy  in  lis- 
tening to  you.  It  is  true  that  the  pleasure  that  I  feel  at  present 
is  greater  than  that  which  I  felt  in  our  preceding  conversations. 
I  know,  then,  the  difference  between  these  two  pleasures.  And  I 
do  not  know  it  otherwise  than  by  the  feeling  (sentiment)  that  I 
have  of  it,  by  the  modalities  with  which  my  soul  is  affected; 
modalities,  then,  which  are  not  so  dark  that  they  do  not  teach 
me  a  constant  truth."  Ariste  replies:  "You  should  say,  Theo- 
dore, that  you  feel  this  difference  in  your  modalities  and  in  your 
pleasures.  But  do  not  say,  if  you  please,  that  you  know  it.  God 
knows  it  and  does  not  feel  it.  But  as  for  you,  you  feel  it  with- 
out knowing  it.  If  you  had  a  clear  idea  of  your  soul,  if  you  saw 
the  archetype  of  it,  then  you  would  know  that  which  you  now 
only  feel. '  '76  And  Ariste  goes  on  to  point  out  the  unmeasurable 
character  of  mental  facts,  urging  that  if  we  were  really  to  know 
them  it  would  be  necessary  to  know  them  mathematically. 

74  Recherche,  I,  p.  413. 

75  Recherche,  I,  p.  415.      Cf.  Bouillier,  p.   57f.      Bouillier  holds  that  Malebranche 
and  Gassendi  agree  on  the  obscurity  of  our  knowledge  of  the  soul,  but  that  they  reach 
this  identical  result  by  different  methods.     Gassendi  was  over-occupied  with  the  sensi- 
ble,   Malebranche   with   the   divine.      Bouillier,    idem.      As    Bouillier  points   out,    Male- 
branche thought  that  God  did  not  permit  us  to  behold  the  idea  of  the  soul  lest  we  be 
so  occupied  with  its  beauty  that  we  forget  everything  else.      (Meditation,  X.)      Boul- 
lier,  p.    58.     Victor  Delbos  has  made  an  interesting  comparison  of  Malebranche  and 
Maine  de  Biran.     "On  concoit,"  says  Delbos,   "que  sur  cette  affirmation  du  caratere 
irrtductible    et   singulier    de   la   donnge   de    conscience,    tout   en   I'estimant   incomplete, 
Maine  de  Biran  ait  pu  sympathiser  avec  Malebranche."     See   Revue  de  me"taphysiqu« 
et  du  morale.     Vol.  XXIII,  Malebranche  et  Maine  de  Biran,  p.   157. 

76  Entretiens,  p.   113. 


28  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

We  may  note  that  this  doctrine  of  Malebranche  's  has  been 
compared  with  the  theory  of  Hume  that  we  have  no  logical  basis 
for  belief  in  a  permanent  self.  Dr.  C.  W.  Doxsee77  compares 
Malebranche 's  position  that  "we  do  not  see  the  soul  in  God" 
and  that  "we  only  know  of  our  soul  what  we  feel  taking  place 
within  us,"  to  Hume's  statement  that  "when  I  enter  most  inti- 
mately into  myself  I  always  stumble  upon  some  particular  per- 
ception or  other,  of  heat  or  cold,  of  light  or  shade,  love  or  hatred, 
pain  or  pleasure."  Dr.  Doxsee  declares:  "Now  this  argument 
from  introspection  is  common  to  both  Hume  and  Malebranche 
and  is  really  fundamentally  one  in  both.  They  are  at  one  in 
recognizing  that  'inner  sense'  is  totally  unable  to  reveal  the 
existence  of  a  simple  abiding  spiritual  substance  behind  the  phe- 
nomena of  consciousness. '  '78  It  is  hardly  to  be  denied  that  this 
comparison  is  somewhat  misleading.  For  the  standards  of  know- 
ability  employed  by  Malebranche  and  Hume  respectively  differ 
completely.  ^Malebranche  says  that  we  have  no  knowledge  of  the 
soul  because  We  cannot  give  a  mathematical  or  deductive  expli- 
cation Npf  the  idea,  because  we  cannot  deduce  its  modifications 
from  it^  Hume,  on  the  contrary,  rejects  the  idea  of  the  self  be- 
cause he  can  find  no  impression  from  which  it  could  be  derived. 
There  is  a  similarity  in  their  results,  but  a  radical  difference  in 
their  methods  of  reaching  those  results.  Furthermore,  Male- 
branche would  never  have  admitted  that  "inner  sense  is  totally 
unable  to  reveal  the  existence  of  a  simple  abiding  spiritual  sub- 
stance."79 The  very  sentence  quoted  by  Doxsee  from  Male- 
branche proves  the  contrary:  "We  only  know  of  our  soul  by 
what  we  feel  taking  place  within  us. ' ' 


77  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XXV,  p.  704. 

78  Doxsee,  idem. 
78  Doxsee.  idem. 


MALEBRANCHE  'S  PSYCHOLOGY  29 


CHAPTER  III:   MALEBRANCHE 's  PSYCHOLOGY  (Continued). 

The  Natural  Inclinations. 

Let  us  continue  our  account  of  Malebranche 's  psychology. 
The  Fourth  Book  of  the  Recherche  de  la  verite  concerns  the  * '  In- 
clinations or  Natural  Passions  of  the  Mind. ' n  Just  as  God  gave 
motion  to  matter,  so  he  gave  inclinations  to  minds.2  But  it  is  an 
incontestable  truth  that  God  has  no  end  for  his  actions  but  him- 
self.3 He  must  have  himself  as  his  principal  end,  for  he  would 
err  were  he  to  put  his  end  in  everything  that  did  not,  like  him- 
self, contain  all  good.3  Nevertheless,  he  can  have,  as  a  sub- 
ordinate end,  the  conservation  of  created  beings,  for  these  too, 
to  a  certain  extent,  can  participate  in  his  goodness.  Now  the 
natural  inclinations  of  created  minds  are  certainly  continual 
impressions  of  the  will  of  their  creator  and  conserver.3  It  is 
necessary  that  they  can  have  no  other  principal  end  than  his 
glory,  nor  secondary  end  than  their  own  conservation  and  the 
conservation  of  others,  but  always  with  regard  to  him  who  gave 
them  being.4  There  is,  strictly  speaking,  in  God  only  one  love, 
which  is  love  of  himself,  and  as  God  can  love  nothing  save  by 
that  love,  since  God  can  love  nothing  save  by  relation  to  him- 
self, thus  God  has  given  us  only  one  love,  which  is  the  love  of 
good  in  general.4  Love  of  the  good  in  general  is  the  principle  of 
all  our  special  loves.4  This  love  is  our  will,  which  is  simply  the 
continual  impression  exerted  by  God  on  all  finite  creatures  to- 
wards the  all-inclusive  good.5 

Not  only  does  our  will  for  good  in  general  come  from  God, 
our  inclinations  for  particular  goods,  which  are  common  in  all 
men,  such  as  our  inclination  for  the  perpetuation  of  our  own 
being  and  of  those  with  whom  we  are  united  by  nature,  are  sim- 
ply effects  of  the  divine  will  as  exerted  upon  us.6  This  inclina- 
tion for  the  good  in  general  is  the  cause  of  the  inquietude  of  our 
will,  for  striving  for  a  universal  good  necessarily  gives  the  soul 
a  continual  agitation.  Whatever  the  mind  regards  as  a  particu- 
lar good  is  finite,  and  the  finite  can  only  attract  the  will  for  a 
time;  it  cannot  permanently  hold  it.7  The  will  is  always  rest- 
less ;  it  is  forced  to  seek  what  it  cannot  find ;  hence,  it  loves  what 

1  On    this    subject   <•/.    Olle-Laprune,    La    philosophic   de    Malebranche,    Vol.    I,    p. 
296ff. 

Recherche,  IT,  p.  1. 

Recherche,  II,  p.  :>. 

Recherche,  II,  p.  4. 

Cf.   Olle-Laprune,  La  philosophie  de  Malebranche,  Vol.  I,   p.   308f. 

Recherche,  II,  p.  5. 

Recherche,  II,  p.  8. 


30  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

is  great  or  extraordinary,  whatever  is  like  the  infinite.8  Not 
having  found  its  good  among  common  and  familiar  things,  the 
mind  seeks  it  in  the  unknown.  Now  this  restlessness  of  the  will 
is  a  great  cause  of  illusion,  and  is  thus  related  to  Malebranche 's 
central  purpose  in  writing  the  Recherche,  the  exposure  of  the 
psychological  causes  of  error.  The  will  is  generally  more  con- 
cerned with  our  happiness  than  with  truth.8  The  essential  rest- 
lessness of  the  will  prevents  sufficient  application  to  any  one 
subject.8  This  explains  why  the  principles  of  morality  are  so 
little  understood,9  and  why  the  truths  of  religion  had  to  be  made 
evident  to  the  senses  through  revelation  rather  than  discovered 
by  reason.10 

With  unwearied  thoroughness,  Malebranche  points  out  the 
relation  between  our  inclinations  and  our  errors.  All  the  secret 
machinations  of  self-love  and  vanity  are  laid  bare.  The  sections, 
4 'On  the  desire  to  appear  wise,"  "On  the  conversations  of  false 
savants,"  "How  our  inclination  for  dignities  and  wealth  leads 
to  error,"  are  complete  and  adequate  discussions  of  their  sub- 
jects. But  there  is  no  need  for  us  in  this  study  to  follow  this 
analysis  into  its  details.  It  is  enough  for  us  to  appreciate  its 
general  character.11 

The  Passions. 

The  Fifth  Book  of  the  Recherche  is  on  the  Passions.  It 
opens  with  a  masterly  definition.  The  human  mind  has  two 
essential  relations,  one  to  the  body,  the  other  to  God.  As  pure 
spirit,  man  is  essentially  united  with  the  Word  of  God,  eternal 
wisdom  and  truth,  sovereign  reason.12  But  as  human  spirit, 
man  is  united  to  the  body.  In  sense  or  imagination  the  mind 
has  the  body  as  the  occasional  cause  of  its  modifications,  and  in 
understanding  it  is  directly  united  with  God.  Now  it  is  the 
same  with  the  human  will.  As  pure  will  it  depends  essentially 
on  the  love  that  God  bears  to  himself.  But  as  human  will  it  is 
related  to  the  body.  "Natural  inclinations"  is  the  proper  term 
for  all  the  movements  of  the  soul  which  we  have  in  common  with 
pure  intelligences;  "passions"  is  to  be  applied  to  all  the  emo- 
tions the  soul  feels  on  the  occasion  of  extraordinary  movements 
of  animal  spirits  and  the  blood.  It  is  thus  the  addition  of  a 
bodily  element  that  distinguishes  the  passions  from  the  inclina- 
tions. Descartes,  in  his  Passions  of  the  Soul1*  defines  the  pas- 
sions as  "the  perceptions,  feelings  or  emotions  of  the  soul  which 

8  Recherche,  II,  p.  9. 

9  Recherche,  II,  p.  10. 

10  Recherche,  II,  p.  13. 

11  But  cf.  Bouillier,  p.  97ff,  and  Joly,  p.  109ff. 

12  Recherche,  II,  p.  129. 

13  Cf.    D.   Irons,    Descartes   and   Modern   Theories   of   Emotion,    Philosophical    Re- 
view, Vol.  IV,  p.  291. 


MALEBRANCHE  'S  PSYCHOLOGY  31 

relate  especially  to  it,  and  which  are  caused,  maintained,  and 
fortified  by  some  movement  of  the  (animal)  spirits."14  And 
further  on  in  the  same  treatise  he  explains  that  "they  (the  pas- 
sions) are  principally  caused  by  the  (animal)  spirits  which  are 
contained  in  the  cavities  of  the  brain,  in  as  much  as  they  take 
their  course  towards  the  nerves  which  serve  to  enlarge  or  con- 
tract the  orifices  of  the  heart,  or  to  drive  in  various  ways  to  it  the 
blood  which  is  in  other  parts,  or,  in  whatever  other  fashion  it 
may  be,  to  carry  on  the  same  passion,  we  may  from  this  clearly 
understand  why  I  have  placed  in  my  definition  of  them  above, 
that  they  are  caused  by  some  particular  movement  of  the  animal 
spirits."15  In  laying  stress  upon  a  physical  factor  as  the  dif- 
ferentia of  passion  Malebranche  is  thus  carrying  on  the  thought 
of  Descartes. 

The  most  complete  analysis  of  passion  occurs  in  Book  V, 
Chapter  III,  of  the  Recherche.  Malebranche  holds  that  in  each 
passion,  with  the  exception  of  admiration,  seven  phases  can  be 
distinguished.  (1)  First  we  have  an  intellectual  judgment,  or 
either  clear  or  confused  view  of  the  relation  the  object  bears  to 
us.16  (2)  Then  we  have  the  movement  of  the  will  towards  the 
object;  previously  to  the  just-mentioned  judgment  the  will  was 
directed  merely  towards  the  good  in  general.  But  when  the 
mind  perceives  this  relation  of  the  object  to  it,  a  movement  of 
the  will  occurs.16  (3)  Then  we  have  in  each  of  the  passions  a 
" sentiment"  or  feeling,  such  as  love,  aversion,  desire,  joy,  sad- 
ness. These  feelings  are  different  in  each  of  the  different  pas- 
sions. (4)  This  is  followed  by  a  new  determination  of  the  course 
of  the  animal  spirits  and  of  the  blood  towards  the  exterior  parts 
of  the  body.  The  animal  spirits  are  forced  into  the  muscles  of 
the  arms,  of  the  face,  and  of  all  the  outer  parts  of  the  body  to 
put  them  in  a  condition  appropriate  to  the  dominating  passion. 
If  the  forces  of  the  individual  are  not  sufficient  to  fulfill  his  need, 
his  animal  spirits  are  mechanically  distributed  in  such  a  way  as 
to  cause  him  to  utter  certain  words  and  cries  and  to  assume ,  a* 
certain  posture  of  countenance  and  body  of  a  nature  to  attract 
the  attention  of  others  who  may  be  able  to  help  him.  In  this  way 
the  human  species  is  bound  together.17  (5)  We  then  have  a 
sensible  emotion  of  the  soul.  This  is  the  necessary  psychic  ac- 
companiment of  the  disturbance  of  the  animal  spirits.17  (6)  We 
now  have  the  feelings  of  love,  of  aversion,  of  joy,  of  desire  or  of 
sadness.  This  is  distinct  from  the  purely  intellectual  feeling  de- 
scribed in  (3),  for  it  includes  the  expression  of  the  disturbances 
of  the  animal  spirits.18  (7)  Lastly,  we  have  a  certain  feeling  of 

14  Philosophical  Works,  Ross  and  Haldane,  Vol.  I,  p.  344. 
16  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  348. 

16  Recherche,  II,  p.  147. 

17  Recherche,  II,  p.  150. 

18  Recherche,  II,  p.  151. 


32  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

joy,  of  douceur  interieur,  which  stops  the  soul  in  its  passion  and 
witnesses  to  it  that  the  soul  is  now  in  the  state  it  should  be  in 
in  regard  to  the  object  it  is  considering.  This  douceur  interieur 
accompanies  generally  all  the  passions,  those  which  spring  from 
the  sight  of  evil  as  well  as  those  which  come  from  the  sight  of 
good.18  This  douceur  is  what  renders  all  our  passions  agreeable 
to  us,  and  it  is  this  douceur  that  must  be  conquered  by  the  dou- 
ceur of  reason  and  faith,  if  we  are  to  be  freed  from  slavery  to 
passions  directed  toward  sensible  goods.18  This  analysis  of  pas- 
sion, which  one  can  only  characterize  as  masterly,  is  further 
elaborated  in  the  same  chapter.  The  limits  of  the  present  study 
alone  prevent  presentation  of  this  elaboration. 

Chapters  IV  and  V  do  not  require  analysis  here.  Their 
titles,  "That  the  pleasures  and  movements  of  the  passions  in- 
volve us  in  error  in  regard  to  the  good,  and  that  they  must  be 
perpetually  resisted,"  and  "That  the  perfection  of  the  mind 
consists  in  its  union  with  God  by  knowledge  of  the  truth  and 
love  of  virtue ;  and,  on  the  contrary,  that  its  imperfection  comes 
from  its  dependence  on  the  body  by  reason  of  the  disorders  of 
sense  and  passion,"  indicate,  as  a  perusal  of  their  contents  veri- 
fies, that  they  fall  rather  in  the  realm  of  ethics  than  in  that  of 
psychology.  But  in  the  remaining  chapters  we  find  much  valu- 
able material.  The  most  general  error  of  sense  is  that  we  project 
our  sensations  into  the  outer  world  and  regard  them  as  inde- 
pendently existing  properties  of  objects;  the  general  error  that 
comes  from  the  passions  is  of  the  same  sort.19  We  attribute  to 
the  objects  that  cause  them  all  the  disturbances  of  our  hearts, 
our  good  will,  our  gentleness,  our  malice,  our  anger  and  all  the 
other  qualities  of  our  minds.  When  we  love  some  person  we 
tend  to  believe  that  this  person  loves  us,  and  we  can  scarcely 
conceive  that  he  should  have  the  design  of  destroying  us,  or  of 
opposing  himself  to  our  desires.  But  if  hatred  succeeds  love, 
we  cannot  believe  that  this  person  wishes  us  well ;  we  are  always 
on  our  guard  and  defiant,  although  the  person  in  question  may 
not  be  even  thinking  of  us  or  is  thinking  only  of  rendering  us 
some  service.20  Our  passions  not  only  disguise  their  principal 
objects,  but  all  things  that  are  related  to  them.  They  not  only 
render  amiable  all  the  qualities  of  our  friends,  but  even  the 
greater  part  of  the  qualities  of  the  friends  of  our  friends.21 

With  this  as  a  point  of  departure,  Malebranche  discusses 
"Admiration  and  its  bad  effects,"22  "The  good  uses  one  can 
make  of  admiration  and  of  the  other  passions,"23  "Love  and 

19  Recherche,  II,  p.  134. 

20  Recherche,  II,  p.  185. 

21  Recherche,  II,  p.  187. 

22  Recherche,  II,  p.  191f. 

23  Recherche,  II,  p.  21 5f 


MALEBRANCHE'S  PSYCHOLOGY  33 

aversion,"24  "That  the  passions  all  justify  themselves,"25  and 
"That  those  passions  which  have  evil  as  an  object  are  the  most 
dangerous  and  the  most  unjust,  and  that  those  which  are  ac- 
companied with  least  knowledge  are  the  most  vivid  and  sensi- 
ble. '  '26  Space  is  lacking  here  for  any  fair  treatment  of  the  con- 
tent of  these  chapters ;  it  may  be  said,  however,  in  a  general  way, 
that  they  merely  carry  through  the  general  principles  we  have 
already  made  clear.27 


24  Recherche,  II,  p.  225f. 

25  Recherche,  II,  p.  240f. 

26  Recherche,  II,  p.  250f. 

27  Cf.   Bouillier,  p.    lOOf,   and  Joly,   p.  230f.      Most  modern   psychologists,   I  pre- 
sume, would  agree  with  the  general  judgment  on  Malebranche  by  Van  Biema.     "Male- 
branche  montre  done  une  grand  independence  d'esprit  lor&que  la  religion  n'est  pas  en 
jeu.     II  pouvait  utiliser  avec  fruit  ses  belles  qualites  de  psychologue;  il  aime  a  analyser 
la  vie  de  1'esprit,  les  perceptions,  les  Emotions,  les  inclinations,  a  rechercher  les  conse- 
quences de  1'imagination  ou  des  passions,  on  connait  sa  finesse  de  'moraliste.'     .     .     . 
Mais  d'abord  la  psychologic  n'a  jamais  etc  pour  lui  qu'un  moyen,  elle  se  subordonne  a 
la   logique   et   &   la    morale.      Et   surtout  il    avait   une    connaisance   trop   precise   de   la 
nature  de  Dieu,  de  ses  perfections,  de  ses  volontes.     Une  metaphysique  aussi  audaci- 
euse  et  aussi  sure  d'elle-mSme  est  bien  dangereuse  pour  un  savant."     Revue  de  Me'ta- 
phiisique  et  du  Morale,  Vol.  XXIII,  p.  12 7f.     The  citation  is  from  p.  146. 


34  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBBANCHE 


CHAPTER  IV:  MALEBRANCHE'S  THEORY  OP  KNOWLEDGE. 

We  now  take  up  IV^alebranche  's  most  famous  doctrine  (jThat 
we  see  all  things  in  God.  For  in  this  proposition  is  summed  up 
his  specific  contribution  to  the  Theory  of  Knowledge.  We  take 
as  our  primary  authority  Part  II  of  Book  III  of  the  Recherche, 
correcting  and  supplementing  this  authority  where  necessary 
with  material  drawn  from  other  sources. 

The  Argument  for  Vision  in  God. 

Every  one  will  agree,  says  Malebranche,  that  we  do  not  per- 
ceive objects  outside  of  us  by  themselves.  We  see  the  sun,  the 
stars  and  an  infinity  of  outer  objects.  But  it  is  not  probable! 
that  the  soul  leaves  the  body  and  goes,  so  to  speak,  marching 
through  the  skies  to  contemplate  objects  seen  there.  The  soul 
does  not  see  them  in  themselves;  the  immediate  object  of  our 
mind  when  it  beholds  the  sun,  for  example,  is  not  the  sun,  but 
something  that  is  intimately  united  with  the  mind,  and  may  be 
called  the  idea  of  the  sun.  By  idea,  Malebranche  understands, 
in  the  first  place,  the  immediate  object  of  the  mind.1  When  the 
mind  perceives  something,  or  believes  that  it  perceives  something, 
it  is  absolutely  necessary  that  there  actually  be  an  idea  whether 
or  not  there  exists  any  object  of  this  idea.2 

Men  naturally  believe  that  corporeal  things  are  more  real 
than  ideas;  they  think  that  the  existence  of  corporeal  things  is 
assured  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  it  often  happens  that  our  ideas 
have  nothing  external  to  correspond  to  them;  and  it  is  certain 
that  external  things  do  not  resemble  ideas.2  Men  regard  the 
idea  as  nothing,  just  as  if  ideas  did  not  have  a  great  many  prop- 
erties, as  if  the  idea  of  a  square  and  of  any  given  number  were 
not  essentially  different,  a  thing  which  could  not  possibly  be  true 
if  ideas  were  "nothings."2  If  then  ideas  are  "tres-reelle,"  let 
us  inquire  into  their  nature. 

All  the  things  perceived  by  the  soul  are  of  two  kinds :  either 
they  are  within  the  soul  or  they  are  without.3  Those  that  are 
within  the  soul  are  its  own  modifications,  and  may  be  expressed 
by  pensee,  maniere  de  penser,  modification  de  I'dme.3  Under  this 
head  we  may  consider  the  sensations,  imaginations,  intellections, 
conceptions,  passions  and  natural  inclinations.3  The  soul  has 
no  need  of  ideas  to  perceive  these  things  in  the  way  it  does  per- 
ceive them ;  but  it  needs  ideas  to  perceive  external  things.3  It  is 

1  Recherche,  I,  p.  373. 

2  Recherche,  I,  p.  374. 

3  Recherche.  I,  p.  375. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  35 

possible  that  in  the  case  of  beings  higher  than  man,  such  as  the 
angels,  direct  perception  of  spirit  by  spirit  is  possible  without 
the  intermediation  of  ideas ;  thus  ideas  are  only  absolutely  neces- 
sary in  the  case  of  the  perception  of  matter.4  Nevertheless,  for 
us  men,  since  we  only  know  each  other's  minds  through  speech 
and  gesture,  the  intermediation  of  idea  is  necessary  in  the  per- 
ception of  all  external  objects,  whether  material  or  spiritual.5 

*.  We  know  through  ideas:  but  what  is  the  origin  and  nature 
of  ideas?  According  to  Malebranche,  there  are  five  possibili- 
ties. His  method  of  argumentation  is  to  exclude  four  of  these 
hypotheses  and  leave  the  fifth  standing.  And  the  fifth  theory 
is  that  we  see  all  things  in  God.  Let  us  follow  the  argument 
through. 

The  first  hypothesis6  is  that  material  objects  cast  off  species 
that  resemble  them.  This  ancient  Democritean  doctrine  Male- 
branche attributes  to  the  peripatetics.  In  detail  it  is  that  these 
sensible  objects,  being  thrown  off  by  the  object,  are  rendered 
intelligible  by  the  "active  intellect,"  and  are  then  perceived  by 
the  "passive  intellect."  The  foundation  of  this  whole  system 
is  the  notion  that  sensible  objects  cast  off  species  that  resemble 
them.  There  are  many  reasons  why  this  is  an  absurd  hypoth- 
esis. The  first  is  the  impenetrability  of  bodies.  If  objects  like 
the  sun  and  stars  and  all  nearer  bodies  cast  off  species,  these 
species  would  have  to  be  of  the  same  nature  as  the  bodies  them- 
selves; they  would  have  to  be  gross  and  material.  They  would 
have  to  interpenetrate;  but  this  is  impossible.7  The  whole  of 
space  would  be  full  of  species;  they  would  rub  against  each 
other  and  break,  and  thus  fail  to  render  objects  visible.  Since 
from  a  single  point  we  can  see  a  great  number  of  objects,  the 
species  of  a  great  many  objects  would  necessarily  concentrate 
themselves  to  a  point,  which  is  impossible  since  matter  is  im- 
penetrable.8 Again  it  is  certain  that  the  nearer  an  object  is,  the 
larger  it  appears.  Now  there  is  no  reason  why  the  species  should 
shrink.9  And  it  is  still  more  difficult  to  explain  on  this  theory 
what  happens  to  the  species  when  one  regards  the  object  through 
a  magnifying  glass.9  And  so  on. 

The  second  hypothesis  to  fall  before  Malebranche 's  dialec- 
tic is  the  theory  that  the  soul  has  the  power  to  produce  its  own 
ideas.10  Some  maintain  that  our  souls  have  the  power  to  pro- 
duce the  ideas  of  the  things  of  which  they  wish  to  think,  and 
that  they  are  excited  to  produce  them  by  the  impressions  that 
objects  make  on  our  bodies,  although  these  impressions  are  not 

Recherche,  I,  p.  376. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  375. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  378f. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  397. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  379. 
Recherche,  I,  p.  380. 


36  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

supposed  to  be  images  of  the  objects  that  caused  them.10  They 
claim  that  it  is  in  this  respect  that  man  is  made  in  the  image  of 
God,  and  participates  in  his  power ;  that  just  as  God  created  all 
things  from  nothing  and  as  he  can  annihilate  them  and  create 
other  things  anew,  thus  man  can  create  and  destroy  ideas  of 
whatever  things  he  pleases.10  But  this  participation  in  the 
power  of  God  that  men  boast  of  possessing,  as  it  is  ordinarily 
explained,  has  something  of  independence  in  it,  but  it  is  a  false 
and  chimerical  independence  that  the  vanity  of  men  makes 
them  imagine.10  No  one  can  deny  that  ideas  are  real  beings  and 
that  they  are  capable  of  representing  very  different  things.  It  is 
impossible  to  doubt  that  they  are  spiritual  and  very  different 
from  the  bodies  that  they  represent.11  In  fact,  the  intelligible 
world  is  more  perfect  than  the  material  world,  as  we  shall  see  in 
what  follows.  When  we  say  that  men  have  the  power  of  form- 
ing ideas  as  it  pleases  them  to  form  them,  we  run  the  risk  of  sup- 
posing that  men  have  the  power  of  creating  beings  more  noble 
and  more  perfect  than  the  world  God  has  created.11  Even  if  one 
were  to  grant  the  human  spirit  power  to  create  and  destroy  the 
ideas  of  things,  it  could  never  avail  itself  of  this  power.  For 
just  as  a  painter,  however  skillful  he  may  be  in  his  art,  cannot 
represent  an  animal  he  has  never  seen,  in  the  same  way  a  man 
cannot  form  the  idea  of  an  object  if  he  does  not  know  it  before- 
hand, if  he  does  not  already  possess  the  idea,  and  the  possession 
of  the  idea  does  not  depend  on  his  choice.12  But  if  he  has  the 
idea,  it  is  useless  to  create  a  new  idea,12 

It  is  in  vain  that  our  opponents  object  that  the  mind  has 
certain  general  ideas  which  it  does  not  itself  produce,  but  that 
it  produces  its  particular  ideas.  For  just  as  a  painter  cannot 
paint  a  particular  man  he  has  never  seen,  so  the  mind  cannot 
represent  to  itself  a  horse  if  it  only  possesses  ideas  of  being  in 
general  and  animal  in  general.12  It  is  true  that  when  we  con- 
ceive a  square  by  pure  intellection  we  can  further  imagine  it. 
But  although  this  cannot  be  explained  here — we  are  not  the 
cause  of  the  existence  of  the  image.12  Malebranche  is  referring 
to  his  theory  of  occasional  causes.  Now  when  we  do  thus  imag- 
ine a  square  on  the  basis  of  a  previous  intellection  of  it,  the  first 
idea  serves  as  a  rule  for  the  production  of  the  second.13  We 
must  not  believe  that  images  and  sense-perceptions  are  more  dis- 
tinct than  the  ideas  of  pure  understanding ;  on  the  contrary,  the 

10  Recherche,  I,  p.  382.      It   is   interesting   to    note   that   Leibniz   clearly   perceived 
the  dangers  of  this  magnification  of  God  at  the  expense  of  the  creature.  "There  is  good 
reason,"   he   says   in  one   place,   "also  for  reflating  the   Reverend   Father   Malebranche, 
especially  when  he  maintains  that  the  soul  is  purely  passive.     I  think  I  have  demon- 
strated that  every  substance  is  active,  and  especially  the  soul."     Philosophical  WorTcs, 
Duncan's  Translation,  p.  234. 

11  Recherche,  I,  p.  383. 

12  Recherche,  I,  p.  385. 

13  Recherche,  I,  p.  386. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  37 

ideas  of  sense  and  imagination  are  only  distinct  by  reason  of 
their  conformity  with  the  ideas  of  pure  reason.13 

They  who  hold  that  the  mind  produces  its  own  ideas  hold 
that  the  mind  has  the  power  to  create  with  wisdom  and  order 
and  yet  without  knowledge  of  what  it  is  doing,  a  thing  that  is 
clearly  inconceivable.14  It  is  true  that,  ordinarily  when  men 
have  desire  for  ideas,  the  ideas  come;  whence  it  is  falsely  con- 
cluded that  the  desire  is  the  cause  of  the  idea.  As  well  argue 
that  because  the  sun  and  Mars  are  connected  at  the  nativity  of 
a  child  who  is  destined  to  have  some  extraordinary  thing  happen, 
that  the  sun  and  Mars  are  the  cause  of  the  extraordinary  event.14 
The  desire  is  of  course  only  the  occasional  cause  of  the  manifes- 
tation of  the  idea.15  The  theory  then  that  the  mind  creates  or 
produces  its  own  ideas  is  to  be  rejected. 

-The  third  hypothesis  to  be  submitted  to  criticism  by  Male- 
branche  is  that  we  see  objects  by  means  of  ideas  created  with 
us.16  But  let  us  consider  the  vast  number  of  objects  of  whiclj 
we  can  have  ideas.  The  number  of  geometrical  figures  is  infinite, 
and  if  we  take  any  particular  geometrical  figure,  such  as  the 
ellipse,  we  find  that  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  species  of  it.18 
In  the  same  way,  we  can  conceive  of  the  height  of  a  triangle  in- 
creasing to  infinity,  and  in  this  way  an  infinite  number  of  tri- 
angles being  produced;  or  we  can  conceive  of  the  side  which 
serves  as  a  base  of  the  triangle  increasing  to  infinity,  and  in  this 
way  another  infinite  number  of  triangles  being  produced.  This 
general  idea  that  the  mind  has  of  this  infinite  number  of  tri- 
angles of  different  species  proves  that,  even  if  we  cannot  con- 
ceive each  particular  triangle  of  the  infinity  of  triangles,  it  is 
because  of  the  limitations  of  our  minds  rather  than  because  of 
any  essential  lack  of  idea.17  "If  a  man  applied  himself  to  the 
consideration  of  the  properties  of  all  the  different  species  of  tri- 
angles, even  if  he  were  to  continue  this  study  forever,  he  would 
never  lack  particular  new  ideas,  but  his  mind  would  uselessly 
tire  itself. '  '17  The  mind  has  ideas  of  all  things ;  ideas  would 
never  fail  it  even  were  it  to  devote  centuries  to  the  considera- 
tion of  a  single  figure.*"  There  is  an  infinite  number  of  ideas,  in 
fact,  there  are  as  many  infinite  numbers  of  ideas  as  there  are 
different  figures;  and  since  there  is  an  infinite  number  of  dif- 
ferent figures  the  mind  must  have  in  order  to  know  nothing  but 
figures,  an  infinity  of  infinite  number  of  ideas.17 

Now  is  it  probable  that  God  should  have  created  so  many 
things  with  the  human  mind?18  For  God  had  at  his  disposal  a 
much  simpler  means,  as  we  shall  see  shortly. 

Even  were  the  mind  a  magazine  of  all  the  ideas  that  are 


M  Recherche,  I,  p.  387. 
13  Recherche,  I,  p.  388. 

16  Recherche,  I,  p.  390. 

17  Rfhcrrh,-.  T.  p.  391. 


38  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

necessary,  it  would  be  impossible  to  explain  how  the  soul  should 
choose  some  of  them  to  present  to  itself,  how,  for  example,  she 
could  bring  it  about  that  she  perceived  at  the  very  instant  that 
she  opened  her  eyes  in  the  midst  of  a  landscape,  size,  figure,  dis- 
tance and  movement  ?19  She  could  not  even  in  this  way  perceive 
a  single  object,  like  the  sun,  when  the  sun  is  present  to  the  eyes 
of  the  body;  for  it  is  not  conceivable  that  she  should  justly 
divine,  from  among  all  her  ideas,  which  one  is  necessary  to  imag- 
ine or  see  the  sun,  and  to  see  it  of  such  a  definite  size.  Further- 
more, it  is  evident  that  the  idea  or  immediate  object  of  our 
minds,  when  we  think  of  immense  spaces,  of  a  circle  in  general, 
of  an  indeterminate  being,  is  not  of  created  nature,  for  created 
reality  can  be  neither  infinite  nor  general.30 

The  fourth  hypothesis,  which  is  attributed  by  Malebranche 
to  his  bitter  opponent,  Arnauld,  is  that  the  soul  beholds  the  ex- 
istence and  essence  of  bodies  in  contemplating  its  own  perfec- 
tions.21 There  are  persons,  who  hold,  says  Malebranche,  that  the 
soul,  being  made  for  thinking,  has,  in  herself,  that  is,  in  consid- 
ering her  own  perfections,  all  that  is  necessary  to  perceive  ob- 
jects ;  because,  it  is  thought,  being  of  more  noble  character  than 
all  the  things  that  she  distinctly  conceives,  she  can  be  said  to 
contain  them  all  eminently,  in  the  language  of  the  School,  that 
is,  in  a  manner  more  lofty  and  noble  than  they  are  in  them- 
selves.22 They  claim  that  superior  things  include  in  some  man- 
ner the  perfections  of  inferior  things.22  And  since  they  are 
themselves  the  most  noble  beings  they  know  of,  they  natter 
themselves  on  having  in  themselves  in  a  spiritual  manner  what- 
ever is  in  the  visible  world  and  to  be  able  to  know  all  that  the 
human  mind  can  know  merely  by  diversely  transforming  them- 
selves.22 In  a  word  they  think  that  the  soul  is  an  intelligible 
world  which  contains  in  itself  all  that  the  material  and  sensible 
world  contains  and  infinitely  more.22 

But,  says  Malebranche,  natural  vanity,  love  of  independence 
and  desire  to  resemble  him  who  does  in  truth  contain  in  himself 
all  beings,  are  the  causes  which  account  for  this  false  theory.22 
It  is  true  that  before  the  creation  of  the  world,  there  existed  only 
God,  and  that  he  did  not  produce  the  world  without  knowledge 
and  ideas.  It  is  true  that  God 's  ideas  are  not  different  from  him 
himself,  and  that,  in  this  manner,  all  creatures,  even  the  most 
material  and  earthly,  are  contained  in  God  in  a  spiritual  and, 
to  us,  incomprehensible  manner.22  God  sees  all  beings  within 
himself  by  considering  his  own  perfections  which  represent  them 
to  him.  But  it  is  not  the  same  with  created  beings.  They  can 


18  Recherche, 
18  Recherche, 
20  Recherche, 
31  Recherche, 
33  Recherche, 


,p.  391. 
,  p.  392. 
,  p.  393. 
,  p.  394. 
,  p.  395. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE 

behold  within  themselves  neither  the  existence  nor  the  essence 
of  things.23  The  human  spirit  can  know  all  things,  finite  and 
infinite,  but  it  does  not  contain  them  within  itself ;  for  the  spirit 
can  not  only  behold  one  thing  and  then  another  thing  successive- 
ly, but  it  can  actually  perceive  the  infinite  even  if  it  cannot  fully 
comprehend  it.23  Whence  it  follows  that  not  being  infinite  nor 
capable  of  assuming  infinite  modifications,  it  is  impossible  that 
it  should  behold  the  essence  of  things  by  considering  its  own  per- 
fections.23 

We  now  come  to  the  fifth  and  last  hypothesis  :\  That  we 
see  all  things  in  God.  It  wasvby  this  theory  that  Maleftranche 
was  best  known  in  his  own  age. , 

**  In  the  first  place  let  us  keep  in  mind  that  God  has  in  him- 
self ideas  of  all  the  beings  he  has  created.24  Thus  he  beholds  all 
these  beings  by  considering  the  perfections  to  which  they  are  re- 
lated.24 Furthermore,  God  is  very  intimately  united  with  our 
souls ;  we  can  say  that  he  is  the  place  of  spirits  as  he  is  the  place 
of  bodies.24  <  These  two  things  being  presupposed,  it  follows  that 
the  mind  can  behold  in  God  that  which  represents  created  be- 
ings.25 The  mind,  therefore,  can  see  in  God  the  works  of  God, 
provided  that  God  is  willing  to  reveal  them  to  it.25  These  con- 
siderations seem  to  prove  that  God  would  reveal  the  eternal  ideas 
in  his  own  mind  rather  than  create  an  infinite  number  of  ideas 
with  each  soul.25-  It  is  not  only  very  conformable  to  reason,  but 
it  is  also  apparent  from  the  whole  economy  of  nature,  that  God 
acts  only  by  very  simple  and  direct  ways :  that  he  does  nothing 
uselessly  and  without  reason.  What  distinguishes  his  wisdom 
and  power  is  not  doing  small  things  by  great  means,  but  doing 
great  things  by  small  means.  Thus  it  is  that  from  extension 
alone  he  produces  all  that  is  admirable  in  nature  and  in  the  life 
of  animals;  those  who  believe  in  substantial  forms,  faculties, 
souls  in  animals,  attribute  to  God  a  lack  of  intelligence  in  sup- 
posing that  he  could  not  create  all  these  things  from  extension 
alone.26  "Since  God  could  make  us  see  whatever  we  see  in  his 
perfections,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  he  does  other- 
wise.26 Nevertheless  we  must  not  conclude  that  because  minds 
see  all  things  in  God  in  this  manner  that  they  behold  his  essence. 
Minds  do  not  behold  the  divine  substance  as  it  is  in  itself,  but 
solely  in  so  far  as  it  is  relative  to  creatures  or  "  participable"  by 
them.26  What  they  behold  in  God  is  very  imperfect  and  God  is 
very  perfect.  We  do  not  understand  that  perfect  simplicity 
in  which  God  includes  all  things.27  Another  reason  for  believ- 
ing that  we  see  all  things  in  God  is  such  that  such  a  belief  places 

23  Recherche,  I,  p.  396. 

84  Recherche,  I,  p.  398.     Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  34. 

25  Recherche,  I,  p.  348. 

28  Recherche,  I,  p.  399. 

-17  Recherche.  I,  p.  400.     Rom.  I,  17. 


4Q  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

us  in  an  entire  dependence  upon  God.27  Non  sumus  sufficientes 
cogitare  aliquid  a  nobis  tanquam  ex  nobis,  sed  sufficients  nostra 
ex  Deo  est.27  He  is  the  light  of  spirits  and  the  father  of  light : 
Pater  luminum28  He  is  the  light  which  lighteth  every  man  that 
cometh  into  the  world.  Lux  vera  quae,  illuminat  omnem  homi- 
nem  venientem  in  hunc  mundum29 

'-One  of  the  strongest  reasons  for  the  theory  of  vision  in  God 
is  the  way  in  which  we  do,  as  a  matter  of  experience,  perceive 
things.  Every  one  knows  from  his  experience  that  when  we 
wish  to  think  of  something  in  particular,  we  first  of  all  cast  our, 
mental  look  upon  all  beings,  and  we  then  apply  ourselves  to  the 
particular  object  we  wish  to  think  of.30  We  can  only  desire  to 
see  a  particular  object  that  we  do  not  already  see  on  the  condi- 
tion that  we  have  some  vague  and  confused  apprehension  of  it ; 
thus  all  beings  must  be  present  to  our  minds,  in  a  general  and 
confused  way,  and  this  can  only  be  beecause  God,  who  contains 
all  realities  within  the  simplicity  of  his  own  being,  is  present  to 
the/  mind.30  - 

s^The  mind  would  not  be  capable  of  having  universal  ideas 
of  gehera  and  species  if  it  did  not  behold  all  things  contained  in 
one  single  being.  For  every  creature  is  a  particular  being,  and 
when  we  behold  " triangle  in  general"  we  behold  something 
which  could  not  have  been  created.31  Further,  we  have  the  idea 
of  the  infinite  being,  and  this  is  in  itself  the  most  beautiful  proof 
of  God's  existence.  And  the  idea  of  the  infinite  precedes  the 
idea  of  the  finite ;  for,  if  we  are  to  conceive  a  finite  being,  it  is 
necessary  to  limit  the  idea  of  being  in  general,  or  the  infinite.31 
The  mind  perceives  nothing  save  by  the  idea  of  the  infinite.31 
The  idea  of  the  infinite  is  far  from  being  a  confused  assemblage 
of  particular  ideas;  on  the  contrary,  particular  ideas  are  " par- 
ticipations" of  the  idea  of  the  infinite/Thus  we  see  all  things 
in  God  because  God  is  in  all  things^ 

The  ideas  are  effective  causes^  for  they  act  on  the  mind,  en- 
lighten it,  make  it  happy  or  miserable.  Nothing  can  act  upon 
the  mind  that  is  not  superior  in  nature  to  it;  and  only  God  is 
superior  in  nature  to  the  mind.  Then  these  ideas  which  affect 
the  mind  must  exist  in  the  efficacious  substance  of  the  divinity.32 

It  is  not  possible  that  God  should  have  another  end  for  his 

28  Recherche,  I,  p.  400. 

29  Recherche,  I,  p.  401. 

30  Recherche,  I,  p.  401. 
81  Recherche,  I,  p.  402.  • 

32  Recherche,  I,  p.  403.  Locke  waxes  facetious  over  this  point  of  Malebranche's 
doctrine.  "To  conceive  thus  of  the  soul's  intimate  union  with  an  infinite  being,  and 
by  that  union  receiving  of  ideas,  leads  one  as  naturally  into  gross  thoughts,  as  a 
country  maid  would  have  of  an  infinite  butter-print,  in  which  were  engraven  figures 
of  all  sorts  and  sizes,  the  several  parts  whereof  being,  as  there  was  occasion,  applied 
to  her  lump  of  butter,  left  on  it  the  figure  or  idea  there  was  present  need  of."  Exam- 
ination of  P.  Malebranche's  Opinion  of  Seeing  All  Things  in  God.  Locke's  Philosoph- 
ical Works,  Bohn  Library,  Vol.  II,  p.  413.  The  quotation  is  from  p.  425. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  41 

actions  than  himself.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that  not  only 
does  our  natural  love  tend  towards  him,  but  that  the  knowledge 
and  light  he  gives  us  let  us  know  something  that  is  within  him. 
Otherwise  what  comes  from  God  would  not  be  for  his  sake.  If 
God  had  created  a  mind  and  given  it  as  an  idea  the  sun,  then 
God  would  have  made  that  mind  and  that  idea,  not  for  his  own 
sake,  but  for  the  sake  of  the  sun.33  God  cannot  make  a  mind 
able  to  behold  his  works  if  that  mind  does  not  behold  God  in  be- 
holding his  works.  Thus  we  can  say  that  if  we  did  not  see  God, 
we  should  see  nothing,  just  as,  if  we  did  not  love  God,  we  should 
love  nothing.34 

But  when  it  is  said  that  we  see  sensible  and  material  things 
in  God,  we  must  guard  against  the  notion  that  we  have  our  feel- 
ing in  God.35  God  is  active  within  us,  and  he  knows  sensible 
things,  but  he  does  not  feel  them.  We  must  distinguish  between 
sentiment  and  idee  pure.  The  first  is  a  modification  of  our  souls 
and  God  is  the  cause  of  it,  but  he  causes  it  without  feeling  this 
sentiment.  On  the  other  hand,  the  idea  that  accompanies  the 
feeling  is  in  God,  and  we  see  it  there  because  it  pleases  God  to 
reveal  it  to  us.36  God  joins  the  sensation  to  the  idea  when  the 
objects  are  present  to  us  that  we  may  be  aware  of  them  and 
enter  into  the  sentiments  and  passions  we  ought  to  have  in  rela- 
tion to  them.36 

Spirits  behold  the  eternal  truths  in  God  by  reason  of  their 
essential  union  with  the  word,  or  divine  wisdom.36  On  the  other 
hand,  they  perceive  the  moral  and  imperative  laws  by  reason  of 
the  perpetual  impression  that  they  receive  from  the  will  of  God, 
which  bears  them  towards  him,  and  tries,  so  to  speak,  to  make 
their  wills  entirely  like  his.  In  this  way  they  know  that  the 
eternal  order  is  their  indispensable  law ;  an  order  which  includes 
within  itself  all  the  eternal  laws,  such  as  that  we  ought  to  love 
the  good  and  flee  from  the  evil,  love  justice  more  than  riches, 
obey  God  rather  than  men  and  an  infinity  of  other  natural 
laws.36  It  is  by  this  dependence  upon  God,  by  the  union  of  our 
mind  with  the  Word,  or  divine  wisdom,  and  of  our  wills  with 
the  divine  love,  that  we  are  made  in  the  image  and  resemblance 
of  God.36  This  resemblance  has  been  effaced  by  sin,  but  if  we 
bear  the  image  of  the  Word  humiliated  on  earth  and  follow  the 
movements  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  the  original  union  of  our  minds 
with  the  Word  of  the  Father,  and  the  love  of  the  Father  and  the 
Son  will  be  re-established.37 

These,  then,  are  reasons  which  lead  one  to  believe  that  minds 
perceive  all  things  by  the  intimate  presence  of  him  who 


ss  Recherche, 

84  Recherche, 

85  Recherche, 
88  Recherche, 
37  Recherche, 


,  p.  403. 
,  p.  404. 
,  p.  406. 
,  p.  407. 
,  p.  408. 


42  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

hends  all  things  in  the  simplicity  of  his  being. 3^  God  is  the  in- 
telligible world,  the.  place  of  spirits,  just  as  the  material  world  is 
the  place  of  bodies.  From  his  power,  spirits  receive  all  their 
modifications ;  in  his  wisdom,  they  find  all  their  ideas ;  and  it  is 
by  his  love  that  they  are  moved  in  all  their  lawful  movements. 
Non  longe  est  db  unoquoque  nostrum,  in  ipso  enim  vivimus,  mo- 
vemur  et  sumus.39 

Malebranche  's  epistemology  is  completed  in  the  four-fold 
division  of  knowledge  which  we  find  in  the  Recherche,  Book  III, 
Part  II,  Chapter  VII. 

>*The  first  kind  of  knowledge  is  knowledge  of  things  by  them- 
selves. God  alone  is  known  in  this  way.  .,  It  is  God  alone  that  we 
behold  by  a  direct  and  immediate  vision,  in  which  that  which  is 
/T  ^  known  illumines  the  spirit  by  its  own  substance.40  No  finite  be- 
ing can  represent  the  infinite,  being  without  restriction,  univer- 
sal being.40  On  the  other  hand  it  is  not  diincult  to  conceive  that 
finite  beings  can  be  represented  by  the  infinite  being  that  in- 
cludes them  in  its  "substance  tres-efficace."  We'  thus  know  God 
by  tiimself,  although,  to  be  sure,  in  a  very  imperfect  manner.41 

xThe  second  kind  of  knowledge  is  through  ideas,  that  is, 
through  something  different  from  the  things  known  themselves. 
Everything  in  the  world  of  which  we  have  any  sort  of  knowledge 
is  either  mind  or  matter^  We  know  bodies  and  their  proper- 
ties only  through  ideas.  It  is  in  God  and  by  means  of  their 
ideas,  and  for  this  reason  the  knowledge  that  we  have  of  them 
is  very  perfect ;  the  idea  of  extension  is  enough  to  inform  us  of 
all  the  properties  extension  can  have,  and  we  cannot  desire  to 
have  an  idea  more  distinct  and  more  fruitful  than  that  of  ex- 
tension.41 

<4t  is  not  the  same. with  souls;  and  here  we  come  upon  the 
third  kind  of  knowledge.    We  do  not  behold  the  idea  of  the  soul 

88  Cf.  Olle-Laprune,  La  philosophic  de  Malebranche,  Vol.  I,  p.  238f,  and  Kuno 
Fischer,  Geschichte  der  neuern  Philosophic,  Vol.  II,  Ed.  5,  p.  68.  We  may  observe 
that  Leibniz  virtually  accepts  the  doctrine  of  Vision  in  God.  "It  is  also  true,"  says 
Leibniz,  "that  in  God  is  the  source  not  only  of  existences  but  also  of  essences,  so  far 
as  they  are  real,  of  that  which  is  real  in  the  possible.  This  is  because  tho  under- 
standing of  God  is  the  region  of  eternal  truths,  or  of  the  ideas  on  which  they  depend, 
and  because  without  him,  there  would  be  nothing  real  in  the  possibilities,  and  not 
only  nothing  existing,  but  also  nothing  possible."  Monadology,  No.  43  Philosophical 
Works,  Tr.  Duncan,  p.  224.  Speaking  directly  of  Malebranche's  Vision  in  God,  he 
says:  "I  say  that  it  is  an  expression  which  may  be  excused  and  even  praised,  pro- 
vided it  be  rightly  taken;  ...  It  is,  therefore,  well  to  observe  that  r.ot  only  jn 
Malebranche's  system  but  also  in  mine,  God  alone  is  the  immediate  external  object  of 
souls,  exercising  upon  them  a  real  influence.  And  although  the  current  school  seems 
to  admit  other  influences  by  means  of  certain  species,  which  it  believes  that  objects 
convey  into  the  soul,  it  does  not  fail  to  recognize  that  all  our  perfections  are  a  con- 
tinual gift  of  God,  and  a  limited  participation  in  his  infinite  perfection.  This  suffices 
to  show  that  what  is  true  and  good  in  our  knowledge  is  still  an  emanation  from  the 
light  of  God,  and  that  it  is  in  this  sense  that  it  may  be  said  that  we  see  all  things  in 
Qod."  Op.  cit.,  p.  237. 

»  Recherche,  I,  p.  409.     Cf.  Joly,  p.  64ff.  and  70ff. 

40  Recherche,  I,  p.  411. 

41  Recherche,  I,  p.  412. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  43 

in  God.42  We  only  know  the  soul  by  conscience^  and  it  is  for 
this  reason  that  our  knowledge  is  imperfect.42  If  we  beheld  in 
God  the  idea  that  corresponds  to  our  soul,  we  should  know  all 
the  properties  of .  which  it  is  capable,  just  as  we  know  all  the 
properties  of  which  extension  is  capable  by  contemplation  of  the 
eternal  idea  of  extension.42 

The  fourth  kind  of  knowledge  Malebranche  calls  knowledge 
by  conjecture.  This  is  the  knowledge  that  we  have  of  the  souls 
of  other  men  and  of  pure  intelligences.  We  have  no  direct 
knowledge  of  them  either  in  themselves  or  by  their  ideas,  and  as 
they  are  different  from  us  it  is  not  possible  that  we  know  them 
by  conscience.43  We  "conjecture"  that  the  souls  of  other  men 
are  of  the  same  species  with  our  own.  What  we  feel  we  suppose 
that  they  feel,  and  even  where  these  feelings  are  not  related  to 
the  body,  we  are  sure  that  we  are  not  deceived  because  we  see  in 
God  certain  ideas  and  immutable  laws  according  to  which,  as  we 
are  certain,  God  acts  on  all  spirits.43 

Malebranche  and  St.  Augustine. 

5  origin  of  the  doctrine  of  Vision  in  God  is  undoubtedly 
to  be  found  in  the  writings  of  St.  Augustine.  ""From  this  point 
of  view  Malebranche 's  discussion  in  the  Preface  to  the  Recherche 
is  important.  -  St.  Augustine,  says  Malebranche,  speaks  in  a 
thousand  places  in  his  works  of  the  intimate  union  of  God  and 
man,  and  of  this  union  as  the  life,  light,  and  felicity  of  the  soul.**--' 
'Malebranche  is  astonished  that  Christian  philosophers  should  be 
content  to  regard  the  soul  as  merely  the  form  of  the  body,  and 
to  neglect  its  union  with  God.  -  In  truth,  in  proportion  as  a  soul 
is  united  with  God  it  becomes  purer,  more  luminous,  stronger 
and  of  broader  extent.  On  the  other  hand,  the  union  of  the 
soul  with  the  body  is  the  measure  of  the  corruption,  weakness 
and  blindness  of  the  soul.45  As  St.  Augustine  says,  "Eternal 
wisdom  is  the  principle  of  all  creatures  capable  of  intelligence, 
and  this  wisdom,  which  remains  always  the  same,  never  ceases 
to  speak  to  its  creatures  in  the  secret  depths  of  their  minds,  that 
they  may  turn  towards  their  principle ;  for  it  is  only  the  vision 
of  eternal  wisdom  which  gives  being  to  minds,  which  completes 
them  and  gives  them  the  last  perfection  of  which  they  are  capa- 
ble." (Principium  creaturae  intellectualis  est  aeterna  sapientia, 
quod  principium  manens  in  se  incommutabiliter  nullo  modo  ces- 
sat  occulta  inspiratione  vocationis  loqui  ei  creaturae  cui  prin- 
cipium est,  ut  convertatur  ad  id  est  quo  est;  quod  aliter  formata 

**  Recherche,  I,  p.  413. 

43  Recherche,  p.  416.      On  the   four  kinds  of  knowledge,   cf.   Kuno  Fischer,   Oe- 
ichicte  derneuern  Phttosophie,  Vol.  II,  Ed.  5,  p.  66. 

44  Recherche,  I,  p.  i. 

45  Recherche,  I,  p.  viii. 


44.  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

ac  perfecta  non  possit.  De  Genesi  ad  litteram.  Ch.  50.  )46  "This 
mighty  doctrine  of  Augustine  is  indeed  the  basis  of  the  whole 
system  of  Malebranche.  God  is  our  only  master  and  can  alone 
instruct  us,  and  this  he  does  by  the  manifestation  of  his  sub- 
stance. _  As  Augustine  says:  "Insinuavit  nobis  (Christus)  ani- 
mam  humanum  et  mentem  rationalem  non  vegetari,  non  illumi- 
nari,  non  beatificari  nisi  ipsa  substantia  Dei."*7 

Human  teachers  are,  as  Augustine  again  says,  only  monitors. 
They  are  neither  masters  nor  teachers.  They  do  not  speak  with 
their  OWH  authority  but  are  only  representatives  of  eternal  wis- 
dom.48 vWe  are  not  our  own  lights  but  we  draw  all  our  light 
from  God^Noli  putare  te  ipsum  esse  lucam.49  Non  a  me  mihi 
lumen  existens,  sed  lumen  non  participas  nisi  in  TE.5Q 

Malebranche  and  Locke. 

At  this  point  we  may  note  certain  criticisms  and  comments 
upon  the  doctrine  of  Malebranche.  In  the  first  place,  an  inter- 
esting commentary  on  the  philosophy  of  Malebranche,  or,  more 
particularly,  on  his  epistemology,  is  Locke's  "Examination  of 
P.  Malebranche' s  Opinion  of  Seeing  All  Icings  in  God."51  It  is, 
of  course,  written  from  the  general  standpoint  for  which  Locke 
is  so  well  known.  He  refers  to  Malebranche  as  "acute  and  in- 
genious, ' '  and  as  having  a  ' '  great  many  very  fine  thoughts,  judi- 
cious reasonings,  and  uncommon  reflections."52  Malebranche 's 
proof  by  elimination  of  the  theory  of  the  Vision  in  God  is  at 
fault ;  it  '  *  loses  all  its  force  as  soon  as  we  consider  the  weakness 
of  our  minds  and  the  narrowness  of  our  capacities,  and  have 
but  humility  enough  to  allow  that  there  may  be  many  things 
which  we  cannot  fully  comprehend,  and  that  God  is  not  bound 
in  all  he  does  to  subject  his  ways  of  operation  to  the  scrutiny  of 
our  thoughts,  and  confine  himself  to  do  nothing  but  what  we 
must  comprehend.  "53  vThe  most  significant  point,  however,  is 
that  Locke  clearly  perceives  that  Malebranche 's  philosophy  leads 
to  subjective  idealism.  "He  further  says,"  continues  Locke, 
"that  had  we  a  magazine  of  all  ideas  that  are  necessary  for 
seeing  things,  they  would  be  of  no  use,  since  the  mind  could  not 
know  which  to  choose,  and  set  before  itself  to  see  the  sun.  What 

46  Recherche,  I,  p.  ix. 

47  Recherche,  I,   p.  xi.     Malebranche  gives  the  reference  to  Augustine,  In.  Joan. 
Tr.  23. 

48  Malebranche  here  refers  us  to  Augustine,  De  Mavistro,  XVII. 

49  Malebranche's  reference  is,   In  Psal.,  XVII. 

50  The  reference  is  De  Verbis  Domini,   Ser.   8.      Of.  Saint  Augustine,  J.  Martin, 
Paris,   1907,  for  a  very  scholarly  account  of  the  teachings  of  St.  Augustine.     Cf.  also 
The  Doctrine  of  the  Self  in  St.  Augustine  and  in  Descartes,  Marguerite  Witmer  Kehr, 
Philosophical  Review,  XXV,  p.  587. 

V1  Philosophical  Works,  Bohn  Library,  Vol.  II,  p.  41 3/ 

52  Op.  cit.,  p.  414. 

53  Idem. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  45 

he  here  means  by  the  sun  is  hard  to  conceive ;  and,  according  to 
this  hypothesis  of  Seeing  All  Things  in  God,  how  can  he  know 
that  there  is  any  such  real  being  as  the  sun?  Did  he  ever  see 
the  sun?  No;  but  on  occasion  the  presence  of  the  sun  to  his 
eyes,  he  has  the  idea  of  the  sun  in  God,  which  God  has  exhibited 
to  him;  but  the  sun,  because  it  cannot  be  united  to  his  soul,  he 
cannot  see.  How  then  does  he  know  that  there  is  a  sun  which 
he  never  saw?  And  since  God  does  all  things  by  the  most  com- 
pendious ways,  what  need  is  there  that  God  should  make  a  sun 
that  we  might  see  its  idea  in  him  when  he  pleased  to  exhibit  it, 
when  this  might  as  well  be  done  without  any  real  sun  at  all."54 
Locke  does  not  seem  to  have  suspected  that  his  own  theory  of 
knowledge  could  be  developed  in  the  same  direction.  "  'Perhaps 
it  is  God  alone,'  says  our  author,"  writes  Locke,  "  'who  can  en- 
ligten  our  mind  by  his  substance.'  When  I  know  what  the  sub- 
stance of  God  is,  and  what  it  is  to  be  enlightened  by  that  sub- 
stance, I  shall  know  what  I  also  shall  think  of  it,  but  at  present 
I  confess  myself  in  the  dark  as  to  this  matter ;  nor  do  these  good 
words  of  substance  and  enlightening,  in  the  way  they  are  here 
used,  help  me  one  jot  out  of  it."55  On  the  whole,  however,  it 
must  be  said  that  Locke's  habits  of  thought  were  so  opposed  to 
those  of  Malebranche  that  he  seldom  gets  beyond  a  superficial 
understanding  of  him.56 

Malebranche  and  Berkeley. 

Berkeley's  reaction  to  Malebranche  sets  the  difference  of 
their  systems  in  a  clear  light.  In  the  Second  Dialogue  between 
Hylas  and  Philonous  the  famous  English  philosopher  considers 
the  doctrine  of  Vision  in  God  as  compared  with  his  own  theory. 
Hylas  asks,  concerning  Berkeley's  idealism,  "Do  you  not  think 
it  looks  very  like  a  notion  entertained  by  some  eminent  moderns, 
of  Seeing  All  Things  in  God?"57  But  Philonous  cannot  under- 
stand how  ideas  which  are  things  all  together  passive  and  inert, 
can  be  the  essence,  or  any  part  (or  like  any  part)  of  the  essence 
of  God,  who  is  an  impassive,  indivisible,  pure,  active  being.  "It 
makes  the  material  world  serve  to  no  purpose."58  The  differ- 
ence between  Malebranche 's  rationalism  and  Berkeley's  empiri- 
cism comes  clearly  to  light  when  Philonous  says  of  Malebranche, 
"He  builds  on  the  most  general  abstract  ideas,  which  I  entirely 
disclaim.  "59  "  It  must  be  owned  that  I  entirely  agree  with  what 

54  Op.  cit.,  p.  425. 

55  Op.  cit.,  p.   444. 

M  On  this  point  cf.  Ollion,  La  philosophic  gentrale  de  John  Locke,  p.  402.  And 
for  a  discussion  of  Locke's  criticism  of  Malebranche,  cf.  Olle-Laprune,  La  philosophic 
de  Malebranche,  Vol.  II,  p.  33f. 

57   Works,  Ed.  Fraser,  Vol.  I,  p.  305.    Si"1*    Q 

M  Op.  cit.,  p.  306. 

M  Idem. 


46  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBKANCHE 

the  Holy  Scripture  saith,  'That  in  God  we  live  and  move  and 
have  our  being. '  But  that  we  see  things  in  his  essence,  after  the 
manner  above  set  forth,  I  am  far  from  believing.  Take  here  in 
brief  my  meaning — it  is  evident  that  the  things  I  perceive  are 
my  own  ideas,  and  that  no  idea  can  exist  unless  it  be  in  a  mind. 
Nor  it  is  less  plain  that  these  ideas  or  things  by  me  perceived, 
either  themselves  or  their  archetypes,  exist  independently  of  my 
mind;  since  I  know  myself  not  to  be  their  author,  it  being  out 
of  my  power  to  determine  at  pleasure  what  particular  ideas  I 
shall  be  affected  with  upon  opening  my  eyes  or  ears."60  These 
"things"  or  "ideas"  or  "sensations"  must  then  exist  in  some 
other  mind.  Whence  Philonous  concludes,  "there  is  a  Mind 
which  affects  me  every  moment  with  all  the  sensible  impressions 
I  perceive.  And,  from  the  variety,  order,  and  manner  of  these, 
I  conclude  the  Author  of  them  to  be  wise,  powerful  and  good 
beyond  comprehension.  Mark  it  well ;  I  do  not  say,  I  see  things 
by  perceiving  that  which  represents  them  in  the  intelligible  Sub- 
stance of  God.  This  I  do  not  understand ;  but  I  say,  the  things 
by  me  perceived  are  known  by  the  understanding,  and  are  pro- 
duced by  the  will  of  an  infinite  Spirit."61  The  difference  be- 
tween Malebranche  and  Berkeley  is,  of  course,  more  important 
than  any  superficial  resemblance  between  their  systems.  In  the 
former  the  criterion  of  reality  is,  ultimately,  logical  intelligibil- 
ity, i.  e.,  the  possibility  of  being  clearly  conceived,  while  for  the 
latter  the  standard  of  reality  is — with  certain  well-known  excep- 
tions— the  possibility  of  being  reduced  to  the  experience  of  the 
senses.  On  the  one  side,  the  Idea  of  Plato ;  on  the  other,  what 
Hume  calls  an  impression,  is  taken  as  the  crucial  instance  of 
reality. 

Malebranche  and  Arnauld. 

Perhaps  the  most  interesting  comment  on  Malebranche 's 
epistemology,  from  certain  points  of  view,  is  that  contained  in 
the  criticism  which  Arnauld  brought  against  Malebranche 's  the- 
ory of  ideas.62.  Certain  passages  in  Malebranche 's  writings 
suggest  what  is  called  in  contemporary  philosophy,  "Repre- 
sentative Perceptionism, "  and  he  was  attacked  on  that  score  by 
Arnauld.  These  passages,  however,  do  not  seem  to  represent  the 
true  spirit  of  his  teaching.  Although  in  the  above  cited  pass- 
ages he  speaks  of  ideas  representing  bodies  to  us,  his  deeper 
meaning  was  always  that  ideas  represent  objects  in  God,  not  by 
copying  them,  but  by  expressing  their  real  significance.  We 
know  objects  through  ideas,  not  as  we  know  the  original  of  a 

80  Op.  cit.,  p.  307. 

81  Op.  cit.,  p.  308. 

82  For  a  fairly  detailed  account  of  Arnauld' s  criticism  of  Malebranche,  see  M. 
Ginsberg,  The  Nature  of  Knowledge  as  conceived  by  Malebranche.     Proceedings  of  the 
Aristotelian  Society,  1916-17,  pp.  182-194. 


THEORY  OF  KNOWLEDGE  47 

painting  through  the  picture,  but  as  we  know  the  instance 
through  the  law,  the  fact  through  the  theory,  the  act  through 
the  will  which  it  expresses.  The  great  Jansenist  theologian  was 
bent  on  overturning  Malebranche  's  system  in  every  detail,  and 
he  therefore  centered  his  attack  upon  what  seemed  its  pivotal 
point,  the  doctrine  of  ideas.  Taking  his  stand  upon  certain 
passages  in  Malebranche 's  writings,  which  do  not  seem  to  ex- 
press the  real  spirit  of  the  latter 's  teaching,  he  regarded  Male- 
branche's  ideas  as  etres  representatifs,  representative  beings, 
entities  distinct  from  the  act  or  modality  of  the  soul  by  which 
it  knows,  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  the  object  known,  on  the 
other.  He  thus  accuses  Malebranche  of  representative  percep- 
tionism.  His  own  position  is  that  it  is  the  nature  of  the  soul  to 
think  of,  and  to  know,  objects  external  to  itself,  and  that  there 
is  no  need  for  the  intermediation  of  ideas  between  the  soul  and 
its  object.  That  which  exists  formally  in  nature,  is  capable  of 
existing  objectively  in  the  mind.  This  capacity  which  the  soul 
possesses  of  having  objects  present  to  it  objectively  constitutes 
its  very  essence  and  needs  no  explanation.  If  the  term  idea  is 
to  be  used  it  must  stand  merely  for  the  soul's  act  of  perception. 
The  notion  of  ideas  as  representative  entities  interposed  be- 
tween the  soul  and  its  object  is  based  upon  a  crude  analogy  be- 
tween intellectual  and  bodily  vision.  In  the  latter  case,  the 
object  seen  must  be  either  present  itself,  or  be  represented  by 
some  image,  as  when  we  see  things  in  mirrors.  These  things  do 
not  hold  of  intellectual  vision  and  the  whole  notion  of  "ideas" 
is  simply  a  fiction. 

Arnauld  thus  foreshadows  Reid  in  his  attack  upon  the  '  *  way 
of  ideas."  "When  we  say,"  says  Arnauld,  "that  our  ideas  and 
our  perceptions  (for  I  take  these  for  the  same  thing)  represent 
to  us  the  things  which  we  conceive,  and  are  images  of  them,  it  is 
in  an  entirely  different  sense  than  when  we  say  that  pictures 
represent  their  originals,  or  that  spoken  or  written  words  are 
images  of  our  thoughts;  for  with  regard  to  ideas  it  means  that 
the  things  which  we  conceive  are  objectively  in  our  mind  and  in 
our  thoughts.  Now  this  way  of  being  objectively  in  the  mind, 
is  so  peculiar  to  mind  and  thought,  as  being  that  which;  makes 
up  its  peculiar  nature,  that  we  seek  in  vain  for  anything  simi- 
lar in  all  that  is  not  mind  and  thought.  And,  as  I  have  remarked, 
what  has  confused  this  whole  matter  of  ideas,  is  that  one  has 
desired  to  explain,  by  comparisons  taken  from  corporeal  things, 
the  manner  in  which  objects  are  represented  by  our  ideas,  al- 
though there  can  be  no  true  comparison  between  body  and 
mind.63  On  the  basis  of  considerations  of  this  sort,  Arnauld 
completely  denies  the  existence  of  ideas  as  representative  enti- 
ties. With  this  denial  he  believes  himself  to  have  overthrown  the 

68  Des  vraies  et  des  fausses  idtes,  Oeuvres  Phttosophiques   de  Antoine  Arnatdd, 
edited  by  Jules  Simon,  1843,  p.  52. 


48  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

very  foundations  of  Malebranche  's  system.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  is  easy  to  see  that  his  arguments  were  really  beside  the  point. 
For  the  divine  ideas  through  which  we  contemplate  things  were 
not  essentially  representative  entities.  They  were  not  copies  of 
things,  but  representatives  of  things.  We  owe  to  Arnauld's 
attack,  however,  a  very  clear  re-statement  on  the  part  of  Male- 
branche of  his  position.  "A  serious  reflection,"  he  says  in  his 
first  reply,  "upon  the  difference  which  is  to  be  found  between 
knowing  by  feeling  (sentiment)  and  knowing  by  idea,  or  rather 
between  knowing  and  feeling,  between  knowing  numbers  and 
their  properties,  extension,  geometrical  figures  and  their  rela- 
tions, and  feeling  pleasure,  pain,  heat,  color,  and  even  the  inner 
perceptions  which  we  have  of  objects,  gives  reason  enough,  it 
seems  to  me,  for  those  who  are  accustomed  to  metaphysical  spec- 
ulation to  conclude: 

I.  That  to  feel  pain,  for  example  it  is  not  necessary  to  have 
a  representative  idea,  and  that  the  modality  of  the  soul  is  suffi- 
cient; because  it  is  certain  that  pain  is  a  modality  or  modifica- 
tion of  the  soul ; 

II.  That  to  know  numbers  and  geometrical  figures  and  re- 
lations one  needs  an  idea,  in  order  that  the  soul  can  have  per- 
ception of  them;  for  without  idea,  the  soul  has  perception  of 
nothing  distinguished  from  itself,  and  the  idea  of  a  circle  can- 
not be  a  modality  of  the  soul ; 

III.  That  in  order  to  see  a  sensible  object,  the  sun,  a  tree, 
a  house,  etc.,  two  things  are  needed,  the  modality  of  color,  for 
M.  Arnauld  agrees  that  color  is  a  modification  of  the  soul,  and  a 
pure  idea,  namely  the  idea  of  extension,  or  intelligible  exten- 
sion ;  for  when  one  has  a  lively  sensation  of  light,  attached  to  a 
distant  intelligible  circle  in  a  certain  intelligible  space,  rendered 
sensible  by  certain  colors,  one  sees  the  sun,  not  as  it  is,  but  as  one 
sees  it  (sic).    Here,  Sir,  is  all  that  is  necessary  to  feel  that  which 
passes  in  the  soul,  to  learn  sciences,  and  to  see  all  the  objects  of 
this  visible  world."64   This  passage  shows  that  Malebranche  re- 
garded the  idea  as  the  essence  of  the  sensible  thing,  as  its  mean- 
ing or  nature,  without  which  it  could  not  exist,  not  as  a  copy  or 
picture  of  it.     For  these  reasons  Arnauld 's  attack  can  be  re- 
garded as  largely  irrelevant,  although  it  had  a  certain  justifica- 
tion in  the  looseness  of  terminology  with  which  Malebranche 
expressed  himself.65 


«*  Idem. 

65  Cf.  the  interesting  discussion  in  Olle-Laprune,  La  Philosophie  de  Malebranche, 
Vol.  II,  p.  7ff. 


METHODOLOGY  49 


CHAPTER  V:   MALEBRANCHE 's  METHODOLOGY. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  examine  Malebranche 's  contri- 
bution to  methodology.1  The  Sixth  Book  of  the  Recherche  is  a 
complete  exposition  of  the  rationalistic  ideal  of  scientific  and 
philosophical  method.  We  shall  see  here  how  true  Malebranche 
was  to  the  spirit  of  Descartes,  and  especially  to  the  Descartes 
of  the  Regulae  ad  directionem  ingenii,  as  Cassirer  points  out.2 
First  of  all,  we  may  ..note  that  Malebranche  divides  his  discus- 
sion into  two  parts:  the  first  treats  of  means  for  rendering  the 
mind  attentive;  the  second,  of  the  rules  to  be  followed  in  the 
search  for  truth.^> 

Aids  to  Attention. 

Understanding  has  the  exclusive  function  of  perceiving; 
there  is  no  difference,  as  far  as  understanding  is  concerned,  be,- 
tween  simple  perceptions,  judgments  and  reasonings.4  Judg- 
ments and  reasonings,  however,  are  much  more  complex  than 
simple  perceptions,  because  they  not  only  represent  several  things 
to  the  mind,  but  also  relations  between  several  things.4  Simple 
perceptions  only  present  things  to  the  mind ;  judgments  present 
relations  between  things,  and  reasonings  relations  between  re- 
lations.4 Nevertheless  simple  perception,  judgment  and  reason- 
ing are  only  three  levels  of  complexity  in  the  same  process.4  And 
since  judgment  and  reasoning  are  only  complex  perceptions  (as 
far  as  understanding  is  concerned)  error  is  inconceivable;  for 
we  cannot  conceive  how  a  pure  perception  should  be  in  error.5 
One  can  see  that  2  times  2  equals  4  and  that  2  times  2  is  not  5, 
for  there  really  is  a  relation  of  equality  between  2  times  2  and  4 
and  of  inequality  between  2  times  2  and  5 ;  thus  the  perception 
of  truth  is  intelligible.5  But  no  one  will  ever  see  that  2  times  2 
is  5.  Error  then  consists  solely  in  a  precipitous  consent  of  the 
will  which  permits  itself  to  be  dazzled  by  some  false  gleam,  and 
in  the  place  of  preserving  its  liberty  as  much  as  possible  rests 
negligently  in  the  appearance  of  truth.5 

We  must  seek  means  then  that  will  prevent  our  perceptions 
from  being  confused  and  imperfect.  And  as  there  is  nothing 
that  renders  perceptions  more  clear  and  distinct  than  attention 
we  must  attempt  to  discover  methods  of  becoming  more  atten- 

1  For  an  interesting  constructive  interpretation  of  Malebranche's  methodology,  cf. 
Novaro,  Die  Philosophic  des  Nicolaus  Malebranche,  p.  7f. 

2  Erkenntnwproblem,  I,  p.  563. 

3  Recherche,  II,  p.  261. 

4  Recherche,  II,  p.  262. 
5-  Recherche,  II,  p.  263. 


50  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

tive  than  we  are.  In  this  way  we  must  "conserver  I' evidence'' 
in  our  reasonings,  and  see  in  a  single  view  a  necessary  connec- 
tion between  the  parts  of  the  longest  deductions.5  Now  the 
mind  naturally  applies  itself  not  to  abstract  ideas  but  to  sensi- 
ble things.6  Hence  all  who  would  seriously  devote  themselves 
to  the  pursuit  of  truth  ought  to  avoid  all  strong  sensations,  such 
as  loud  noises,  too  bright  light,  pleasure  and  pain.  They  ought 
to  guard  ceaselessly  the  purity  of  their  imaginations  lest  there 
be  traced  in  their  brains  too  deep  vestiges  which  would  contin- 
ually disturb  and  dissipate  the  mind.'3  They  ought  to  prevent 
every  movement  of  the  passions.  Although  the  pure  ideas  of 
truth  are  always  present  to  us,  we  cannot  contemplate  them  when 
the  mind  is  occupied  with  these  disturbing  modifications.6 

Nevertheless  there  is  a  positive  side  to  passion  and  sense. 
There  are  useful  passions  which  give  us  the  force  and  courage 
to  overcome  the  pain  that  is  involved  in  attention.7  Good  pas- 
sions are  the  desire  to  discover  the  truth,  to  acquire  sufficient 
light  to  conduct  oneself,  to  render  oneself  useful  to  one's  neigh- 
bor. Bad  passions  are  desire  to  acquire  a  reputation,  to  estab- 
lish oneself,  to  rise  above  one's  equal  and  other  still  more  law- 
less passions.7  The  passion  for  glory  can  be  related  to  a  good 
end,  and  it  is  permitted  to  some  persons  and  on  certain  occa- 
sions to  avail  themselves  of  this  passion  to  render  themselves 
more  attentive.8  But  it  is  indeed  necessary  to  take  care  in  mak- 
ing use  of  this  passion,  which  is  liable  to  lead  us  insensibly  into 
bad  studies  which  have  more  glitter  than  utility  or  truth.8 

Malebranche  was  deeply  convinced  of  the  philosophical  value 
of  mathematical  studies.  He  regards  geometry  as  a  species  of 
universal  science  which  opens  the  mind,  renders  it  attentive,  and 
gives  it  skill  in  controlling  the  imagination.  One  can  compare 
this  conviction  with  that  of  Plato,  who,  in  the  Republic,  says: 
"That  the  knowledge  at  which  geometry  aims  is  knowledge  of 
the  eternal,  and  not  of  aught  perishing  and  transient.  .  .  . 
Geometry  will  draw  the  soul  towards  truth  and  create  the  spirit 
of  philosophy  and  raise  up  that  which  is  now  unhappily  allowed 
to  fall  down."9 

In  Book  VI,  Chapter  V,  of  the  Recherche,  Malebranche  pur- 
sues the  same  theme  with  respect  to  arithmetic  and  algebra.  Of 
all  the  sciences,  says  Malebranche,  arithmetic  and  geometry  are 
the  principal  ones  that  teach  us  to  think  with  "skill  and  light 
and  admirable  management  of  the  mind."10  Ordinarily  geom- 
etry does  not  perfect  the  intellect  so  much  as  the  imagination 
and  the  truths  discovered  by  this  science  are  not  always  as  evi- 

8  Recherche,  II,  p.  266. 

7  Recherche,  II,  p.  267. 

8  Recherche,  II,  p.  268. 

9  Jowett's  Translation:    Book  VII. 
30  Recherche,  II,  p.  302. 


METHODOLOGY  51 

dent  as  geometricians  imagine.11    Arithmetic,  with  its  basic  idea'j  - 
of  equality,  is  a  more  enlightening  science.11     And  algebra  is ' 
still  more  important  than  arithmetic ;  it  divides  the  power  of 
the  mind  still  less,  and  abbreviates  ideas  in  the  simplest  and 
easiest  manner  that  can  be  conceived.12    What  can  only  be  done 
in  arithmetic  in  a  great  deal  of  time,  can  be  done  in  a  moment 
in  algebra.12     These  two  sciences  are  the  foundations  of  all  the 
rest  and  give  us  the  true  means  for  mastering  all  the  exact  sci- 
ences; one  cannot  utilize  to  a  greater  advantage  the  capacity  of 
the  mind  than  in  arithmetic  and  algebra. 

The  Rules  of  Method. 

The  preceding  methodological  discussion  may  be  regarded 
as  concerned,  in  general,  with  means  of  availing  oneself  of  the 
power  of  attention,  of  concentrating  and  focusing  the  mind.  In 
the  Second  Part  of  the  Sixth  Book,  De  la  Methode,  of  the  Re- 
cherche, Malebranche  discusses  certain  rules  that  are  to  be  fol- 
lowed in  the  pursuit  of  truth.  The  principle  of  all  the  rules  is 
that  in  order  to  discover  the  truth  without  fear  of  deception  it 
is  always  necessary  "conserver  V evidence  dans  ses  raisonne- 
ment,"  that  is,  our  reasonings  must  always  be  clear  and  com- 
pelling.13 This  may  be  compared  with  the  first  of  Descartes' 
four  rules  of  method,  which  is  stated  in  the  Discourse  on  Method 
as  follows :  "To  accept  nothing  as  true  which  I  did  not  clearly 
recognize  to  be  so. '  '14  From  this  we  may  derive  a  rule  in  regard 
to  the  subject  matter  of  our  studies:  we  should  reason  only  con- 
cerning things  of  which  we  can  have  clear  ideas.15  As  Descartes 
says  in  his  Regulae :  ' l  Only  those  objects  should  engage  our  at- 
tention to  the  sure  and  indubitable  knowledge  of  which  our  men- 
tal powers  seem  to  be  adequate."16  Hence  we  should  always 
commence  with  the  easiest  and  simplest  things  and  remain  with 
them  a  long  time  before  undertaking  the  investigation  of  the 
more  complex  and  difficult.17  As  Descartes  says:  "We  ought 
to  give  -the  whole  of  our  attention  to  the  most  insignificant  and 
most  easily  mastered  facts,  and  remain  a  long  time  in  the  con- 
templation of  them  until  we  are  accustomed  to  behold  the  truth 
clearly  and  distinctly. ' >18 

As  for  rules  governing  the  procedure  of  our  thought,  as 
distinct  from  rules  governing  the  choice  of  the  subject-matter, 
Malebranche  proposes  the  following:  First,  we  must  conceive 
very  clearly  the  question  which  we  are  attempting  to  answer. 
This  rule  corresponds  to  Descartes  *  Rule  XIII,  which  runs: 

11  Recherche,  II,  p.  302ff. 

12  Recherche,  II,  p.  306. 

13  Recherche,  II,  p.  308. 

14  Philosophical  Works,  Tr.  Ross  and  Haldane,  Vol.  I,  p.  92. 

15  Recherche,  II,  p.  308. 

18  Op.  tit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  3,  Rule  II. 

17  Recherche,  II,  p.  308. 

18  Op.  tit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  28,  Rule  IX. 


52  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

"Once  a  'question'  is  perfectly  understood,  we  must  free  it  of 
every  conception  superfluous  to  its  meaning,  state  it  in  its  sim- 
plest terms,  and,  having  recourse  to  an  enumeration,  split  it  up 
into  the  various  sections  beyond  which  analysis  cannot  go  in 
minuteness. '  '19 

As  a  second  rule,  Malebranche  has :  We  must  discover  by 
an  effort  of  mind  one  or  more  intermediate  ideas  which  can 
serve  as  a  common  nature  in  the  discovery  of  relations.20  To 
this  may  be  compared  Descartes ' :  "  If  we  wish  our  science  to  be 
complete,  those  matters  which  promote  the  end  we  have  in  view 
must  one  and  all  be  scrutinized  by  a  movement  of  thought  which 
is  continuous  and  nowhere  interrupted;  they  must  also  be  in- 
cluded in  an  enumeration  which  is  both  adequate  and  method- 
ical. "21  Thirdly,  says  Malebranche,  we  must  eliminate  from 
the  subject  under  investigation  all  things  that  are  not  neces- 
sary for  the  discovery  of  the  particular  truth  we  seek.  This  may 
be  compared  with  the  rule  from  Descartes  we  have  just  corre- 
lated with  Malebranche 's  first  rule.  In  the  fourth  place,  says 
Malebranche,  we  must  divide  the  subject  of  meditation  into 
parts,  and  consider  them  all,  one  after  another  in  their  natural 
order,  beginning  with  the  simplest,  that  is,  with  those  that  in- 
volve fewest  relations,  and  never  passing  to  the  more  complex 
save  when  we  have  clearly  grasped  the  simpler,  and  rendered 
them  familiar.22  With  this  we  may  compare  Descartes'  Rule  V: 
"Method  consists  entirely  in  the  order  and  disposition  of  the 
objects  toward  which  our  mental  vision  must  be  directed  if  we 
would  find  out  any  truth.  We  shall  comply  with  it  exactly  if 
we  reduce  involved  and  obscure  propositions  step  by  step  to 
those  that  are  simpler  and  then  starting  with  the  intuitive  ap- 
prehension of  all  those  that  are  absolutely  simple  attempt  to 
ascend  to  the  knowledge  of  all  others  by  precisely  similar  steps.23 
In  the  fifth  place,  says  Malebranche,  we  should  abbreviate  our 
ideas  and  then  arrange  them  in  our  imagination,  or  write  them 
down  on  paper,  so  that  they  may  not  occupy  too  much  of  the 
capacity  of  the  mind.24  Now  to  this  we  may  compare  Descartes' 
Rule  XVI,  "When  we  come  across  matters  which  do  not  re- 
quire our  present  attention,  it  is  better,  even  though  they  are 
necessary  to  our  conclusion,  to  represent  them  by  highly  abbre- 
viated symbols,  rather  than  by  complete  figures.  This  guards 
against  error  due  to  defective  memory,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on 
the  other,  prevents  that  distraction  of  thought  which  an  effort 
to  keep  those  matters  in  mind  while  attending  to  other  instances 

19  Op.  eft.,  Vol.  I,  p.  49. 

20  Recherche,  II,  p.  309. 

21  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  19,  Rule  VII. 

22  Recherche,  II,  p.  309. 

23  Op.  cit.,  p.  14. 

2*  Recherche,  II,  p.  309. 


METHODOLOGY  53 

would  cause."25  In  the  sixth  place,  we  should  compare  all  our 
ideas  according  to  the  rules  of  combination,  says  Malebranche, 
either  alternately  one  with  another,  or  by  a  single  glance  of  the 
mind,  or  by  a  movement  of  the  imagination  accompanied  by  a 
glance  of  the  intellect  or  by  the  calculation  of  the  pen  joined 
with  attention  of  mind  and  imagination.26  And  in  correspond- 
ence with  this  we  have  Descartes'  Rule  IX,  "If,  after  we  have 
recognized  intuitively  a  number  of  simple  truths,  we  wish  to 
drawr  any  inference  from  them,  it  is  useful  to  run  them  over  in 
a  continuous  and  uninterrupted  act  of  thought,  to  reflect  upon 
their  relations  to  one  another,  and  to  grasp  together  distinctly' 
a  number  of  these  propositions  as  far  as  is  possible  at  the  same 
time.  For  this  is  a  way  of  making  our  knowledge  much  more 
certain  and  of  greatly  increasing  the  power  of  the  mind.27 

We  must  guard  against  contenting  ourselves  with  some 
gleam  of  probability  and  repeat  the  comparisons  so  often  that 
we  cannot  avoid  believing  without  feeling  the  secret  reproaches 
of  the  Master,  Eternal  Reason.28  The  necessary  rules  are  not 
many  in  number;  and  they  all  mutually  depend  upon  each 
other.28  They  are  natural  and  can  be  made  so  familiar  that  it 
is  not  necessary  to  think  of  them  much  of  the  time  that  one  is 
using  them.28  They  are  capable  of  governing  the  attention  of 
the  mind  without  dividing  it.28  But  in  order  to  understand  the 
importance  of  these  rules  it  is  necessary  to  see  the  errors  into 
which  philosophers  fall  who  do  not  apply  them. 

The  philosophers  of  the  School  do  not  follow  the  first  and 
most  elementary  rule  of  exact  thought  which  is  to  reason  only 
concerning  that  of  which  we  have  clear  ideas,  and  to  com- 
mence with  what  is  simple  and  advance  to  what  is  complex.29 
Aristotle,  who  well  merits  the  title  of  the  prince  of  these  phil- 
osophers, in  Malebranche 's  opinion,  almost  always  reasons  ac- 
cording to  confused  ideas  received  by  sense  and  on  certain  other 
vague  and  indeterminate  ideas  which  represent  nothing  in  par- 
ticular to  the  mind.29  Aristotle's  physics  is  the  worst  example 
of  this.30  At  the  basis  of  it  all  is  the  notion  that  the  sensible 
qualities  of  things  belong  to  the  things  themselves  rather  than 
to  our  minds.31  If  one  asks  for  example  those  who  have  passed 
their  entire  lives  in  the  reading  of  the  ancient  philosophers  and 
physicians  (medecins)  as  to  whether  water  is  humid,  fire  dry, 
wine  hot,  the  blood  of  fishes  cold,  or  as  to  whether  plants  !and 
animals  have  souls,  they  will  reply  at  once  without  consulting- 

25  Op.  fit.,  p.  66. 

26  Recherche,  II,  p.  310. 

27  Op.  cit.,  p.  33.     For  a  comparison  of  the  methods  of  Descartes  and  Malebranche 
along   more    general    lines    cf.    Olle-Laprune,    La    philosophie    de    Malebranche,   Vol.    I, 
p.  79ff. 

28  Recherche,  II,  p.  311. 

29  Recherche,  II,  p.  312. 

30  Recherche,  II,  p.  313. 
81  Recherche,  II,  p.  314. 


54  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

anything  but  their  sense  and  their  memory  of  what  they  have 
read.  They  do  not  see  that  these  terms  are  all  equivocal,  and 
they  find  it  strange  that  one  should  care  to  define  them.  They 
grow  impatient  if  one  tries  to  make  them  see  that  they  are  going 
too  fast  and  that  their  senses  are  misleading  them.32  If  we  re- 
member that  the  greater  part  of  the  questions  of  philosophers! 
and  physicians  include  such  equivocal  terms  as  we  have  just 
mentioned,  we  cannot  avoid  believing  that  there  is  nothing  solid 
in  all  of  their  big  books.33  Descartes  proceeded  in  another  way ; 
he  knew  how  to  distinguish  things  from  each  other  and  he  did 
not  answer  questions  with  ideas  drawn  from  sense-impression. 
If  people  would  take  the  trouble  to  read  him,  they  would  find 
that  he  explains  in  a  clear  and  evident  manner  the  chief  effects 
of  nature  solely  from  the  ideas  of  extension,  figure,  and  move- 
ment.33 

Besides  ideas  drawn  from  sense-perception,  the  philosophers 
of  the  School  use  general  logical  terms  by  means  of  which  they 
can  explain  anything  without  having  any  special  knkowledge 
of  it.33  Such  terms  are  genus,  species,  act,  power,  nature,  form, 
faculty,  quality,  cause  in  itself,  and  cause  by  accident,  etc.33  The 
partisans  of  Aristotle  do  not  understand  that  these  words  sig- 
nify nothing  and  that  one  is  no  wiser  after  one  knows  that/  fire 
dissolves  metals  because  it  has  the  faculty  of  dissolving,  and  that 
a  man  does  not  digest  because  he  has  a  weak  stomach  or  because 
his  faculte  concoctrice  does  not  perform  its  functions  well.33 
Senna  purges  because  of  its  purgative  quality,  bread  nourishes 
because  of  its  nutritive  quality;  these  propositions  are  not  er- 
roneous, but  they  have  no  significance.  They  do  not  involve  us 
in  error,  but  they  are  entirely  useless  in  the  pursuit  of  truth. 

The  most  dangerous  fallacy  in  the  philosophy  of  the  an- 
cients, which  arose  because  the  ancients  did  not  follow  the  max- 
ims of  the  method  of  clear  ideas,  was  the  notion  that  there  are 
certain  subordinate  powers  in  nature.  If  we  consider  attentively 
the  idea  of  cause  or  power  of  action  we  see  that  this  idea  con- 
tains something  divine  in  it.34  The  idea  of  a  sovereign  power  is 
the  idea  of  a  sovereign  divinity,  and  the  idea  of  a  subordinate 
power  is  the  idea  of  an  inferior  divinity.34  We  therefore  admit 
that  there  is  something  divine  in  the  bodies  that  surround  us  if 
we  admit  that  there  are  forms,  faculties,  virtues,  or  real  beings 
or  any  other  beings  capable  of  producing  effects  by  the  force  of 
their  own  nature.35  We  necessarily  tend  to  adopt  the  feelings 
of  the  pagans  if  we  respect  their  philosophy.35  It  is  hard  to 
persuade  oneself  that  one  should  neither  love  nor  fear  real  pow- 
ers that  act  upon  us;35  and  love  and  fear  being  genuine  adora- 

32  Recherche,  II,  p.  317. 

33  Recherche,  II,  p.  318. 

34  Recherche,  II,  p.  322. 

35  Recherche,  II,  p.  323. 


METHODOLOGY  55 

tion,  we  can  hardly  avoid  adoring  what  we  love  and  fear.36  Thus 
the  admission  of  subordinate  powers  into  nature  is  the  basis  of 
pagan  polytheism.  But  the  development  of  this  theme,  which 
leads  into  Malebranche  's  whole  scheme  of  occasional  causes,  may 
well  be  postponed  to  a  later  chapter. 

The  rule  that  we  should  begin  with  the  simple  and  advance 
to  the  complex  was  completely  disregarded  by  the  scholastics. 
This  rule  is  contrary  to  the  natural  inclination  of  men,  who  nat- 
urally despise  the  simple  because  it  appears  too  easy.37  The 
mind  has  a  natural  striving  for  the  infinite  and  love  of  what  is 
obscure  and  mysterious.37  The  reason  is,  not  that  the  mind  really 
loves  shadows,  but  that  it  hopes  to  find  in  the  shadows  the  good 
that  it  desires,  and  which  it  knows  cannot  be  attained  in  broad 
daylight  in  this  world.37  Vanity  also  leads  minds  to  plunge  into 
the  great  and  extraordinary.38  Experience  teaches  that  exact 
knowledge  of  ordinary  things  gives  no  reputation  in  the  world, 
and  determines  those  who  are  more  sensitive  to  vanity  than  to 
truth  to  search  blindly  for  a  specious  knowledge  of  all  that  is 
grandiose,  rare  and  obscure.38  Many  reject  the  philosophy  of 
Descartes  for  the  amusing  reason  that  its  principles  are  too  sim- 
ple and  easy.38  There  are  no  obscure  and  mysterious  terms)  in 
his  philosophy;  women  and  people  who  know  neither  Greek  nor 
Latin  can  understand  it,  therefore  it  is  thought  worthless.  It  is 
imagined  that  principles  so  simple  and  clear  cannot  explain  na- 
ture and  that  it  is  better  to  use  incomprehensible  principles  of 
explanation.38 

The  Fourth  Chapter  of  the  Sixth  Book,  Part  II,  of  the  Re- 
cherche elucidates  this  point  at  length,  but  along  lines  with  which 
we  are  now  familiar.  It  also  develops  in  some  detail  Descartes' 
vortex  theory  of  the  universe.  Time  prevents  any  consideration 
of  this  latter  development.  The  Fifth  Chapter  is  an  intensive 
critique  of  the  peripatetic  system  and  in  particular  of  Aristo- 
tle 's  De  Coelo.  The  Sixth  Chapter,  '  *  General  Advice  Necessary 
to  Conduct  One's  Investigation  of  Truth,"  etc.,  adds  little  or 
nothing  to  what  has  already  been  said.  The  Seventh  Chapter, 
1 '  On  the  Use  of  the  First  Rule  as  Regards  Particular  Ques- 
tions," and  the  Eighth  Chapter,  "Application  of  the  Rules  to 
Particular  Questions,"  while  valuable  and  suggestive  in  them- 
selves, call  for  no  particular  comment  here.  The  same  is  true 
of  the  Ninth  Chapter,  which  deals  with  the  cause  of  hardness, 
that  is,  of  the  union  of  the  parts  of  bodies  with  each  other,  from 
tha^fandpoint  of  method. 

C  Malebranche 's  philosophical  ideal  now  stands  before  us. 
In  spirit  it  is  identical  with  the  spirit  of  exact  science,  which  has 
always  found  its  philosophical  foundation  in  rationalistic  phil- 

36  Recherche,  II,  p.  324. 
81  Recherche,  II,  p.  336. 
38  Recherche,  II,  p.  337. 


56  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

osophy,  or  rather  in  philosophy  that  is  deep  enough  to  be  both 
rationalistic  and  empiristic.  _As  Novaro  says:  "In  general,  as 
has  been  said,  he  (MalebMiiche)  does  not  combat  sense  and  ex- 
perience as  such,  but  rather  unscientific  empiricism  and  that 
empty  scholastic  philosophy  which  bases  natural  science  upon 
particular  facts  of  sense  and  arbitrary  conceptions,  that  same 
philosophy  which  Galileo  fought  in  his  Dialogues.  Malebranche 
opposes  reason  or  science,  that  is,  scientific  experience,  to  mere 
empirical  knowledge  and  regards  this  latter  as  the  first  stage 
of  knowledge  in  which  man  is  the  center  and  measure  of  all 
things,  and  draws  no  distinction  between  their  subjective  and 
objective  aspects.39 


39  Philosophic  des  N.  Malebranche,  p.  13.     Cf.  Bouillier,  103f. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  57 


CHAPTER  VI:   MALEBRANCHE 's  METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY. 

Schopenhauer,  in  the  Preface  to  the  World  as  Will  and  Idea, 
remarks  of  his  own  system:  "A  single  thought,  however  com- 
prehensive it  may  be,  must  preserve  the  most  perfect  unity.  If 
it  admits  of  being  broken  up  into  parts  to  facilitate  its  com- 
munication the  connection  of  these  parts  must  yet  be  organic, 
i.  e.,  it  must  be  a  connection  in  which  every  part  supports  the 
whole  just  as  much  as  it  is  supported  by  it,  a  connection  in 
which  there  is  no  first  and  last,  in  which  the  whole  thought  gains 
distinctness  through  every  part,  and  even  the  smallest  part  can- 
not be  completely  understood  unless  the  whole  has  already  been 
grasped.  A  book,  however,  must  always  have  a  first  and  last 
line,  and  in  this  respect  will  always  remain  very  unlike  an  or- 
ganism, however  like  one  its  content  may  be ;  thus  form  and  mat- 
ter are  here  in  contradiction."1  The  same  is  true,  of  course,  of 
any  philosophical  system  and  is  particularly  true  of  so  closely 
integrated  a  system  as  that  of  Malebranche.  It  has  frequently 
been  necessary  in  our  expositions  of  the  Psychology,  Epistemol- 
ogy  and  Methodology  of  Malebranche  to  assume  conceptions 
which  cannot  be  understood  save  in  the  light  of  his  metaphysical 
doctrine.  It  is  now  to  this  central  doctrine  that  we  turn  our 
attention.  Here  our  guide  is  the  Entretiens  sur  la  metaphysique 
et  la  religion,  which,  as  Joly  says,  is  "I'oeuvre  ou  il  faut  chercher 
le  fruit  le  plus  substantiel  de  sa  pleine  maturite."2  Here  Male- 
branche 's  system  is  expounded  in  systematic  and  complete  form, 
and  the  center  of  gravity  is  no  longer,  as  in  the  Recherche,  in 
psychology  and  theory  of  knowledge,  but  is  rather  in  metaphy- 
sics and  theology. 

Mind  and  Body. 

\The  Premier  Entretien  establishes  the  distinction  between 
minchand  body.  Indeed,  as  Kuno  Fischer  says  :•*"  The  funda- 
mental speculative  question,  which  dominates  the  doctrine  of  our 
philosopher  (Malebranche),  lies  in  the  application  of  dualistic 
principles  to  the  possibility  of  our  knowledge  of  things :  -How 
can  the  essence  of  bodies  become  known  to  the  mind,  if  there  is 
between  mind  and  body  no xnatural  community  but  on  the  con- 
trary a  complete  opposition r¥  -* 

The  discussion  opens  with  the  proposition  that  the  Nothing 
has  no  properties.4  From  this  Malebranche  advances  to  the  Car- 

1  World  as  Will  and  Idea,  Trans.  Haldane  and  Kemp,  Vol.  I,  p.  viii. 

2  Joly.  p.  55. 

8  Oeschichte  der  neuern  Philosophie,  Vol.  II,  Ed.  5,  p.  54. 
4  Entretiens,  p.  5.     Cf.  Novaro,  op.  cit.,  p.  26. 


58  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

tesian  cogito,  ergo  sum.  I  think,  hence  I  am.  But  what  am  I, 
I  who  think,  at  the  time  that  I  think  ?  Am  I  body,  spirit,  man  ? 
In  the  first  place,  I  know  nothing  of  that;  I  only  know  that 
when  I  think  I  am  something  which  thinks.  But  can  a  body 
think?  Can  something  which  is  extended  in  length,  breadth, 
and  depth,  reason,  desire,  or  feel  ?  Beyond  a  doubt,  no ;  for  all 
the  ways  of  existing  (manieres  d'etre)  of  such  an  extended 
thing  consist  solely  of  relations  of  distance;  and  it  is  evident 
that  these  relations  are  not  perceptions,  reasonings,  pleasures, 
desires,  or  feelings,  not,  in  a  word,  thoughts.  Hence  this  "I" 
that  thinks  is  not  a  body.5 

~  The  essence  of  mind  then  is  pure  thought  as  Descartes  has 
said.6  And  it  is  clear  that  thought  as  pure  thought  is  eternally 
distinct  from  matter  as  pure  extension.  But  perhaps  matter  is 
something  besides  extension.  Perhaps  my  body  is  something  be- 
sides extension,  for  it  seems  that  it  is  my  finger  that  feels  the 
pain  of  a  wound,  my  heart  that  desires,  my  brain  that  reasons.  *- 
Prove  to  me,  says  Ariste,  that  my  body  is  nothing  but  pure  ex- 
tension and  I  will  admit  that  my  mind,  which  thinks,  wills,  and 
reasons,  is  neither  material  nor  corporeal.7  Do  you  not  under- 
stand, replies  Theodore,  that  it  suffices  to  have  extension  to  form 
a  brain,  a  heart,  arms,  and  hands  and  everything  else  of  which 
your  body  is  composed.7  Whatever  is  can  either  be  conceived 
alone  or  cannot  be  conceived  alone.5-  Now  whatever  can  be  con- 
ceived alone  and  without  thought  of  anything  else,  that  is,  can 
be  conceived  as  existing  independently  of  everything  else,  is  a 
substance.8  And  that  which  cannot  be  conceived  alone  or  with- 
out thinking  of  anything  else  is  a  maniere  d'etre,  that  is,  a  mod- 
ification of  substance.9  Roundness,  for  example,  cannot  be  an 
independent  existence  by  itself ;  it  always  refers  us  to  something 
which  is  round,  or  possesses  roundness  as  an  attribute.9  That 
which  is  round,  but  is  not  roundness,  is  matter,  i.  e.,  extended 
substance.10  Hence  extension  is  a  substance  and  in  no  sense 
merely  a  modification  or  manner  of  being.10  Modifications  of 
extension  consist  merely  in  relations  of  distance.11  For  relations 
of  distance  can  be  compared,  measured,  and  exactly  determined 
by  the  principles  of  geometry,  and  it  is  impossible  to  measure  in 
this  manner  our  perceptions  or  feelings.^-  Hence  my  soul  is  not 
material ;  it  is  a  thinking  substance,  and  has  no  resemblance  to 
the  extended  substance  of  which  my  body  is  composed.^.  From 

5  Entretiens,  p.  5. 
8  Of.  Bouillier,  p.  35. 

7  Cf.  Joly,  p.  HCff. 

8  Entretiens,  p.  6. 

9  Cf.  Kuno  Fischer,  Geschichte  der  neuern  Philosophie,  Vol.  II,  Ed.  5,  p.  54. 

10  Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  34. 

11  Entretiens,  p.  7. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  59 

this  distinction  Malebranche  can  conclude  an  infinity  of  truths ; 
it  is  the  foundation  of  the  principal  dogmas  of  philosophy.12 

-f-Here  then  we  have  the  Cartesian  distinction  between  exten- 
sion^ and  thought  upheld  in  its  integrity,  and  made  the  basis  of 
a  far-reaching  metaphysical  construction.""  But  before  we  can 
understand  this  metaphysical  construction,  we  must  understand 
the  third  substance  in  which  the  two  finite  substances  are 
grounded,  that  is,  God. 

Intelligible  Extension  and  the  Existence  of  God. 

It  is  in  the  Deuxieme  Entretien  that  the  existence  of  God  is 
proved.  -.The  foundation  of  geometrical  knowledge  is  intelligi- 
ble extension,  and  infinite  intelligible  extension  is  not  a  modifi- 
cation of  the  finite  mind.13-  It  is  immutable,  eternal,  and  neces- 
sary.13 Whatever  is  immutable,  eternal,  and  necessary,  and 
above  all  infinite  is  not  created,  but  belongs  to  the  creator.13 
Hence  there  is  a  God  and  a  reason ;  a  God  in  whom  is  found  the 
archetype  of  the  created  world,  and  in  whom  is  also  found  the 
reason  which  enlightens  me  by  purely  intelligible  ideasX-  For 
I  am  sure  that  all  men  are  united  to  the  same  reason  that  I  am, 
since  I  am  certain  that  they  see  or  can  see  what  I  see  when  I 
enter  into  myself,  and  there  discover  the  truths,  or  necessary 
relations,  that  the  intelligible  substance  of  universal  reason  in- 
cludes.14 Nevertheless,  although  it  is  in  God  that  we  behold  in- 
telligible extension,  we  only  see  the  archetype  of  the  material 
world  and  of  an  infinity  of  possible  other  worlds ;  we  do  not  be- 
hold the  divine  essence  in  itself,  but  only  in  so  far  as  it  is  repre- 
sentative of  material  creatures.14  We  can  infer  with  certainty 
from  infinite  intelligible  extension  that  God  is,  for  nothing  finite 
can  contain  an  infinite  reality.14  But  you  do  not  see  what  God 
is,  for  God  has  no  limits  in  his  perfections,  and  what  you  be- 
hold when  you  think  of  immense  spaces  is  deprived  of  an  infin- 
ity of  perfections.  Thus  the  divine  essence,  in  itself,  escapes  us. 

Infinite  intelligible  extension,  then,  is  only  the  archetype 
of  an  infinity  of  possible  worlds  like  our  own.14  When  we  think 
of  that  extension  we  only  behold  the  divine  essence  in  so  far  as 
it  is  representative  of  bodies.15  But  when  we  think  of  being, 
and  not  of  such  and  such  beings,  when  we  think  of  the  infinite 
and  not  of  such  and  such  an  infinite,  it  is  certain  that  we  do  not 
behold  so  vast  a  reality  in  the  modifications  of  our  own  minds.15 
For  if  the  modifications  of  our  own  minds  do  not  have  enough 

12  Entretiens,  p.  8.     On  the  distinction  between  mind  and  body,  cf.  Novaro,  p.  33f. 

13  Entretiens,   p.   26.      Cf.    Olle-Laprune,   La  philosophie   de   Malebranche,  Vol.  I, 
p.  143f. 

14  Entretiens,  p.  28.     Cf.  Kuno  Fischer,  Geschichte  der  neuern  Philosophie,  Ed.  5, 
Vol.  II,  p.  73. 

15  Entretiens,   p.    28.      Cf.    Novaro,    Die   Philosophie   des   N.   Malebranche,   p.    31. 
For  Novaro,  Malebranche's  proof  of  the  existence  of  God  means  Das  Sein  wird  gedacht 
— das  Sein  ist. 


60  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBKANCHE 

reality  in  them  to  represent  infinite  intelligible  extension,  how 
can  they  represent  that  which  is  infinite  in  all  ways?16  Thus 
only  God,  only  the  infinite,  only  the  indeterminate  being,  only 
the  infinitely  infinite  infinite,  can  contain  the  infinitely  infinite 
reality  which  we  think  when  we  think  of  being.16  Being,  reality, 
indeterminate  perfection,  is  not  the  divine  substance  in  so  far 
as  representative  of  a  creature.17  It  would  be  a  contradiction 
were  God  to  make  or  engender  a  being  in  general  or  being  infi- 
nite in  all  ways  that  would  not  be  identical  with  God  himself; 
the  Son  and  the  Holy  Spirit  do  not  participate  in  the  divine 
being;  they  completely  receive  it.17  Again  the  idea  of  a  circle 
in  general  is  not  the  intelligible  extension  in  so  far  as  intelli- 
gible extension  is  representative  of  such  and  such  a  circle.18 
The  idea  of  a  circle  in  general  covers  infinite  circles.18  In  the 
same  way  the  idea  of  being  without  restriction,  of  infinity,  is  not 
the  idea  of  creatures,  but  the  idea  that  represents  the  divinity.18 
Being  includes  all  things,  but  all  things  both  created  and  possi- 
ble, with  all  their  multiplicity,  cannot  exhaust  its  vast  extent.18 
God,  then,  is :  He  that  is.18 

But  God,  or  the  infinite,  is  not  visible  by  an  idea  that  rep- 
resents him.18  The  infinite  is  its  own  idea.18  It  has  no  arche- 
type.18 It  can  be  known,  but  not  made,  and  only  creatures,  only 
such  and  such  beings,  which  are  "makable,"  are  visible  by  the 
ideas  that  represent  them.19  We  can  see  a  circle,  a  house,  a  sun, 
even  when  such  an  object  does  not  exist,  for  every  finite  object 
can  be  seen  in  the  infinite,  which  includes  the  intelligible  ideas 
of  all  things.  But  the  infinite  can  only  be  seen  by  itself ;  nothing 
finite  can  represent  it.20  If  we  think  of  God,  he  exists.20  We 
can  contemplate  the  essence  of  a  finite  being  without  contem- 
plating its  existence ;  but  the  opposite  is  true  of  God.  We  can 
not  behold  his  essence  without  admitting  his  existence,  for  he  is 
himself  his  own  archetype.20  Thus  the  proposition,  There  is  a 
God,  is  in  itself  the  clearest  of  propositions  affirming  existence 
and  is  as  certain  as  I  think,  therefore  I  amJ*> 

16  Entretiens,  p.    28.      Of.    Olle-Laprune,    La  philosophic   de   Malebranche,   Vol.   I, 
p.  232ff. 

17  Entretiens,  p.  28  and  p.  29. 

18  On  this  point  ef.  Bouillier,  p.   107. 
18  Entretiens,  p.  29. 

20  Entretiens,  p.  30. 

21  Entretiens,   p.    30.      It    is    interesting    to    observe    the    reaction    of   the    modern 
scholastics,  as  ever  the  faithful  disciples  of  Aristotle,  to  Malebranche's  doctrine.      Car- 
dinal Mercier,  for  example,  writes  as  follows:      "The  fundamental  tenet  of  this  theory 
is  clearly  belied  by  many  psychological  facts;    for   instance,    (a)    were  the  knowledge 
we   haye   of   God  immediately   derived  from   Him   it  would  be   a   positive   and   proper 
knowledge,    whereas   our  present   ideas   of   Him   are   all   either   negative   or   analogical, 
(b)    All  our   intellectual   cognition   is   dependent,    as  we  have   seen,    upon   the   senses; 
yet  if  our  intellect  has  what  is  supersensible  and  absolute  for  its  direct  and  immedi- 
ate  object,    how   has   such    a    dependence   any   explanation?      The   theory   stands   also 
condemned  by  some  of  the  consequences  that  may  be  deduced  from  it.     For,  if  we  en- 
joyed an  intuition  of  the  Divine  Essence    (a)   we  should   necessarily  be  in  possession 
of   our   highest   good   and   complete  happiness;    (b)    there   would  be   no  error   possible 
about   God,   and    (c)    there   would  be   no   doubts   about  his  existence   and   attributes." 
Manual  of  Modern  Scholastic  Philosophy,  London,   1916,  Vol.  I. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  61 

There  is  a  possibility,  however,  that  we  ourselves  have  cre- 
ated this  idea  of  being  in  general  or  of  the  infinite.    Perhaps  the 
mind   constructs   general   ideas   from  several   particular  ideas. 
When  we  have  seen  several  trees,  an  apple  tree,  a  pear  tree,  and 
a  plum  tree,  we  construct  a  general  idea  of  "tree."     After  we 
have  seen  several  beings,  we  construct  an  idea  of  being  in  gen- 
eral.    Thus  this  idea  of  being  in  general  may  be  only  a  confused 
assemblage  of  particular  ideas.22    If  our  ideas  were  infinite,  they 
could  not  be  of  our  own  creation,  but  perhaps  they  are  finite, 
although  it  is  through  them  that  we  perceive  the  infinite.23    The 
answer  to  this  is  that  our  ideas  are  finite  if  by  ideas  you  under- 
stand the  perceptions  or  modifications  of  our  minds.23     But  if 
you  understand  by  the  idea  of  the  infinite  that  which  is  the  im- 
mediate object  of  the  mind  when  you  contemplate  the  infinite, 
assuredly  that  is  infinite.23     The  impression  that  the  infinite 
makes  on  the  mind  is  finite.23    Nevertheless,  although  the  mind 
is  always  more  touched,  more  penetrated,  more  modified  by  a 
finite  idea  than  by  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  there  is  more  reality 
in  the  idea  of  the  infinite  than  in  that  of  the  finite.23    We  imag- 
ine that  we  have  drawn  our  general  ideas  from  an  assemblage 
of  particular  ideas.    We  think  of  a  circle  of  one  foot  diameter, 
then  of  one  of  a  two  foot  diameter,  then  one  of  three,  of  four, 
and  finally  we  do  not  determine  the  diameter  at  all  and  think 
of  a  circle  in  general/   Now  this  circle  in  general  cannot  be  a 
confused  assemblage  of  the  particular  circles  of  which  we  have 
thought;  for  it  represents  an  infinite  number  of  circles  and  we 
only  can  have  thought  of  a  finite  number  of  circles.24    The  fact 
is  that  we  find  the  secret  of  forming  the  idea  of  circle  in  general 
by  seeing  five  or  six  circles.    This  is  true  in  one  sense  and  false 
in  another.     It  is  false  that  there  is  enough  reality  in  the  ideas 
of  five  or  six  circles  to  form  the  idea  of  circle  in  general.    But 
it  is  true  in  this  sense,  that,  after  having  recognized  that  the 
size  of  circles  does  not  change  their  properties,  we  have  perhaps 
ceased  considering  them  in  order  and  begun  to  consider  them  in 
general  and  as  of  indeterminate  quantity.24    We  could  not  form 
general  ideas  if  we  did  not  find  in  the  idea  of  the  infinite  suffi- 
cient reality  to  give  generality  to  our  ideas.24     You  can  only 
think  of  an  indeterminate  diameter  because  you  see  the  infinite 
in  extension,  that  is,  that  you  can  augment  or  diminish  a  diam- 
eter to  infinity.25     Without  the  idea  of  the  infinite,  you  could 
think  only  of  sucli^and  such  a  particular  circle  but  never  of  a 
circle  in  general.25    No  finite  and  determinate  idea  can  represent 
anything  of  the  infinite  and  indeterminate,  but  the  mind,  with- 

22  Entrctiens,  p.  33. 

23  Entretiens,  p.  34. 

24  Entretiens,  p.  35. 

25  Entretier.ft.  p.  36. 


62  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

out  reflection,  joins  to  its  finite  ideas  the  idea  of  a  generality 
that  it  finds  in  the  infinite.25 

Thus  a  mere  confused  assemblage  of  particular  ideas  can 
never  possess  true  generality.  If  we  mix  twenty  colors  together, 
we  do  not  obtain  color  in  general,  but  some  particular  color.26 
If  we  mix  feelings  to  obtain  a  feeling  in  general  we  fail  in  the 
same  way.26  Every  modification  of  the  mind  is,  as  the  modifica- 
tion of  a  particular  being,  itself  a  particular  thing,  and  is  unable 
to  possess  true  generality.26  We  must  not  suppose  that  because 
modifications  are  more  sensible  than  ideas  that  they  are  more 
real.27  Such  a  judgment  is  like  that  of  people  who  say  that  there 
is  more  matter  in  a  cubic  foot  of  lead  than  in  a  cubic  foot  of 
air.27  This  is  to  give  the  prick  of  a  pin  more  reality  than  the 
whole  universe  and  the  infinite  being  itself.28  In  this  way,  Male- 
branche  answers  the  empiricist,  who  would  reduce  our  ideas  to 
mere  heaps  of  sensations,  and  thus  defends  his  idea  of  God.29 

In  the  Troiseme  Entretien  Malebranche  explains  how  the 
divine  Word  as  universal  reason  includes  in  its  substance  the 
primordial  ideas  of  all  created  and  possible  things.30  All  in- 
telligences are  united  to  this  sovereign  reason  and  discover  in  it 
ideas  according  as  God  wills.30  Thus,  we  cannot  doubt  that  in- 
telligible extension,  which  is  the  archetype  of  bodies,  is  con- 
tained in  the  universal  reason  which  enlightens  all  minds  and 
even  him  with  whom  it  is  consubstantial.30  Thus  there  is  a  pro- 
found difference  between  "la  lumiere  de  nos  idees"  and  "les 
tenebres  de  ses  propres  modifications."30  It  is  this  difference 
that  is  the  basis  of  the  ontological  argument  for  the  existence  of 
God  as  expounded  by  Malebranche.31 

It  is  the  distinction  between  intelligible  and  material  ex- 
tension that  distinguishes  the  system  of  Malebranche  from  that 
of  Spinoza.  This  comes  out  in  the  very  interesting  correspond- 
ence between  Malebranche  and  de  M  air  an,  a  well-instructed 
and  skillful  student  of  both  Malebranche  and  Spinoza.32  De 
Mairan,  as  Kuno  Fischer  says,33  turns  to  Malebranche  for  aid 
in  withstanding  the  attraction  of  Spinozistic  pantheism.  Male- 
branche had  spoken  of  a  fundamental  error  in  the  system  of 
Spinoza ;  will  he  not  make  it  clear  just  what  this  error  is  ?  Male- 
branche replies  that  Spinoza  has  not  adequately  distinguished 
between  intelligible  and  real  extension,  between  the  world  in 
God  and  the  created  world.  The  world  of  eternal  ideas  is,  of 
course,  necessary  in  character ;  created  extension  or  real  space — 
what  Spinoza  called  an  attribute  of  God — is  not  necessary  but 

28  Entretiens,  p.  37. 

27  Entretiens,  p.  38. 

28  Entretiens,  p.  39. 

28  On  this  whole  matter  c/.  Bouillier,  p.  74. 

80  Entretiens,  p.  42-43. 

81  Cf.  Joly,  p.  55f  and  p.  60f. 

82  Cf.  Victor  Cousin,  Fragments  de  philosophic  cartesienne. 
38  Oeachiehte  de  neuern  Philosophie,  Vol.  IT,  p.  86. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  63 

contingent  in  character.  Like  all  created  beings,  it  is  a  product 
of  the  free  act  of  God.  As  Joly  remarks,34  this  apercu — that  is, 
the  distinction  between  intelligible  and  material  extension — does 
sufficiently  distinguish  Malebranche  from  Spinoza.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  transcendent  God,  on  the  other,  the  immanent  God. 
The  discussion  between  de  Mairan  and  Malebranche  develops 
many  interesting  and  instructive  points.  Unfortunately  the  lim- 
its of  the  present  study  prevent  the  exposition  here. 

It  is  interesting  to  compare  this  demonstration  of  the  ex- 
istence of  God  with  the  arguments  of  Descartes.  Descartes  uses 
three  arguments.  The  first  is  from  the  idea  of  God  to  the  cause 
of  the  idea  of  God  which  can  only  be  God  himself.  "There  is 
no  doubt,"  he  says,  "that  those  (ideas)  which  represent  to  me 
substances  are  something  more  and  contain  so  to  speak  more 
objective  reality  within  them  (that  is  to  say,  by  representation 
participate  in  a  higher  degree  of  being  or  perfection)  than  those 
that  simply  represent  modes  and  accidents ;  and  that  idea  again 
by  which  I  understand  a  supreme  God,  eternal,  infinite,  immuta- 
ble, omniscient,  omnipotent,  and  creator  of  all  things  which  are 
outside  of  himself,  has  certainly  more  objective  reality  in  itself 
than  those  ideas  by  which  finite  substances  are  represented. 
Now  it  is  evident  by  the  natural  light  that  there  must  at  least 
be  as  much  reality  in  the  efficient  and  total  cause  as  in  its  ef- 
fect."35 Therefore  there  must  be  a  God  since  otherwise  we 
should  have  no  idea  of  him.  The  second  argument  is  essentially 
a  restatement  of  the  first.  What,  less  than  God,  can  be  the  cause 
of  the  existence  of  me  who  contain  in  myself  the  idea  of  God?36 
The  third  argument,  which  Descartes  says  has  the  appearance  of 
being  a  sophism,37  is  the  Ontological  Argument  in  its  purest 
form.  "But  when  I  think  of  it  with  more  attention,  I  clearly 
see  that  existence  can  no  more  be  separated  from  the  essence  of 
God  than  can  its  having  three  angles  equal  to  two  right  angles 
be  separated  from  the  essence  of  a  rectilinear  triangle,  or  the 
idea  of  a  mountain  from  the  idea  of  a  valley,  and  so  there  is 
not  any  less  repugnance  to  our  conceiving  a  God  (that  is,  a 
being  supremely  perfect)  to  whom  existence  is  lacking,  (that  is 
to  say,  to  whom  a  certain  perfection  is  lacking)  than  to  con- 
ceive of  a  mountain  which  has  no  valley. '  '38 

It  is,  of  course,  only  with  this  third  argument  that  Male- 
branche 's  argument  is  to  be  compared.  We  immediately  behold 
the  essence  and  existence  of  the  divine  being  and  discern  that 
they  are  inseparable.  Spinoza's  arguments  are  virtually  the 
same.  The  Ethics39  defines  God  as  "a  being  absolutely  infinite — 

34  Joly,  p.  81. 

35  Meditations,  Philosophical   Works,  Trans.  Ross  and  Haldane,  p.  162. 

36  Meditations,  Op.  cit.,  pp.  167-171. 

37  Op.  cit.,  p.  118. 

38  Op.  cit.,  p.  181. 

39  Chief  Works  of  Benedict  de  Spinoza,  trans,  by  R.  H.  M.  Elwes,  Vol.  II. 


64  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

that  is,  a  substance  consisting  in  infinite  attributes,  of  which 
each  expresses  eternal  and  infinite  essentiality."40  Proposition 
XI  establishes  the  conclusion  that  "God,  or  substance,  consist- 
ing of  infinite  attributes,  of  which  each  expresses  eternal  and 
infinite  essentiality,  necessarily  exists,"  because,  as  Proposition 
VII  states,  "Existence  belongs  to  the  nature  of  substance." 

Many  a  proposition  of  the  Ethics  might  have  been  written 
by  Malebranche.  Consider,  for  example,  the  following,  Proposi- 
tion XIII:  "Substance,  absolutely  infinite,  is  indivisible." 
Proposition  XV:  "Whatever  is,  is  in  God,  and  without  God 
nothing  can  be  or  be  conceived."  Proposition  XVII:  "God 
acts  solely  by  the  laws  of  his  own  nature  and  is  not  disturbed 
by  any  one."  Proposition  XX:  "The  existence  of  God  and 
his  essence  are  one  and  the  same."  Proposition  XXIV:  "The 
essence  of  things  produced  by  God  does  not  involve  existence." 
Proposition  XXV:  "God  is  the  efficient  cause  not  only  of  the 
existence  of  things  but  of  their  essence. ' '  Proposition  XXX : 
"Intellect  in  function  finite  or  in  function  infinite,  must  com- 
prehend the  attributes  of  God  and  the  modifications  of  God  and 
nothing  else."  Proposition  XXXI:  "The  intellect  in  function, 
whether  finite  or  infinite,  as  will,  desire,  love,  should  be  re- 
ferred to  passive  nature  and  not  to  active  nature."  These 
propositions  show  how  the  two  systems  tend  to  coincide,  al- 
though the  radical  difference  between  a  transcendent  and  an 
immanent  God  is  never  to  be  lost  sight  of.41 

Occasionalism.42 

In  the  Quatrieme  Entretien  Malebranche  discusses  the  na- 
ture of  sense,  the  wisdom  of  the  laws  of  the  union  of  the  soul 
and  the  body,  and  the  fact  that  this  union  was  changed  into 
dependence  by  the  sin  of  the  first  man.43  In  speaking  of  the 
nature  of  sense  he  adds  nothing  to  what  we  have  not  already 
brought  out  in  our  review  of  the  Recherche.  -The  chief  point  is 
the  subjectivity  of  sensible  qualities.44  •  'But  in  the  next  division 
of  the  dialogue  he  expounds  the  very  important  doctrine  of 
occasionalism  as  an  explanation  of  the  relation  between  mind 
and  body.  \  When  we  investigate  the  reason  of  certain  effects, 
and  ascend  from  effect  to  cause  we  come  in  the  end  to  a  general 
cause,  or  to  a  cause  which  one  clearly  sees  has  no  relation  to 
the  effect  that  it  produces,  and  then,  in  place  of  constructing 
chimeras,  we  must  have  recourse  to  the  author  of  nature.  If 

40  Part  I,  Def.  6. 

41  There  thus  seems  to  be  some  exaggeration  in  Hegel's  statement  that  "Die  Phil- 
osophic  des  Malebranche   hat  gam   denselben  Inhalt   olsder  Spinozismus,  aber   in  an- 
derer,  theolof/isher  Form."     Geschichte  der  Philosophic,  Werke,  1844,  XV,  p.  369.    On 
the  relation  between  Malebranche  and  Spinoza,  cf.  Kuno  Fischer,  Geschichte  der  neu- 
ern  Philosophic,  Vol.  II,  Ed.  5,  p.  80f. 

42  On  the  whole  matter  of  occasionalism  cf.  Novaro,  op.  cit.,  p.  43. 

43  Entretiens.  p.  69. 

44  Entretiens.  p.  76  77.    Cf.  Kuno  Fischer,  Op.  cit.,  p.  54. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  65 

you  ask  me  the  cause  of  the  pain  that  we  feel  when  we  are 
pricked,  I  should  be  wrong  in  answering  at  once  that  it  is  one 
of  the  laws  of  the  author  of  nature  that  being  pricked  is  fol- 
lowed by  pain.  I  should  first  tell  you  that  the  fibers  of  our  flesh 
cannot  be  separated  without  disturbing  our  nerves  which  reach 
to  the  brain,  and  without  disturbing  the  brain  itself.  But  if  you 
wish  to  know  whence  it  comes  about  that  when  a  certain  part  of 
my  brain  is  disturbed  in  this  way,  I  feel  the  pain  of  being 
pricked,  we  can  assign  no  further  natural  or  particular  cause 
but  must  refer  to  the  author  of  nature.44  —We  clearly  see  that 
there  can  be  no  necessary  connection  between  the  disturbances 
of  the  brain  and  the  feelings  of  the  soul ;  therefore,  we  must 
have  recourse  to  a  power  which  is  not  contained  in  these  two 
beings.45  There  is  no  metamorphosis  of  physical  event  into  phy- 
sical event.  The  disturbance  of  the  brain  cannot  change  itself 
into  a  mental  state.46 — When  we  press  the  corner  of  the  eye,  you 
see  light;  this  is  because  he  who  alone  can  act  upon  minds  has 
established  certain  laws  according  to  which  body  and  soul  re- 
ciprocally correspond  to  each  other.46  You  see  a  light  where 
there  is  no  luminous  body  because  luminous  bodies  act  in  a  sim- 
ilar way  on  the  nervous  system  and  the  brain,  and  God  acts  ac- 
cording to  constant  laws.47  God  performs  no  miracles,  says 
Malebranche  in  this  connection.48  His  conduct  always  bears  the 
character  of  his  attributes;  it  remains  forever  the  same,  unless 
in  some  circumstances,  his  immutability  is  a  lesser  consideration 
as  compared  with  some  other  of  his  perfections.48  God  does  not 
stand  "les  bras  croises;"  everything  that  happens  in  the  world 
is  an  expression  of  his  activity.49—  There  is  no  necessary  connec- 

45  Cardinal    Mercier,    in   the   work    cited    above,    offers   the    following   criticism    of 
occasionalism :     "If  I  consider  myself  acting,   I  become  conscious  of  two  things :   first, 
that  my  act  is  real,  and,  secondly,  that  until  it  is  over  and  done  with  it  is  thoroughly 
dependent  upon  me."    "If  we  study  the  things  of  nature  we  see  a  marvelous  variety  of 
type,   in  internal  constitution  and  in  function.      Now  what  is  all  this  profuse  variety 
in  their  natures   for,   if  they   are   not  efficient   causes  ?      Such  richness   would  be  pur- 
poseless and  a  meaningless  prodigality."    Op.  dt.,  Vol.  I,   p.   540.      Furthermore,    "oc- 
casionalism  compromises   free-will,"    (p.    540),    "leads  to   idealism,"    (p.  ^>40)    and   to 
"pantheism"    (p.  540). 

46  Entretiens,  p.   78.     Thus  Leibniz's  famous  figure  of  the  clock-maker,   who  was 
obliged  continually  to  readjust  his  clocks  to  keep  them  running  together,  is  a  very  in- 
accurate  description  of   occasionalism.      This   conception  of   God's  action   taking  place 
according  to  universal  decrees,  and  not  according  to  particular  decrees,  is  one  of  Male- 
branche's  most  important  theological  positions.      The  difference  between  Liebniz's  pre- 
established  harmony  and  Malebranche's  occasionalism  is  very  nearly  one  of  names,  for 
both  thinkers  believed  in  an  immutable  God,  who  foresees  everything,  and  rules  every- 
thing according  to  an  unchanging  will.     We  are  sorry  to  note  that  Mr.  Russell,  in  his 
scholarly   Philosophy   of  Leibniz,   accepts   Leibniz's   misinterpretation   of   Malebranche. 
Russell  says:      "The   advantage  which   he    (Leibniz)    had  over   occasionalism,    and   of 
which  he  made  the  most,  was  that  by  the  activity  of  every  substance  he  was  able  to 
preserve   the   harmony    of   all    the    series,    without   the   perpetual    intervention   of    God. 
This  advantage  was  already  secured  in  Spinoza,  but  not  in  occasionalism  such  as  that 
of   Malebranche"    (p.    136f).      One   hour's   reading   of   Malebranche    would   have   con. 
vinced  Mr.  Russell  of  the  contrary. 

47  Entretiens,  p.  79. 

48  Entretiens,  p.  80. 
48  Entretiens,  p.  80. 


(J6  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

tion  between  the  two  substances  of  which  we  are  composed.49 
There  is  no  relation  of  causality  from  body  to  mind  or  from 
mind  to  body.50  God  ceaselessly  wills  that  certain  disturbances 
of  the  brain  be  always  joined  with  certain  thoughts,  and  it  is 
this  constant  and  efficacious  will  of  the  creator  that  produces  the 
union  of  the  two  substances.50  — 

Why  did  God  will  to  join  mind  and  body?  The  answer  is, 
apparently,  that  God  wished  to  give  us  as  he  gave  to  his  Son,  a 
victim  which  we  could  offer  to  him.50  He  wished  to  make  us 
merit,  by  sacrifice  and  self-annihilation,  the  possession  of  eternal 
goods.50  For  this  reason  we  have  our  bodies.  That  our  bodily 
life  might  be  conserved  and  at  the  same  time  our  souls  directed 
as  far  as  possible  upon  eternal  goods,  God  has  established  as  an 
occasional  cause  of  the  confused  knowledge  we  have  of  the  pres- 
ence of  objects,  and  of  their  properties  in  relation  to  us,  not  the 
activity  of  attention,  but  diverse  disturbances  in  our  brains.51 
He  has  given  us  distinct  witnesses,  not  of  the  nature  and  prop- 
erties of  the  bodies  that  surround  us,  but  of  their  relation  to  our 
own  bodies,  to  the  end  that  we  be  able  to  work  with  success  for 
the  conservation  of  our  lives  without  being  incessantly  attentive 
to  our  needs.51  We  are,  however,  subordinated  to  our  bodies  to 
the  extent  that  we  are  by  reason  of  the  original  sin.52  That  a 
prick  warn  me  is  just  and  conformable  to  order,  but  that  it 
should  trouble  me,  make  me  unhappy,  disturb  my  ideas  and 
prevent  me  from  thinking  of  true  goods,  is  a  disorder,  and  is 
unworthy  of  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  the  creator.53  The 
explanation  is  that  the  human  spirit  has  lost  before  God  its  dig- 
nity and  excellence ;  we  are  sinners  worthy  of  the  divine  wrath.54 

Image  and  Meaning. 

The  Cinquieme  Entretien  discusses  the  use  of  the  senses  in 
science,  the  distinction  between  clear  ideas  and  confused  feel- 
ing, and  the  fact  that  the  idea  illumines  the  mind,  while  it  is 
by  feeling  (sentiment)  that  the  intelligible  idea  becomes  sensi- 
ble.55 It  will  not  be  necessary  to  dwell  very  long  on  this  dia- 
logue since  the  main  ideas  have  already  been  brought  out  in  our 
earlier  discussion.  We  may  content  ourselves  with  noting  an 
admirably  clear  statement  of  the  relation  between  image  and 
meaning,  to  use  the  language  of  modern  psychology.  It.  is  not 
sense,  but  reason  joined  to  sense,  that  enlightens  us  and  discloses 
the  truth  to  us.56  It  is  the  clear  idea  of  extension  and  not  black 
and  white  which  are  only  feelings,  only  confused  modalities  of 
sense,  that  gives  mathematical  truth.56  In  our  perception  of 

50  Entretien*,  p.  81. 

51  Entretiens,  p.  84. 

52  Entretiens,  p.  88. 

53  Entretiens,  p.  87. 

54  Entretiens,  p.  88. 

55  Entretiens,  p.  96. 
58  Entretiens,  p.  100. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  67 

sensible  objects  there  is  always  a  clear  idea  and  a  confused  feel- 
ing; the  idea  represents  their  essence,  the  feeling  informs  us  of 
their  existence.56  The  first  gives  us  their  nature,  properties,  and 
relation  among  themselves ;  the  second  the  relation  they  bear  to 
the  convenience  and  conservation  of  life.56  But  as  a  whole  this 
dialogue  adds  very  little  to  what  we  have  learned  from  the 
Recherche. 

The  Existence  of  Bodies. 

The  Sixieme  Entretien,  on  the  contrary,  on  proofs  of  the 
existence  of  bodies  drawn  from  revelation,  on  the  two  sorts  of 
revelation,  and  upon  natural  revelation  as  an  occasion  of  error, 
is  relatively  important.57 

There  are  sciences  of  two  sorts:  One  sort  considers  the  re- 
lations of  ideas;  the  other,  the  relations  of  things  by  means  of 
their  ideas.58  The  first  sort  are  evident  in  every  way;  the  sec- 
ond are  only  evident  on  the  supposition  that  things  resemble 
the  ideas  we  have  of  them  and  according  to  which  we  reason.58 
These  latter  sciences  are  very  useful  but  they  involve  great  ob- 
scurity, for  they  presuppose  facts  concerning  which  it  is  impos- 
sible to  know  the  exact  truth.  But  if  we  can  find  some  means 
of  assuring  ourselves  of  the  truth  of  our  suppositions,  we  can 
avoid  error  and  at  the  same  time  discover  truths  which  more 
closely  concern  us.59  Thus  the  best  use  that  we  can  make  of  our 
minds  is  to  discover  what  things  are  related  to  us,  what  things 
can  make  us  happy  and  perfect.59  Thus  it  seems  that  the  best 
use  we  can  make  of  our  minds  is  to  attempt  to  understand  the 
truths  which  we  believe  by  faith.59  We  believe  these  great 
truths,  but  that  does  not  dispense  those  who  can  from  filling 
their  minds  with  them  and  convincing  themselves  of  them  in  all 
possible  ways.59  For  faith  is  given  us  to  regulate  all  the  move- 
ments of  our  minds  as  well  as  those  of  our  hearts.60  It  is  given 
us  to  lead  us  to  the  understanding  of  those  very  truths  it 
teaches.60 

A  man  must  be  a  good  philosopher  to  enter  into  the  truths 
of  faith,  and  the  stronger  one  is  in  the  truths  of  religion  the 
stronger  one  is  in  metaphysics.61  Good  philosophers  can  not 

57  Entretiens,  p.  120. 
68  Entretiens,  p.  122. 
M  Entretiens,  p.  123. 

60  Entretiens,  p.  124. 

61  Entretiens,  p.  125.    Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  139,  and  E.  Boutroux,  L'intellectualisme  de 
Malebranche,  Revue  de  Metaphysique  et  de  Morale,  Vol.  XXIII,  pp.  27-36.     In  this  last 
paper  it  is  shown  that  Malebranche,  although  an  intellectualist,  was  obliged  to  extend 
his  intellectualism   beyond  the  limits  of   mathematical  truth  and   make   it  include  reli- 
gious and  moral  truth.     Thus  Boutroux  says:    "Etant  donnee  1'impossibilite  de  reduire 
a  1'intelligible  mathematique  une  partie  considerable  des  choses  que  nous  tenons  pour 
des  realites,    telles    que   1'existence   du   monde   materiel   et   les   verites   morales  et  reli- 
gieuses  deux  partis  sont  possible:  ou  tenter  de  demontrer  que  ces  elements  refractaires 
ne  possedent  aucune  r£alit6  effective,  et  ne  sont  que  des  fantomes  de  notre  imagina- 
tion;   ou   se   demander   si   1'intelligence   mathfimatique  est   bien    toute   1' intelligence,    si 
1'intelligence   ne  comporterait  pas  des  modes  de  penser  et  de  comprendre,  analogues, 
mais  supe>ieurs  a  la  demonstration  mathematique.      De  cette  alternative,  Malebranche 
adopte  le  second  terme"   (p.  35). 


68  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

have  opinions  opposed  to  those  of  true  Christians.62  For  wheth- 
er Jesus  Christ,  the  Word,  eternal  reason,  speaks  to  philosophers 
in  their  most  secret  souls,  or  whether  he  instructs  Christians  by 
the  visible  authority  of  the  Church,  he  cannot  contradict  him- 
self.62 Truth  speaks  in  various  ways,  but  it  always  says  the 
same  thing.62  We  must  not  oppose  philosophy  to  religion,  unless 
indeed  it  is  the  false  philosophy  of  the  pagans,  which  does  not 
bear  the  stamp  of  truth,  that  invincible  evidence  which  com- 
pels all  attentive  minds  to  submit.62 

Now  there  are  three  sorts  of  beings  of  which  we  can  have 
knowledge:  God,  or  the  infinitely  perfect  being;  minds,  that 
we  only  know  by  our  inner  feeling  of  our  own  souls ;  and  bodies, 
the  existence  of  which  we  are  assured  of  by  a  revelation.63  For 
it  is  only  by  revelation  that  we  know  of  the  existence  of  bodies.64 
It  is  God  himself  who  produces  in  our  souls  all  the  different  feel- 
ings by  which  they  are  affected  on  the  occasion  of  changes  in 
our  bodies  in  accordance  with  the  general  laws  governing  the 
union  of  body  and  soul.64  These  laws  are  nothing  but  the  con- 
stant and  efficacious  decrees  of  the  creator.64  Thus  it  is  God 
himself  who  reveals  to  us  what  takes  place  outside  of  us.64  But 
perhaps  there  are  no  external  bodies?  Is  the  revelation  that 
God  gives  us  of  their  existence  certain?  It  is  certain  that  we 
see  certain  bodies  which  do  not  exist,  as  for  example  when  we 
sleep  or  fever  disturbs  our  brains.65  If  God  in  consequence  of 
his  general  laws  sometimes  gives  us  deceptive  perceptions,  could 
he  not  always  give  them  to  us?  Thus  it  seems  that  we  should 
suspend  our  judgment  on  the  existence  of  bodies.65 

*  It  is  true  that  no  exact  demonstration  of  the  existence  of 
bodies  can  be  given.65  On  the  contrary  it  is  possible  to  give  an 
exact  demonstration  that  such  a  demonstration  is  impossible.65 
For  the  notion  of  an  infinitely  perfect  being  includes  no  neces- 
sary relation  to  any  creature.66  God  is  fully  self-sufficient.86 
Matter  is  not  a  necessary  emanation  from  the  divinity,  whence 
it  follows  that  no  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  matter  is 
possible.66  The  existence  of  bodies  is  arbitrary ;  this  divine  res- 
olution is  not  like  the  decrees  involving  the  punishment  of  the 
wicked  and  the  compensation  of  good  works.  These  latter  de- 
crees of  God  and  many  others  like  them  are  necessarily  included 
-in  the  divine  reason,  that  substantial  law  which  is  the  inviolable 
rule  of  all  the  decrees  of  the  infinitely  perfect  being  and  gen- 
erally of  all  intelligences.66  The  will  to  create  bodies  is  not  nec- 
essarily included  in  the  notion  of  a  being  infinitely  perfect; 

62  Entretiens,  p.  125.    On  Malebranche's  theory  of  the  relation  of  faith  and  rea- 
son, see  Olle-Laprune,  La  phttosophie  de  Malebranche,  Vol.  I,  p.   lOOff.      Cf.  also  Joly, 
p.  149ff. 

63  Entretiens,  p.  126. 

64  Entrettens,  p.  127. 

65  Entretiens,  p.  128. 
86  Entretiens,  p.  129. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  £9 


9 


rather  this  notion  seems  to  exclude  such  a  will.06  Only  revela- 
tion can  assure  us  that  God  did  indeed  will  to  create  bodies. 
There  are  two  sorts  of  revelation,  natural  and  supernatural*7 
The  former  take  place  according  to  certain  general  laws  which 
are  known  to  us;  and  the  latter  either  according  to  certain  un- 
known general  laws,  or  by  particular  volitions  superadded  to 
the  general  laws.'57  Now  both  revelations  are  in  themselves  au- 
thentic.67 But  natural  revelation  is  now  an  occasion  of  error, 
not  because  in  itself  it  is  false  but  because  in  the  first  place  we 
do  not  make  the  proper  use  of  it,  and  secondly  because  original 
sin  has  corrupted  our  natures.67  The  general  rules  of  the  union 
of  mind  and  body  are  very  wisely  established.67  Whence,  then, 
comes  it  that  we  are  now  plunged  in  an  infinity  of  errors  ?  It  is 
because  our  minds  are  obscured,  because  our  union  with  uni- 
versal reason  is  greatly  enfeebled  by  the  dependence  upon  our 
bodies  in  which  our  sin  has  placed  us.68  As  God  follows  and 
ought  to  follow  exactly  the  laws  he  has  established  concerning 
the  union  of  the  two  natures  of  which  we  are  composed,  and  as 
we  have  lost  the  power  that  our  rebellious  animal  spirits  make 
in  the  brain,  we  mistake  phantoms  for  realities.69  But  the  cause 
of  our  error  is  not  precisely  the  falsity  of  the  natural  revela- 
tion, but  rather  the  impudence  and  temerity  of  our  judgments; 
in  a  word,  the  disorder  into  which  sin  has  thrown  us.69  Never- 
theless there  is  no  good  reason  for  doubting  the  existence  of 
bodies  in  general.69  We  see  that  the  errors  into  which  we  fall 
concerning  bodies  are  merely  because  the  irregularity  of  our 
conduct  cannot  influnce  the  uniformity  of  divine  action.69  There- 
fore, although  we  may  be  mistaken  concerning  the  existence  of 
such  and  such  a  body,  we  need  not  doubt  concerning  the  exist- 
ence of  bodies  in  general.  For  the  different  feelings  we  have 
of  them  are  so  consecutive,  so  chained  together  and  so  well  or- 
dered, that  it  appears  certain  that  God  would  have  to  have 
willed  to  deceive  us  were  nothing  of  all  that  we  see  real.70 

But  it  is  faith  that  gives  an  irresistible  demonstration  which 
cannot  be  resisted ;  for  whether  or  not  there  are  bodies,  it  is  cer- 
tain that  we  see  them  and  that  it  is  God  alone  who  gives  us  these 
perceptions.70  God,  then,  presents  to  my  mind  these  appear- 
ances of  men,  these  books,  these  preachers;  I  read  in  tHe  New 
Testament  of  the  miracles  of  the  Man-God,  of  his  resurrection, 
of  his  ascension  to  heaven,  of  the  preaching  of  the  apostles,  of 
its  fortunate  success  and  of  the  establishment  of  the  Church.70 
I  compare  all  these  appearances  with  my  ideas  of  God,  of  the 
beauty  of  religion,  of  the  sanctity  of  morality,  and  of  the  neces- 
sity of  a  cult;  and  at  length  I  am  led  to  believe  all  that  faith 

67  Entretien«,p.  131. 
88  Entretiens,p.  133. 
en  Entretiens,  p.  134. 
70  Entrctii-ns.  p.  135. 


70  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

teaches.70  I  believe  it  without  having  a  demonstrative  proof  of 
it,  for  nothing  seems  more  unreasonable  than  infidelity.70  Men 
need  an  authority  to  teach  them  truths  necessary  to  lead  them 
to  their  end.70  Now  faith  teaches  that  God  created  the  heavens 
and  the  earth,  and  teaches  me  that  the  Holy  Scripture  is  a  di- 
vine book.  This  book  tells  me  directly  and  positively  that  there 
are  thousands  and  thousands  of  creatures.71  Hence  my  "ap- 
pearances" change  into  "realities."71  "Thus  Malebranche  re- 
tires before  subjective  idealism  in  the  name  of  Christian  faith.72 


71  Entretiens,  p.  136. 

72  On  this  matter  cf.  Joly,  126ff.     For  a  special  study  of  the  problem  cf.  the  ex- 
istence of  an  outer  world  in  Malebranche's  system  cf.  Pillon,  L'evolution  de  Videalisme 
au  dix-huititme  siecle,  Malebranche  et  ses  critiques,  Annee  philosophique,  No.  4,  p.  108. 
Pillon  is  himself  a  subjective   idealist    (Cf.,  p.   206)    and  he   is  interested   in   showing 
the  relation  of  Malebranche's  doctrine  to  his  own  position.     Since  our  aim  is  merely 
to  present  the  doctrine  in  its  original  form,  we  have  not  given  any  account  of  Pillon's 
paper,   which,  valuable   as  it  is   in  itself,   adds  very  little  to  our  knowledge  of  what 
Malebranche  himself  thought. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  71 


CHAPTER  VII:    MALEBRANCHE'S  METAPHYSICS  AND 
THEOLOGY  (Continued). 

The  Divine  Omnipotence. 

The  Septieme  Entretien  is  on  the  inefficacy  of  natural 
causes,  or  the  powerlessness  of  creatures,  and  on  the  proposition 
that  it  is  only  to  God  that  we  are  directly  and  immediately 
united.1  As  we  have  already  seen  neither  mind  nor  matter  can 
affect  the  other.2  Neither  can  body  act  on  body.3  It  is  contra- 
dictory to  suppose  that  such  action  is  possible.  A  body  cannot 
move  itself.4  This  is  evident  from  the  pure  essence  of  matter, 
intelligible  extension.5  Now  a  body  must  be  either  in  rest  or 
motion,  and  it  is  self-contradictory  for  a  body  to  be  in  neither 
rest  nor  motion. 

The  same  will  that  created  bodies  always  subsists,  and  should 
this  will  cease  to  exist,  bodies  would  necessarily  cease  to  exist.8 
It  is,  then,  this  same  will  that  puts  bodies  in  rest  or  motion,  for 
it  gives  them  existence,  and,  as  existing,  they  must  be  in  either 
rest  or  motion.6  Hence  it  is  self-contradictory  that  God  should 
make  a  body  and  not  give  it  either  rest  or  motion/5  It  is  sup- 
posed that  when  the  moment  of  creation  is  past,  God  no  longer 
gives  bodies  their  rest  or  motion;  but  the  moment  of  creation 
never  passes.6  Should  God  cease  to  will  that  there  be  a  world, 
the  world  would  be  annihilated,  for  the  world  depends  on  the 
will  of  the  creator.7  The  conservation  of  creatures  is  only  their 
continued  creation.7  When  a  human  architect  dies,  the  house 
he  has  built  may  remain,  but  we  depend  essentially  upon  the 
creator.7  Since  bodies  depend  essentially  upon  the  creator,  they 
only  exist  as  sustained  by  his  continual  influence,  and  thus  what- 
ever takes  place  in  the  world  is  only  an  expression  of  divine 
activity.8  The  greatest,  most  fertile  and  most  necessary  of  prin- 
ciples is  that  God  does  not  communicate  his  power  to  creatures 
and  only  unites  them  with  each  other  by  making  their  modali- 
ties occasional  causes  of  effects  he  himself  produces.9  One 
moving  ball  does  not  move  another  upon  collision ;  for  one  body 
can  only  communicate  its  motion  to  another  body  by  communi- 

Entretiens,  p.  141.     Cf.  Olle-Laprune,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  321ff. 

Entretiens,  p.  144f. 

Entretiens,  p.  149. 

Entretiens,  p.  150f. 

Entretiens,  p.  151. 

Entretiens,  p.  152.   Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  116f. 

Entretiens,  p.  153. 

Entretiens,  p.  155.   Cf.  Kuno  Fischer,  op.  cit.,  p.  56. 

Entretien*,  p.  158. 


72  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

eating  its  moving  force ;  but  the  moving  force  of  a  moving  body 
is  not  a  quality  that  belongs  to  the  body  but  is  the  will  of  the 
creator  which  successively  sustains  it  in  existence  in  different 
places.10 

Thus  creatures  are  united  only  to  God,  and  depend  directly 
and  essentially  upon  him.11  We  have  nothing  that  comes  from 
our  own  nature,  or  from  the  imaginary  Nature  of  the  philoso- 
phers, but  everything  comes  from  God.12  God  himself  is  pres- 
ent in  the  midst  of  us,  not  as  a  simple  spectator,  but  as  the 
principle  of  our  society,  the  bond  of  our  friendship,  and  the 
soul  of  our  commerce.12 

It  is  interesting  to  observe  that  Hume's  rejection  of  Male- 
branche's  theory  is  a  consequence  of  his  dictum  that  all  knowl- 
edge comes  from  impressions.  In  the  Treatise,  for  example, 
Hume  says:  " Matter,  they  (the  Cartesians)  say,  is  entirely 
unactive,  and  depriv'd  of  any  power,  by  which  it  may  produce 
or  continue  or  communicate  motion.  But  since  these  effects  are 
evident  to  our  senses,  and  since  the  power  that  produces  them 
must  be  placed  somewhere,  it  must  lie  in  the  Deity,  or  that 
divine  being,  who  contains  in  his  nature  all  excellency  and  per- 
fection. .  .  .  This  opinion  is  certainly  very  curious,  and  well 
worth  our  attention;  but  'twill  appear  superfluous  to  examine 
it  in  this  place  if  we  reflect  a  moment  on  our  present  purpose  in 
taking  notice  of  it.  We  have  established  it  as  a  principle,  that 
as  all  ideas  are  derived  from  impressions,  or  some  precedent 
perceptions,  'tis  impossible  we  can  have  any  idea  of  power  and 
efficacy,  unless  some  instances  can  be  produced,  wherein  this 
power  is  perceived  to  exert  itself.  Now,  as  these  instances  can 
never  be  discovered  in  body,  the  Cartesians,  proceeding  upon 
their  principle  of  innate  ideas,  have  had  recourse  to  a  supreme 
spirit  or  deity,  whom  they  consider  as  the  only  active  being  in 
the  universe,  and  as  the  immediate  cause  of  every  alteration  in 
matter.  But  the  principle  of  innate  ideas  being  allowed  to  be 
false,  it  follows  that  the  supposition  of  a  deity  can  serve  us  in 
no  stead,  in  accounting  for  that  idea  of  agency,  which  we  search 
for  in  vain  in  all  the  objects  which  are  presented  to  our  senses, 
or  which  we  are  internally  conscious  of  in  our  own  minds.  For, 
if  every  idea  be  derived  from  an  impression,  the  idea  of  a  deity 
proceeds  from  the  same  origin ;  and  if  no  impression  either  of 
sensation  or  reflection,  implies  any  force  or  efficacy,  'tis  equally 
impossible  to  discover  in  such  a  principle;  the  same  course  of 
reasoning  should  determine  them  to  exclude  it  from  the  supreme 
being.  "13  This  passage  sets  the  relation  of  Hume  to  Malebranche 
in  a  clear  light.  It  is  maintained  by  Dr.  Doxsee14  that  Hume 

10  Entretieng,  p.  159. 

11  Entretiens,  p.  164. 

12  Entretiens,  p.  165. 

18  Hume's  Treatise  on  Human  Nature,  Ed.  Green  and  Grose,  1886,  p.  454. 
«  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  XXV,  pp.  692-701. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  73 

and  Malebranche  make  "a  very  similar  analysis  of  causation."15 
There  is  a  good  deal  of  truth  in  this  position,  but  yet  as  Dr. 
Doxsee  himself  says,  "Although  Malebranche  remarkably  an- 
ticipates the  position  that  was  later  to  be  developed  by  Hume^ 
the  final  place  of  causation  in  his  system  is  by  no  means  what 
the  analysis  just  outlined  would  seem  to  indicate.  All  the  causal 
efficacy  that  he  denies  to  finite  creatures  he  attributed  to  God. '  '16 
The  difference  between  Malebranche  and  Hume  remains  as  rad- 
ical as  the  difference  between  a  rationalist  and  empiricist  must 
always  be.  For  Malebranche,  we  must  remember,  has  no  occa- 
sion to  deny  causality  in  principle,  as  Hume  was  forced  to;  on 
the  contrary,  his  philosophy  merely  focuses  causality  in  a  su- 
preme cause  without  questioning  the  validity  of  the  concept 
itself. 

The  Attributes  of  God. 

The  Huitieme  Entretien,  on  God  and  his  attributes,  devel- 
ops the  same  theme.  By  Divinity  we  understand  the  infinite, 
being  without  restriction,  the  infinitely  perfect  being.17  We 
know  that  he  exists  by  the  thought  of  him.17  God  is  independ- 
ent, hence  he  is  immutable.18  He  cannot  be  affected  by  outer 
causes;  hence,  should  he  change,  he  must  needs  change  him- 
self.18 But  although  God  is  absolutely  free,  he  does  not  change 
himself.18  God  forms  his  eternal  decrees  according  to  his  eternal 
wisdom,  which  is  the  inviolable  rule  of  his  actions,  and  although 
the  effects  of  these  decrees  are  infinite  and  they  produce  thou- 
sands and  thousands  of  changes  in  the  universe,  they  are  them- 
selves unchanging.19  But  how  can  God  be  both  free  and  im- 
mutable? The  answer  is  that  in  God  there  is  no  succession  of 
thoughts  and  volitions.  By  an  eternal  and  immutable  act  he 
knows  and  wills  all  that  he  knows  and  wills.  He  wills  with  per- 
fect liberty  and  entire  indifference  to  create  the  world;  but  his 
decrees  assumed,  they  cannot  be  changed.19  They  are  not  abso- 
lutely necessary,  but  necessary  by  the  force  of  the  supposition.20 
Certain  of  his  decrees  only  hold  for  a  limited  time;  these  are 
those  concerning  miracles.  When  that  time  arrives,  he  does  not 
change  his  mind,  for  these  special  decrees  have  been  included 
in  that  eternal  act  of  will  which  is  related  to  all  the  times  he 
includes  in  his  eternity.20 

God,  then,  is  all-powerful,  eternal,  necessary  and  immense. 
He  is  immense  because  the  divine  substance  is  everywhere;  in 
the  universe  and  beyond  it.21  God's  work  is  contained  in  him; 
but  he  is  not  contained  in  his  work.21  It  is  because  he  is  not 

15  Doxsee,  op.  cit.,  p.  692. 

16  Op.  cit.,  p.  699. 

17  Entretiens,  p.  174. 

18  Entretiens,  p.  175. 

19  Entretiens,  p.  176. 

20  Entretiens,  p.  177. 

21  Entretiens,  p.  179. 


74  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

corporeal  that  he  is  everywhere.21  Were  he  corporeal  he  could 
not  penetrate  bodies  as  he  does.21  The  divine  substance  does 
not  possess  local  extension  and  is  not  more  present  in  an  ele- 
phant than  in  a  fly.22  Created  extension  is  to  the  divine  im- 
mensity as  time  is  to  eternity.  There  is  neither  past  nor  future 
in  his  existence,  and  in  the  same  way,  there  is  in  his  substance 
neither  great  nor  small  but  everything  is  simple,  equal  and  in- 
finite.22 God's  existence  is  completely  in  eternity,  and  complete- 
ly in  every  moment  of  his  eternity,  in  the  same  way  God  is  not 
partly  in  the  sky  and  partly  in  the  earth,  but  he  is  completely 
in  his  immensity,  and  completely  in  every  body  that  is  ex- 
tended in  his  immensity;  he  is  completely  contained  in  every 
part  of  matter  although  matter  is  infinitely  divisible.  God  is 
extended  since  he  contains  in  himself  all  perfections,  but  he  is 
not  extended  like  bodies.23 

But  the  divine  immensity  is  not  to  be  confused  with  intelli- 
gible extension.24  The  immensity  of  God  is  the  fact  that  his 
substance  is  everywhere  without  local  extension.25  But  intelli- 
gible extension  is  only  the  substance  of  God  in  so  far  as  his  sub- 
stance is  representative  of  bodies.  It  is  the  idea  or  archetype 
of  bodies.26  No  finite  mind  can  understand  the  immensity  of 
God,  but  on  the  other  hand  nothing  is  more  clear  than  intelli- 
gible extension.26  In  fact,  extension  is  an  attribute  that  is  to- 
tally inadequate  to  the  divine  essence.  The  property  of  the 
infinite  that  is  unintelligible  to  the  human  mind  is  that  it  is  at 
the  same  time  one  and  all  things,  composed  of  an  infinity  of  per- 
fections, and  so  simple  that  each  perfection  it  contains  includes 
all  the  others  without  any  real  distinction.27  This  property  is 
more  in  agreement  with  the  nature  of  the  soul,  which,  without 
any  composition  of  parts,  receives  at  the  same  time  different 
modalities,  than  it  is  with  that  of  extension.27  Thus  there  is  no 
substance  more  imperfect  and  more  removed  from  the  divinity 
than  matter.27 

That  "impious  man"  of  Malebranche 's  own  time,  Spinoza, 
who  made  the  universe  his  God,  had  in  truth  no  God  and  was  a 
veritable  atheist.29  On  the  other  hand,  many  good  people  have 

22  Entretiens,  p.  180,  and  cf.  Bouillier,  p.  109. 
22  Entretiens,  p.  180. 

28  Entretiens,  p.  184. 

24  As   Bouillier   remarks,    Malebranche   was    accused   by   Arnauld    of    making    God 
corporeal  and  of  deifying  the  material  universe.     In  a  word,  he  was  accused  of  Spi- 
nozism.     Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  49.     But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  as  Bouillier  says,  Malebranche 
places  extension  in  God,   not  formaliter,  but  eminenter.     And,   as  we  have  seen,   it  is 
by  the  distinction  between  intelligible  and  material  extension  that  he  answers  de  Mai- 
ran.      Cf.   Bouillier,   p.   51,    and  Joly,  p.    79,  as  well  as  M.   Ginsberg,   The  Nature  of 
Knowledge    as    conceived    by    Malebranche,    Proceedings    of    the    Aristotelian    Society, 
1916-17,   p.    174. 

25  Entretiens,  p.  186. 

26  Entretiens,  p.  187. 

27  Entretiens,  p.  188. 

29  Entretiens,  p.   189.      Cf.  Bouillier,  p.   106.     On  Malebranche  and  Spinoza  con- 
sult P.  Janet,  Le  Spinozisme  en  France,  Revue  Philosophique,  p.  HOf,  1882. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  75 

an  unworthy  idea  of  the  divinity.  They  regard  God  as  the  cre- 
ator of  the  universe  and  as  nothing  more ;  we  cannot  avoid  com- 
plaining of  the  idea  they  form  of  the  infinite  being.  Men  hu- 
manize all  things,  and  strip  the  infinitely  perfect  being  of  all 
his  essential  attributes.29 

If  we  consult  the  idea  of  an  infinitely  perfect  being,  we  see 
that  omniscience  is  involved  in  it.30  God  knows  in  himself  all 
that  He  knows.31  He  is  not  only  wise  but  is  wisdom  itself,  not 
only  enlightenment  but  the  light  that  enlightens.31  It  is  by  this 
wisdom  that  one  of  us  sees  what  another  sees.  1  see  that  two 
plus  two  are  four,  and  I  am  certain  that  God  sees  this  and  that 
all  minds  either  actually  do  or  are  able  to  see  this.31  There  is, 
however,  this  great  difference  between  finite  minds  and  the 
mind  of  God ;  God  is  wise  by  His  own  wisdom,  and  we  are  wise 
by  union  with  His  wisdom.32  The  question  may  be  asked  wheth- 
er, when  God  sees  that  two  plus  two  is  four,  and  at  the  same 
time  two  persons  behold  the  same  truth,  may  there  not  be,  not 
one  truth  which  all  three  minds  behold,  but  three  similar  truths  ? 
On  the  contrary,  there  are  three  similar  perceptions  of  one  and 
the  same  truth.  And  we  know  that  the  perceptions  are  similar, 
because  we  know  that  one  and  the  same  truth  is  perceived.33 
Thus  God  is  not  only  the  efficient  cause  of  our  knowledge,  but 
also  the  formal  cause.33 

Justice  is  also  an  attribute  of  the  divinity.  God  includes 
in  the  simplicity  of  his  being  ideas  of  all  things  and  of  their 
infinite  relations.33  We  can  distinguish  in  God  two  sorts  of 
truths,  relations  of  magnitude  and  relations  of  perfection,  spec- 
ulative and  practical  truths,  relations  which  arouse  judgments 
by  reason  of  their  evidence  and  relations  which  furthermore) 
excite  movements.34  Twice  two  is  four,  and  a  man  is  worth 
more  than  an  animal;  in  the  first,  we  have  a  speculative  truth 
or  relation  of  magnitude;  in  the  second,  we  have  a  relation  of 
perfection.34  God  knows  and  loves  all  that  he  includes  within 
the  simplicity  of  His  being,  and  he  loves  everything  in  propor- 
tion to  its  perfection  or  according  as  it  is  lovable.34  He  loves 
the  immutable  order  which  consists  of  the  relations  of  perfection. 
He  is  thus  essentially  just.  He  cannot  positively  and  directly 
will  that  any  disorder  occur  in  His  works,  for  he  esteems  all 
creatures  according  to  the  perfections  of  their  archetypes.34 

God  is  neither  good,  nor  merciful,  nor  patient,  as  these 
things  are  commonly  understood.35  Such  ideas  are  unworthy  of 
the  infinitely  perfect  being.35  Nevertheless  he  regards  good 

80  Entretiens,  p.  191. 
31  Entretiens,  p.  192. 
82  Entretiens,  p.  193. 

33  Entretiens,  p.  194.     Bouillier  makes  it  clear  that  without  the  presupposition  of 
a  universal  truth  we  are  forced  into  skepticism,  p.  63.     On  the  eternal  truths  cf.  O116- 
Laprune,  Vol.  I,  pp.  208ff. 

34  Entretiens,  p.  195. 

35  Entretiens,  p.  198. 


76  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

works  and  punishes  those  who  offend  him.35  God  does  not  de- 
pend upon  us;  and  is  completely  self-sufficient.36  Our  minds 
are  without  wills  save  in  so  far  as  God  ceaselessly  impresses  upon 
us  a  natural  and  irresistible  love  of  the  good.36  God  only  acts 
in  us  because  he  wills  to  act  in  us  according  to  his  love  of  him- 
self and  of  his  divine  perfections.37  He  can  not  will  that  our 
love  which  is  the  effect  of  his  own  be  directed  upon  the  less 
lovable  in  the  place  of  the  more  lovable.  He  wills  that  the  im- 
mutable Order  be  our  law.  Since  he  has  made  us  free  to  follow 
or  not  to  follow  that  Order  we  can  be  punished  and  rewarded.37 
The  sinner  does  not  offend  God  as  one  man  offends  another,  nor 
does  God  punish  him  for  the  sake  of  the  pleasure  of  vengeance, 
but  God  punishes  him  because  he  cannot  act  otherAvise  than  ac- 
cording to  the  immutable  order  of  his  perfections.37  God  is 
always  severe,  always,  an  exact  observer  of  the  eternal  laws.38 

The  Theory  of  Providence. 

The  Neuvieme  Entretien  develops  further  the  theory  of 
Providence.  First  of  all,  the  errors  of  pantheism  must  be  re- 
futed. It  is  supposed  that  the  infinitely  perfect  being  can  will 
nothing,  and  that  we  are  ourselves  a  necessary  emanation  from 
the  Divinity.39  Malebranche  finds  it  difficult  to  believe  that 
there  have  been  philosophers  who  really  held  this  view.40  Even 
the  author  who  revived  this  impiety  (Spinoza)  agrees  that  God 
is  an  infinitely  perfect  being.41  And  if  this  is  true,  how  could 
created  things  be  only  parts  and  modifications  of  the  divinity? 
Is  it  perfection  to  be  unjust  in  his  parts,  unhappy,  ignorant, 
brutal,  impious?  There  are  more  sinners  than  virtuous  people; 
more  idolaters  than  believers ;  what  a  conflict  between  the  divin- 
ity and  his  own  parts!  A  God  necessarily  hated,  blasphemed, 
and  unknown  by  the  greater  part  of  what  he  is !  A  God  aveng- 
ing himself  upon  himself,  an  infinitely  perfect  being  composed 
of  all  the  disorders  of  the  universe  !42 

The  question  inevitably  arises,  however,  as  to  why  the  infi- 
nitely perfect  being  created  us  when  he  had  no  need  of  us.  How 
could  a  being  to  whom  nothing  was  lacking  will  anything?  The 
infinitely  perfect  being  necessarily  loves  his  own  perfections; 
the  movement  of  his  love  cannot  lead  Him  elsewhere.43  In  God 
any  other  love  besides  love  for  himself  would  be  a  lawless  love.44 
We  can  say  that  God  created  us  out  of  pure  goodness,  but  only 

36  Entretiens,  p.  199. 
87  Entretiens,  p.  200. 

38  Entretien*,    p.    201.      On   the   attributes    of   God    in    Malebranche's    system,    see 
Olle-Laprune.     La  philosophic  de  Malebranche,  Vol.  I,  p.  357ff. 

39  Entretiens,  p.  205. 

40  Entretiens,  p.  206. 

41  Malebranche  calls   Spinoza   a  veritable  athee    (Entretiens,  VIII)    and  a  miser- 
able  (Meditations  metaphysique  et  chretiennes,  IX).     Cf.  Bouillier,  p.  33  and  p.  35. 

42  Entretiens,  p.  206. 
48  Entretiens,  p.  207. 
44  Entretiens,  p.  208. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  77 

in  the  sense  that  he  had  no  need  of  us.44  But  we  were  made  for 
him  and  the  motive  and  end  of  his  decrees  can  only  be  found 
in  himself.44  In  what  sense  may  God  be  said  to  have  created  the 
world  for  his  glory  ?  When  an  architect  has  made  a  building  of 
excellent  architecture  he  takes  a  secret  satisfaction  in  it,  for  the 
work  witnesses  the  skill  of  his  art.45  Thus  one  can  say  that  the 
beauty  of  his  work  does  him  honor,  because  it  bears  the  char- 
acter of  the  qualities  he  esteems  and  loves.45  When  a  second 
person  contemplates  the  work  of  the  architect  and  admires  the 
proportions,  the  architect  draws  therefrom  a  second  glory  which 
is  chiefly  founded  on  the  love  and  admiration  he  has  of  his  own 
qualities  as  an  architect.46  Now  God  loves  his  own  qualities  and 
his  work  which  expresses  these  attributes  thus  glorifies  him,  as 
the  work  of  the  architect  glorifies  him.  Whether  or  not  men 
honor  the  works  of  God  as  they  should,  he  draws  eternal  glory 
from  them.46  Nevertheless  this  glory  would  not  be  enough  to 
determine  him  to  act,  unless  there  were  something  divine  and 
infinite  in  the  world  itself.47  The  universe,  however  great,  how- 
ever perfect  it  may  be,  in  so  far  as  it  is  finite  is  unworthy  of  a 
God  whose  worth  is  infinite.47  Now  only  union  with  a  divine 
person  can  render  the  world  worthy  of  being  created  by  a  di- 
vine being.47  God  foresaw  and  permitted  the  original  sin;  this 
proves  that  a  universe  redeemed  by  Jesus  Christ  is  better  than  a 
universe  without  sin.48  The  Incarnation  of  the  Word  in  Jesus 
Christ  first  renders  the  world  worthy  of  its  creator.49 

But  why  did  God  wait  for  an  eternity  before  creating  the 
world?  It  is  because  he  must  leave  the  finite  creature  the  es- 
sential marks  of  finitude;  now  the  great  mark  of  dependence  is 
to  have  not  existed.  An  eternal  world  would  appear  as  a  nec- 
essary emanation  from  the  divinity.50  God  draws  from  the 
world,  through  Jesus  Christ,  a  glory  that  satisfies  him,  but  were 
this  glory  eternal,  it  would  offend  his  attributes,  which  He  must 
always  respect.50 

The  Explanation  of  Evil. 

It  is  in  this  same  Neuvieme  Entretien  that  Malebranche 
formulates  his  theory  of  Providence  in  so  far  as  it  is  an  explana- 
tion of  evil.51  God  did  not  wish  to  make  his  work  as  perfect  as 
possible  without  regard  to  the  ways  in  which  he  made  it,  but  as 
perfect  as  possible  in  relation  to  ways  that  are  worthy  of  him.52 
What  God  absolutely  wills  is  to  act  always  in  the  most  divine 

45  Entretiens,  p.  209. 

46  Entretiens,  p.  210. 

47  Entretiens,  p.  211. 

48  Entretiens,  p.  212. 

49  Entretiens,  p.  214. 

50  Entretiens,  p.  216.     Of.  Bouillier,  p.  117f,  Joly,  p.  87f,  and  p.  165f. 

51  On  Arnauld's  criticism  of  Malebranche's  theory  of  Providence,  cf.  Olle'-Laprune, 
Vol.   II,  pp.  42ff. 

52  Entretie.ns,  p.  223. 


78  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

fashion  that  he  can.52  God  sees  from  all  eternity  all  possible 
works  and  all  possible  ways  to  produce  each  one  of  them,  and 
as  he  acts  only  for  his  own  glory,  only  according  to  what  he  is, 
he  is  determined  to  choose  the  work  which  can  be  produced  and 
conserved  by  ways  which,  joined  to  this  work,  honor  him  more 
than  any  other  works  produced  by  any  other  ways.52  Not  only 
his  work  but  his  ways  must  bear  the  character  of  his  attributes.53 
If  a  world  more  perfect  than  ours  could  only  be  created  and 
conserved  by  less  perfect  ways,  God  is  too  wise  and  loves  his 
glory  too  well,  to  prefer  this  to  the  universe  he  has  created.53  A 
world  more  perfect  but  produced  by  ways  less  simple  and  fertile 
would  not  bear  as  much  as  ours  the  character  of  the  divine  attri- 
butes.54 This  is  why  the  world  is  full  of  impious  persons,  of  mon- 
sters, of  disorders  of  all  kinds.54  He  not  only  permits  monsters; 
he  positively  creates  them.54  But  he  creates  them  out  of  respect 
for  the  universality  of  his  ways.54  In  this  way  we  can  conceive 
that  all  these  effects  that  contradict  each  other,  all  these  works 
which  conflict  and  destroy  each  other,  all  these  disorders  which 
disfigure  the  universe,  are  not  in  contradiction  with  their  gov- 
erning cause,  and  show  no  want  of  intelligence,  and  no  impo- 
tence, but  a  prodigious  fecundity  and  perfect  uniformity  in  the 
laws  of  nature.55 

Divine  Will  and  Divine  Reason. 

God  does  not  act  by  pure  will,  but  his  will  is  subordinate 
to  his  reason.  To  claim  that  God  is  above  reason  and  has  no 
other  rule  than  his  pure  will  is  to  upset  everything.58  This 
false  principle  spreads  darkness  so  thick  that  it  confounds  good 
and  evil,  true  and  false,  and  makes  of  all  things  a  chaos.56  Ac- 
cording to  this  principle,  the  universe  is  perfect  because  God 
willed  it.56  Monsters,  according  to  this  view,  are  as  true  achieve- 
ments as  any  other  of  the  designs  of  God.56  There  is  in  truth 
in  God  an  eternal  order  in  which  we  behold  beauty,  truth,  and 
justice  and  we  do  not  fear  to  criticise  his  work  and  to  point  out 
its  defects.57  This  eternal  order  is  the  law  of  God  himself, 
written  in  his  substance  in  divine  characters.57 

It  is  interesting  to  note  some  of  the  contrasts  and  affinities 
involved  in  this  doctrine  of  Malebranche.  Descartes,  it  will  be 
remembered,  proclaimed  an  ultimate  voluntarism  in  theology. 
He  declares  that  the  divine  will  is  absolutely  independent  of, 
and  prior  to,  the  divine  understanding.  "Thus,"  he  says,  "to 
illustrate,  God  did  not  create  the  world  in  time  because  he  saw 
that  it  would  be  better  thus  than  if  he  created  it  from  all  eter- 

53  Entretiens,  p.  224. 

54  Entretiens,  p.  225. 

55  Entretiens,  p.  226.      Cf.  Bouillier,  pp.   119  and  125.      On  the  theory  of  Provi- 
dence in  general  see  Olle-Laprune,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  I,  p.  38 Iff. 

56  Entretiens,  p.  231. 

57  Entretiens,  p.  232. 


METAPHYSICS  AND  THEOLOGY  79 

nity;  nor  did  he  will  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  to  be  equal 
because  he  knew  that  they  could  not  be  otherwise.  On  the  con- 
trary, because  he  created  the  world  in  time,  it  is  for  that  reason 
better  than  if  he  had  created  it  from  all  eternity;  and  it  is  be- 
cause he  willed  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  to  be  necessarily 
equal  to  two  right  angles  that  this  is  true  and  cannot  be  other- 
wise; and  so  in  other  cases.  .  .  .  "58  Malebranche  would  have 
agreed  with  the  contrary  view  expressed  by  the  English  Platon- 
ist,  Cudworth.  Cudworth  says,  in  his  beautiful  language:  "Now 
it  is  certain  that  if  the  Natures  and  Essences  of  all  things,  as  to 
their  being  such  and  such,  do  depend  upon  a  Will  of  God  that 
is  essentially  Arbitrary,  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as  Science 
or  Demonstration,  nor  the  Truth  of  any  Mathematical  or  Meta- 
physical Proposition  be  known  any  otherwise,  than  by  some 
Revelation  of  the  Will  of  God  concerning  it,  and  by  a  certain 
Enthusiastick  or  Fanatick  Faith  and  Perswasion  thereupon,  that 
God  would  have  such  a  thing  to  be  true  or  false  at  such  a  time, 
or  for  so  long.  And  so  nothing  would  be  true  or  false  Naturally 
but  Positively  only,  all  Truth  and  Science  being  meer  Arbitrari- 
ous  things.  .  .  .  Wherefore,  as  for  that  argument  that  unless 
the  Essences  and  Verities  of  things  depend  upon  the  arbitrary 
Will  of  God,  there  would  be  something  that  was  not  God,  inde- 
pendent upon  God ;  if  it  be  well  considered,  it  will  prove  a  meer 
Bugbear,  and  nothing  so  terrible  and  formidable  as  Cartesius 
seemed  to  think  it.  For  there  is  no  other  genuine  Consequence 
deducible  from  this  Assertion,  that  the  Essences  and  Verities 
are  independent  upon  the  Will  of  God,  but  that  there  is  an  eter- 
nal and  immutable  Wisdom  in  the  Mind  of  God.  .  .  .  Now  all 
the  Knowledge  and  Wisdom  that  is  in  Creatures,  whether  Angels 
or  Men,  is  nothing  else  but  a  Participation  of  the  one  Eternal, 
Immutable,  and  Increated  Wisdom  of  God,  or  several  signatures 
of  that  one  Archetypal  Seal,  or  like  so  many  Reflections  of  one 
and  the  same  Face,  made  in  several  glasses,  whereof  some  are 
clearer,  some  obscurer,  some  standing  nearer,  some  further  off. '  '59 
We  have  now  before  us  Malebranche 's  metaphysics  and 
theology  in  their  main  outlines.  The  remaining  dialogues  are 
either  expansions  of  ideas  we  have  already  discussed  or  else  be- 
long in  the  special  history  of  theology  rather  than  in  the  gen- 
eral history  of  philosophy.  The  Dixicme  Entretien  discusses 
the  magnificence  of  God  in  the  grandeur  and  indefinitely  large 
number  of  his  works,  the  simplicity  and  fecundity  of  the  ways 
by  which  he  conserves  and  develops  them,  the  divine  providence 
in  the  first  impression  of  movement  on  matter,  and  the  idea  that 
this  first  step  which  was  not  determined  by  general  laws  was 

58  Op.  cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  248. 

59  Treatise  concerning  Eternal  and  Immutable  Morality,  written  before  1688,  pub- 
lished  1731.      Cf.   Selby-Biggs,  British  Moralist,  Vol.  II,  p.  256f.      For  an  account  of 
Cudworth  see  Tulloch,  Rational  Theology  in  England  in  the  XVIIth  Century,  Vol.  II, 
pp.  193-301. 


80  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBKANCHE 

yet  guided  by  infinite  wisdom.60  The  Onzieme  Entretien  con- 
tinues the  same  subject  and  discusses  Providence  as  revealed  in 
the  arrangement  of  bodies  and  in  the  infinite  combinations  of 
physical  and  moral,  and  of  the  natural  and  the  supernatural.60 
The  Douzieme  Entretien  discusses  divine  Providence  as  revealed 
in  the  laws  of  mind  and  body,  and  the  manner  in  which  God 
distributes  temporal  goods  through  the  angels  and  spiritual  grace 
through  Jesus  Christ.61  The  Treizieme  Entretien  shows  among 
other  things  the  Providence  of  God  as  revealed  in  the  infalli- 
bility of  his  Church.62  And  lastly  the  Quatorzieme  Entretien 
shows  how  the  incomprehensibility  of  the  mysteries  is  a  demon- 
strative proof  of  their  truth,  and  discusses  the  Incarnation  of 
Jesus  Christ,  defends  his  divinity  against  the  Socinians,  and 
shows  that  no  creature,  not  even  the  Angels  themselves,  can 
adore  God  save  through  Jesus  Christ.63 


60  Entretiens,  p.  233ff. 

61  Entretiens,  p.  296ff. 

62  Entretiens,  p.  333ff. 
68  Entretiens,  p.  265ff. 


SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS  31 


CHAPTER  VIII:  MALEBBANCHE  's  SYSTEM  OP  ETHICS. 

We  have  now  to  examine  Malebranche  's  system  of  moral 
philosophy.1  This  we  find  expressed  in  the  Trait  e  de  Morale  of 
1684.  This  work  is  among  the  earliest  attempts  in  modern  phil- 
osophy to  found  the  moral  life  upon  a  rational  basis  and  de- 
serves very  careful  consideration  as  a  document  in  the  history 
of  rationalism.  In  fact,  Malebranche 's  ethics  completes  the  sys- 
tem of  Descartes,  although  of  course  it  also  transforms  it.  Des- 
cartes, it  will  be  remembered,  had  relegated  the  practical  life 
of  the  individual  to  the  Church  and  the  State.  He  did  not  feel 
obliged  to  discuss  practical  matters,  * '  for, ' '  he  said,  '  *  as  regards 
that  which  concerns  conduct,  every  one  is  so  confident  of  his 
own  good  sense  that  there  might  be  found  as  many  reformers 
as  heads,  if  it  were  permitted  that  others  than  those  whom  God 
has  established  as  the  sovereigns  of  his  people,  or  at  least  to 
whom  he  has  given  sufficient  grace  and  zeal  to  be  prophets, 
should  be  allowed  to  make  any  changes  in  that. '  '2 

Nevertheless  there  was  contained  in  Cartesianism  the  im- 
petus to  a  rational  foundation  of  the  moral  life  as  well  as  of  the 
theoretical  life,  and  this  tendency  is  expressed  in  the  ethical 
system  of  Malebranche. 

Love  of  the  Eternal  Order. 

The  Traite  de  Morale  opens  with  a  reaffirmation  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Vision  in  God.  The  Reason  which  enlightens  all  men 
is  the  Word,  the  divine  Logos,  or  the  wisdom  of  God.3  Thisi 
reason  or  light  I  have  in  common  with  all  men;  the  pain  I  feel, 
for  example,  is  a  modification  of  my  own  substance  but  the 
truth  that  I  contemplate  is  a  good  common  to  all  minds.4  Thus 
by  means  of  reason  I  enter  into  communion  with  God  and  all 
intelligences  and  this  spiritual  society  consists  in  participation 
in  the  intelligible  substance  of  the  Word,  in  which  all  spirits 
can  nourish  themselves.4  Now  in  thus  contemplating  the  divine 
substance  I  can  discover  a  part  of  what  God  thinks,  and  also  a 
part  of  what  he  wills,  for  he  wills  according  to  the  Order.4  That 
is,  he  loves  things  in  proportion  as  they  are  lovable,  and  I  can 
discover  what  things  are  more  perfect,  more  estimable,  and 
more  lovable  than  others.4 

4  vr 

1  In  general,  on  Malebranche's  ethics,  cf.  Novaro,  op.  cit.,  and  Olle-Laprune,  op. 
cit.,  Vol.  II,  p.  468ff. 

2  Discourse   on  Method,   Part  VI,   p.    119   of  the   Haldane   and   Ross  translation, 
Vol.  I. 

3  Morale,  p.  1. 
*  Morale,  p.  2. 


82  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

Now  the  intelligible  substance  of  the  Word  contains  within 
itself  two  sorts  of  truths  or  relations,  relations  of  magnitude 
and  relations  of  perfection.  These  relations  of  perfection  con- 
stitute the  immutable  Order  which  God  consults  when  he  acts; 
the  immutable  Order  which  should  be  the  rule  of  the  loves  and 
actions  of  all  intelligences.5  There  is  thus  a  true  and  a  false, 
a  just  and  an  unjust,  with  regard  to  all  intelligences,  for  all  in- 
telligences necessarily  behold  the  same  relations  of  magnitude, 
or  speculative  truths,  and  the  same  relations  of  perfection  or 
practical  truths.5  As  examples  of  relations  of  magnitude,  or  of 
speculative  truths,  Malebranche  gives  us  the  simple  arithmetical 
equality  and  inequality  between  two  plus  two  and  four  and  five.6 
Thus  Truth  and  Order  are  real,  immutable,  and  necessary  rela- 
tions contained  in  the  substance  of  the  divine  Word,  and  he  who 
beholds  these  relations  beholds  what  God  beholds  and  he  who 
regulates  his  love  by  them  loves  what  God  loves.6 

Man  is  free.7  He  can  seek  truth  in  spite  of  his  love  of  re- 
pose; he  can  love  the  eternal  Order  despite  concupiscence.7  He 
is  thus  a  subject  of  merit  and  demerit,  and,  since  God  loves  his 
creatures  in  proportion  as  they  are  lovable,  and  wills  that  all 
who  resemble  him  be  rewarded  and  all  who  are  culpable,  pun- 
ished,7 he  who  labors  to  perfect  himself,  to  make  himself  like 
God,  works  at  his  own  happiness.7  For  since  God  loves  beings 
in  proportion  as  they  are  lovable,  and  the  more  perfect  are  the 
more  lovable,  the  more  perfect  will  be  the  more  powerful,  the 
more  fortunate,  and  the  more  contented.8  He  then  who  cease- 
lessly consults  reason,  who  loves  the  Order,  participating  as  he 
does  in  the  divine  perfection,  will  participate  in  the  divine  hap- 
piness and  glory.8 

Man  is  capable  of  three  things,  of  knowledge,  of  love,  and 
of  feeling;  he  can  know  the  good,  love  the  good,  and  enjoy  the 
good.8  To  a  certain  extent  it  depends  upon  the  individual  in 
regard  to  the  first  two,  but  it  depends  entirely  upon  God  whether 
he  shall  enjoy  the  good.8  But  since  God  is  just,  he  who  knows 
and  loves  him  shall  enjoy  him.8  It  is  strange  that  although  man 
well  knows  that  pleasure  and  pain  do  not  depend  upon  him,  but 
that  to  a  certain  extent  it  does  depend  upon  him  as  to  whether 
or  not  he  shall  know  the  truth  and  love  the  eternal  Order,  he 
yet  seeks  only  pleasure  and  neglects  the  principle  of  eternal 
happiness.8 

Here  we  come  upon  the  ultimate  principle  of  duty,  for  the 
sake  of  which  we  have  been  created.  It  is  love  of  the  eternal 
Order.  This  is  "la  vertu  mere,  la  vertu  universelle,  la  vertu 
universelle,  la  vertu  fondamental."9  It  is  knowledge  and  love 

Morale,  p.  4. 
Morale,  p.  6. 
Morale,  p.  7. 
Morale,  p.  8. 
Morale,  p.  9. 


SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS  83 

of  relations  of  perfection,  or  practical  truth,  that  constitutes  our 
perfection.9  But  if  virtue  is  obedience  to  a  divine  law,  obedi- 
ence to  nature  is  merely  obedience  to  divine  decrees  and  is 
necessity  rather  than  virtue.9  We  can  resist  the  action  of  God 
without  disobeying  the  eternal  Order,  for,  although  God  wills 
only  according  to  the  eternal  Order,  he  often  acts  contrary  to 
it.9  For  the  eternal  Order  itself  dictates  that  God  act  in  a  uni- 
form and  constant  manner.9  Thus,  in  consequence  of  his  eter- 
nal laws,  he  may  act  in  particular  cases  in  opposition  to  the 
eternal  Order.  Hence  to  maintain  that  we  should  follow  nature 
is  to  maintain  that  we  should  follow  what  is  necessarily  contrary 
to  Order  in  many  instances.10  If  God  moved  bodies  by  particu- 
lar volitions,  it  would  be  a  crime  to  escape  by  flight  from  a  fall- 
ing wall;  for  God  has  assuredly  the  right  to  take  back  the  life 
he  has  given.10  On  the  same  theory  it  would  be  an  insult  to  the 
divine  intelligence  to  correct  the  course  of  rivers.  But  since 
God  acts  in  accordance  with  general  rules  we  can  resist  his 
action  without  resisting  his  will.11  We  can,  to  some  extent, 
know  the  eternal  Order,  but  the  divine  decrees  are  absolutely 
unknown  to  us;  hence  we  must  abandon  the  chimerical  virtue 
of  following  nature,  and  follow  rather  reason.11 

The  love  of  the  eternal  Order  is  not  only  the  principal 
moral  virtue;  it  is,  in  fact,  the  only  true  virtue.12  If  a  man 
gives  his  goods  to  the  poor  either  because  of  vanity  or  natural 
compassion  he  is  not  liberal,  for  it  is  not  eternal  Order  that 
rules  him,  but  merely  pride  or  disposition  of  the  machine.12 
Officers,  who  voluntarily  expose  themselves  to  danger,  are  not 
courageous  if  ambition  animates  them ;  nor  are  soldiers  if  it  is 
abundance  of  spirits  and  fermentation  of  the  blood  that  ani- 
mates them.12  This  boasted  noble  ardor  is  either  vanity  or  play 
of  the  machine  (jeu  de  machine)  ;  a  little  more  wine  is  often  all 
that  is  needed  to  produce  more  of  it.12  He  who  endures  the 
outrages  which  are  done  to  him  is  often  neither  moderate  nor 
patient.12  It  may  be  his  laziness  which  renders  him  unmoved, 
and  his  ridiculous  and  stoical  pride  which  consoles  him  and 
places  him  in  idea  above  his  enemies ;  this  again  is  only  the  dis- 
position of  the  machine,  condition  of  his  spirits,  coldness  of  the 
blood,  or  melancholy.13  It  is  the  same  with  all  the  virtues.  If 
love  of  Order  is  not  the  principle  of  them,  they  are  false  and 
vain,  in  all  ways  unworthy  of  a  rational  being,  who  bears  the 
image  of  God  himself,  and  communes  with  him  by  reason.13 
Uninspired  by  love  of  Order,  they  draw  their  origin  from  the 
disposition  of  the  body.13  The  Holy  Spirit  does  not  form  them ; 
and  whoever  makes  of  them  the  object  of  his  desires  and  the 

10  Morale,  p.  10. 

11  Morale,  p.  11. 

12  Morale,  p.  14. 

13  Morale,  p.  15. 


84  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

subject  of  his  glory  has  a  base  soul,  a  mean  spirit,  and  a  cor- 
rupt heart.13 

Malebranche  draws  a  distinction  between  virtue  and  the 
duties.  To  confuse  these  two  is  indeed  one  of  the  greatest  mis- 
takes of  all  those  moralists  who  have  not  applied  the  method 
of  clear  ideas.14  Virtue  is  the  inner  love  of  the  eternal  Order ; 
the  duties  are  merely  the  special  outer  actions  which  can  be 
performed  with  or  without  love  of  the  Order.14  Virtue  neces- 
sarily makes  him  virtuous  who  possesses  it,  but  it  is  possible  to 
perform  actions  of  humility,  generosity,  and  liberality  without 
possessing  virtue.14  Men  imagine  that  they  are  following  vir- 
tue when  they  are  in  reality  only  following  their  natural  in- 
clinations, which  lead  them  to  perform  certain  duties.14  Most 
men  are  deceived  by  confused  ideas  as  to  what  virtue  is  and  con- 
sider themselves  better  than  others  who  are  in  reality  more 
virtuous;  for  it  is  impossible  to  follow  the  dictates  of  eternal 
Order  for  any  length  of  time  without  appearing  to  fail  in  some 
essential  ''duty. "14  For  to  appear  prudent,  honest  and  char- 
itable before  men,  it  is  necessary  sometimes  to  praise  vice,  and 
nearly  always  to  be  silent  when  it  is  praised.14  To  be  esteemed 
liberal,  we  must  be  prodigal;  without  being  foolhardy  we  shall 
hardly  pass  as  valiant  men ;  and  if  we  are  not  superstitious,  we 
shall  be  regarded  as  libertines.14 

Now  universal  reason  is  always  the  same,  and  eternal  Order 
is  immutable;  but  morality  (morale)  changes  according  to  time 
and  place.15  Among  the  Germans,  virtue  consists  in  knowing 
how  to  drink.15  Among  the  nobility,  generosity  consists  solely 
in  shedding  the  blood  of  those  who  have  insulted  us.15  Each- 
person  has  his  private  morality,  his  private  devotion,  and  his 
private  virtue.16  Whence  comes  this  diversity?  It  is  because 
men  do  not  always  consult  reason,  because  we  permit  ourselves 
to  be  guided  by  the  imagination.16  We  are  too  prone  to  believe 
that  eternal  law  is  beyond  our  reach,  and  we  believe,  like  the 
gross  and  carnal  Jews,  that  it  is  as  difficult  to  discover  the  eter- 
nal law  as  to  mount  into  heaven  or  descend  into  hell.16  It  is 
true  that  eternal  Order  is  not  of  easy  access;  it  dwells  within, 
but  we  are  always  turned  outwards.16  We  must  silence  sense, 
imagination,  and  passion,  and  not  imagine  that  we  can  be  rea- 
sonable without  consulting  Reason.16 

Some  hold  that  reason  is  corrupt  and  should  be  subjected 
to  faith,  that  philosophy  is  only  a  servant,  that  we  must  deny 
our  light.17  Perpetual  equivocation,  says  Malebranche.  Man 
is  not  his  own  light  and  his  own  reason,  and  religion  is  itself  the 
true  philosophy.17  Reason  is  infallible,  immutable,  and  incor- 

14  Morale,  p.  17. 

15  Morale,  p.  18. 

16  Morale,  p.  19. 

17  Morale,  p.  20. 


SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS  85 

ruptible,  and  should  always  be  supreme.17  God  himself  follows 
reason.17  We  must  not  close  our  eyes  to  the  light  but  accustom 
ourselves  to  distinguish  true  light  from  the  false  gleams  of  con- 
fused feeling,  or  of  sense.17  Intelligence  is  preferable  to  faith.17 
Faith  passes  but  understanding  abides  forever.  Faith  is  indeed 
a  great  good  because  it  leads  to  understanding,  and  because  with- 
out it  we  cannot  be  worthy  of  understanding  certain  essential 
truths  without  which  we  can  neither  acquire  solid  virtue  nor 
eternal  felicity.17  Nevertheless,  if  we  leave  the  mysteries  out  of 
account,  faith  totally  without  light,  if  it  is  possible,  cannot  ren- 
der us  solidly  virtuous.18  Those  who  have  not  enough  light  to 
conduct  themselves,  can  acquire  virtue  just  as  well  as  those  who 
are  better  able  to  enter  into  themselves  and  contemplate  the 
beauty  of  the  eternal  Order ;  but,  all  other  things  equal,  he  who 
enters  most  into  himself  is  most  solidly  virtuous,  and  of  two 
loves  for  the  eternal  Order  that  is  more  meritorious  into  which 
more  intelligence  enters.18 

Love  of  the  eternal  Order,  Malebranche  holds,  is  identical 
with  the  Christian  virtue  of  charity,  which,  however,  is  de- 
scribed in  the  Scriptures  in  somewhat  vague  language.19  This 
immutable  Order  consists  in  relations  of  perfection  holding  be- 
tween the  intelligible  ideas  contained  in  the  substance  of  the 
Word.20  Now  there  are  two  distinct  sorts  of  love  which  are  due 
•to  perfection.21  There  is  the  love  of  good- will  (bienviellance) 
and  the  love  of  union.21  In  the  love  of  union  we  regard  the 
object  of  our  passion  as  the  cause  of  our  happiness  and  we  de- 
sire to  be  united  with  it  that  the  object  may  exert  its  full  in- 
fluence.21 But  the  love  of  good-will  is  for  people  according  to 
their  merit,  and  we  feel  this  love  for  them  even  when  they  can- 
not benefit  us.21  Thus  the  power  of  effecting  our  happiness  calls 
forth  the  love  of  union,  while  the  other  perfections  call  forth 
the  love  of  good-will.21  Now  since  God  is  the  sole  efficient  cause 
in  the  universe,  since  finite  beings  derive  their  whole  efficacy 
from  him,  he  alone  is  the  proper  object  of  love  of  union.  To 
love  a  finite  object  with  a  love  of  union  is  only  possible  on  the 
false  doctrine  that  they  can  causally  influence  us.21 

The  reverse  is  true,  however,  of  the  love  of  good-will.22 
True,  God  is  infinitely  more  deserving  of  the  love  of  good-will 
than  any  finite  creature  can  be.22  But  he  really  communicates 
to  them  some  perfection.22  The  eternal  Order  itself  demands 
that  we  esteem  and  love  creatures  in  proportion  to  the  perfec- 
tion that  they  possess,  in  so  far  as  these  perfections  are  known 
to  us.22  It  is  entirely  impossible  to  love  them  precisely  accord- 
ing to  their  perfection,  for  our  knowledge  of  the  relations  of 

18  Morale,  p.  21. 

19  Morale,  p.  24f . 

20  Morale,  p.  27. 

21  Morale,  p.  28. 

22  Morale,  p.  29. 


86  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

perfection  is  much  less  exact  than  our  knowledge  of  the 
relations  of  magnitude,  and  we  do  not  know  completely  what 
perfection  the  individual  possesses.22  Nevertheless  beings  who 
are  made  in  the  image  of  God,  and  who  are  united  with  him, 
are  of  more  value  than  any  other  creatures.22  Again,  a  mem- 
ber of  Jesus  Christ  is  more  worthy  of  love  than  a  thousand 
impious  persons.22 

Self-love  can  be  accommodated  to  the  love  of  union,  which 
responds  to  and  honors  a  power  capable  of  affecting  us,  if  self- 
love  is  enlightened.23  Man  has  a  necessary  desire  for  happiness 
and  he  sees  clearly  that  God  alone  can  render  him  happy;  he 
can  therefore  desire  to  be  united  with  God.23  Even  if  a  man 
does  not  know  that  God  rewards  merit  and  only  thinks  of  the 
power  and  goodness  of  God,  his  faith  can  lead  him,  for  the  sake 
of  his  own  happiness,  to  unite  himself  with  God.24  Thus  self- 
love  is  not  directly  opposed  to  the  love  of  union.  The  reverse  is 
true  of  the  love  of  good-will.24  The  eternal  Order  of  justice 
dictates  that  recompense  be  proportional  to  merit,  happiness  to 
virtue ;  but  self-love  does  not  willingly  endure  limits  to  its  hap- 
piness and  glory.24  However  enlightened  this  love  may  be,  if 
it  is  not  just,  it  is  necessarily  contrary  to  Order,  and  it  cannot 
be  just  without  diminishing  or  destroying  itself.24 

The  love  of  Order  is  not  like  particular  dispositions  that 
can  be  lost  or  acquired;  for  Order  is  not  a  particular  creature 
that  one  can  wholly  begin  or  cease  to  love.24  It  is  in  God  and  is 
ceaselessly  impressed  upon  us.25  We  cannot  completely  renounce 
reason  nor  wholly  cease  to  love  Order.25  In  fact,  the  love  of 
Order  naturally  rules  us  save  when  self-love  or  concupiscence 
resist.25  Thus  the  beauty  of  justice  often  affects  the  unjust 
themselves,  so  that  self-love  itself  finds  it  to  its  own  advantage 
to  conform  to  Order.25  All  light  comes  from  the  Word;  all 
movement  from  the  Holy  Spirit ;  hence,  in  so  far  as  a  man  thinks 
he  is  united  to  reason,  in  so  far  as  he  loves,  he  loves,  to  some 
extent,  the  eternal  Order.25  For  we  cannot  fall  into  error  with- 
out using  reason  nor  love  the  evil  save  by  our  love  of  the  good.25 
Thus  self-love  cannot  destroy  love  of  Order.26 

It  is  not  enough  to  love  the  Order  with  a  natural  love  which 
easily  accommodates  itself  to  self-love.26  Our  love  must  be  free, 
enlightened  and  reasonable.26  Our  love  of  the  eternal  Order 
must  be  dominant;  for  however  wicked  a  man  may  be,  he  will 
feel  some  passing  inclination  for  the  Order.26  The  demons  them- 
selves have  still  some  love  of  the  Order.26  God  judges  the  dis- 
position of  the  soul,  not  its  actual  transitory  actions.  A  single 
act  does  not  form  a  habit  and  a  man  is  only  just  before  God 

23  Morale,  p.  30. 

24  Morale,  p.  31. 

25  Morale,  p.  32. 

26  Morale,  p.  33. 


SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS  87 

when  he  has  a  permanent  disposition  to  love  the  good  in  prefer- 
ence to  the  evil.27  Furthermore,  love  may  be  either  natural  or 
free.27  Natural  love  is  a  natural  product  of  pleasure.27  Free 
love  expresses  a  choice ;  it  depends  on  reason,  or  liberty,  on  the 
power  of  the  soul  to  resist  pressure.27  The  essential  differentia 
of  this  species  of  love  is  the  consent  of  the  will.27  Now  God 
only  regards  free  love  in  the  cases  where  both  free  and  natural 
love  are  present.28  From  all  these  considerations,  Malebranche 
concludes  that  the  sole  love  which  justifies  us  before  God  is  an 
habitual,  free  and  dominant  love  of  the  immutable  Order.28 

The  Fourth  Chapter  of  the  First  Part  of  the  Trait  e  de 
Morale  is  an  illuminating  discussion  of  the  relation  of  action  and 
habit.  In  the  first  place,  we  must  recognize  that  actions  produce 
habits,  and  secondly  that  habits  express  themselves  in  actions.29 
Nevertheless  the  soul  does  not  always  act  in  accordance  with  its 
dominant  habit.  The  sinner  could  always  have  refrained  from 
any  particular  sin,  and  the  righteous  man  was  always  capable  of 
an  unjust  action ;  for  the  sinner  was  never  wholly  without  love 
of  Order,  nor  was  the  righteous  man  wholly  without  self-love.30 
But,  as  Malebranche  adds,  in  accordance  with  his  Jansenistic 
tendency,  free-will  alone  cannot  save  a  man.  No  philosopher, 
however  enlightened  he  may  have  been,  whether  Socrates,  or 
Plato,  or  Epictetus,  nor  even  those  whom  we  may  suppose  to 
have  shed  their  blood  for  the  sake  of  the  eternal  Order,  shall 
be  saved  without  the  grace  that  faith  alone  bestows.31 

If  love  of  Order  is  the  supreme  virtue,  then  the  means  of 
acquiring  it  are  of  the  first  importance.  Of  these  Malebranche 
distinguishes  three:  Force  of  Mind,  Liberty  of  Mind,  and 
Obedience  to  Order.  The  first  two  are  concerned  with  the  dis- 
covery of  ethical  truth;  the  last  is  concerned  with  making  ethi- 
cal truth  the  dominant  and  habitual  principle  of  our  practical 
lives.  The  first  two  principles,  especially,  sow  the  imprint  of 
Descartes '  methodological  canons.  Let  us  examine  them  in  order. 

Force  of  Mind. 

To  explain  this  cardinal  virtue,  Malebranche  returns  to  the 
basic  principles  of  the  whole  system.  Faith  and  reason  alike 
assure  us,  he  says,  that  God  is  the  unique  cause  of  all  things, 
while  experience  shows  that  he  acts  according  to  certain  laws. 
Thus  the  collision  of  two  bodies  is  the  occasional  cause  which 
necessarily  determines  the  efficacy  of  the  general  laws  according 
to  which  God  produces  thousands  of  effects  in  his  works.32  Thus 
it  is  God  alone  who  enlightens  spirits ;  nevertheless,  we  may  seek 

27  Morale  p.  35. 

28  Morale  p.  36. 

29  Morale  pp.  38  and  39. 

30  Morale  p.  40. 

31  Morale  p.  43. 

32  Morale  p.  47. 


88  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

in  ourselves  the  occasional  cause  which  determines  him  to  com- 
municate understanding  to  us.32  He  has  attached  the  presence 
of  ideas  to  the  attention  of  the  mind,  and  in  proportion  to  our 
attention  we  shall  have  light.33  So  true  is  this  that  man,  in  his 
ingratitude  and  stupidity,  imagines  that  he  is  the  cause  of  his 
knowledge.33  God  has  made  us  occasional  causes  of  our  knowl- 
edge for  many  reasons,  of  which  the  first  is  that  without  being 
occasional  causes  of  our  knowledge,  we  could  not  be  masters  of 
our  wills ;  for  had  we  no  power  of  thinking,  we  should  have  none 
of  willing  and  should  not  be  in  a  position  to  merit  the  true  goods 
for  which  we  were  made.33 

The  attention  of  the  mind  is,  then,  a  natural  prayer  for 
enlightenment.33  Now  those  who  are  made  for  this  severe  toil, 
or  labor  of  attention  and  who  are  always  attentive  to  the  truth 
which  ought  to  guide  them  may  be  said  to  possess  Force  of  Mind 
(force  d' esprit]  ,34  To  acquire  this  force  of  mind  we  must  begin  at 
an  early  age.  To  begin  is  itself  difficult.  We  become  dis- 
couraged and  declare  ourselves  unfit  for  meditation.  But  if  We 
do  this  we  are  renouncing  virtue,  at  least  in  part.34  For  with- 
out the  work  of  attention,  we  shall  never  comprehend  the  gran- 
deur of  religion,  the  littleness  of  all  that  is  not  God,  the  absurd- 
ity of  the  passions,  and  of  all  our  internal  miseries.  Without 
this  labor,  the  soul  will  live  blindly  and  in  a  disorderly  fashion.34 
There  is  no  other  way  to  obtain  the  light  that  should  conduct 
us;  we  shall  be  eternally  under  disquietude  and  in  strange  em- 
barrassment; for  we  fear  everything  when  we  walk  in  darkness 
and  surrounded  by  precipices.  It  is  true  that  faith  guides  and 
supports;  but  it  does  so  only  as  it  produces  some  light  bj^  the 
attention  it  excites  in  us ;  for  light  alone  is  what  can  assure  minds 
like  ours,  which  have  so  many  enemies  to  fear.34 

How  can  we  acquire  Force  of  Mind?  We  must  avoid  all 
that  divides  the  capacity  of  the  mind,  that  is,  all  the  objects, 
that  flatter  the  senses  and  awaken  the  passions.35  We  must  avoid 
as  much  as  possible  all  the  sciences  and  employments  which  are 
merely  showy,  in  which  memory  alone  works,  and  where  the 
imagination  is  too  active.36  Nothing  is  more  opposed  to  reason 
than  imagination  too  well  instructed,  too  delicate,  too  active,  or 
rather,  too  malign  and  corrupt.36  A  man  must  toil  in  the  spirit 
to  gain  the  life  of  the  spirit,  but  to  use  one's  mind  to  gain  honor 
or  gold  is  servile.36  That  a  workman  should  work  with  his  body 
to  gain  the  life  of  the  body  is  according  to  Order,  but  that  a 
magistrate,  or  a  man  of  affairs,  or  a  merchant  spend  the  energy 
of  their  minds  in  the  acquisition  of  goods  which  are  harmful  to 
their  souls  is  a  striking  piece  of  madness.37 

33  Morale,  p.  48. 

34  Morale,  p.  49. 

35  Morale,  p.  50. 

86  Morale,  p.  51. 

87  Morale,  p.  52. 


SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS  89 

The  one  rule  upon  which  Malebranche  insists  is  that  we 
meditate  only  on  clear  ideas  and  incontestable  facts.37  To  med- 
itate on  confused  sentiments  and  on  doubtful  facts  is  a  futile 
work:  it  is  to  contemplate  phantoms.38  The  immutable  and 
necessary  Order  should  be  the  subject  of  our  meditations,  but 
there  is  nothing  more  abstract  and  less  sensuous  than  this  Or- 
der.38 It  is  true  that  the  Order  became  sensible  and  visible  in 
the  actions  and  precepts  of  Jesus  Christ;  the  Word  made  flesh, 
however,  is  only  an  indispensable  model  according  to  which  by 
"la  folie  apparent e  de  la  foi"  we  are  lead  to  reason.38  Jesus 
Christ  accommodated  Himself  to  our  weakness  to  draw  us  from 
it.38  Faith  speaks  to  the  mind  through  the  body  in  order  that 
man  may  free  himself  from  the  body  and  enter  the  intelligible 
world.38 

Knowledge  of  the  eternal  Order,  which  is  our  indispensable 
law,  is  a  mixture  of  clear  ideas  and  feelings.39  All  men  know 
that  it  is  better  to  be  just  than  to  be  rich ;  but  not  all  men  know 
this  by  clear  ideas.  Children  and  ignorant  people  know  when 
they  do  wrong,  but  it  is  rather  the  secret  reproach  of  reason 
than  clear  understanding  that  warns  them.39  For  Order  may 
be  speculatively  apprehended  and  in  this  way  it  enlightens  the 
mind  without  stirring  it  to  action;  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  thus 
apprehended,  the  eternal  order  is  clear.39  But  Order  can  also 
be  apprehended  as  the  natural  and  necessary  principle  and  rule 
of  the  actions  of  the  soul ;  as  such  it  moves  the  soul  without  en- 
lightening it.  Thus  we  can  know  the  eternal  Order  either  by 
clear  idea  or  confused  feeling.39  This  confused  feeling  of  the 
Order,  however,  is  peculiarly  open  to  the  deceiving  influence  of 
passion  and  concupiscence.39  Thus  we  must  seek  for  clear  ideas : 
we  must  exercise  the  virtue  of  Force  of  Mind. 

Liberty  of  Mind. 

The  second  of  Malebranche 's  cardinal  virtues,  which  is  also 
drawn  from  the  Cartesian  methodology,  is  what  he  calls  Liberty 
of  Mind.  However  much  Force  of  Mind  we  may  possess,  we 
cannot  work  without  cessation,  and  there  are  subjects  so  ob- 
scure that  we  cannot  penetrate  into  them ;  we  must  have  another 
virtue,  Liberte  d' esprit,  according  to  which  we  withhold  our 
judgment  until  we  are  forced  to  give  it.40  When  we  examine  a 
very  complex  question,  and  the  mind  finds  itself  surrounded  by 
difficulties  on  all  sides,  reason  permits  that  we  abandon  the  ques- 
tion, but  also  dictates  that  we  suspend  our  judgment.40  To  make 
as  great  a  use  of  Liberty  as  possible  is  thus  an  indispensable  pre- 
cept of  logic  and  morality.41  We  must  never  believe  until  the 
evidence  forces  us  to  believe.41 

38  Morale,  p.  53. 
38  Morale,  p.  56. 
*°  Morale,  p.  59. 
«  Morale,  p.  60. 


90  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

This  holds  of  man  as  reasonable,  of  man  in  so  far  as  he 
conducts  himself  according  to  reason.41  For  the  citizen,  the  sol- 
dier, the  man  of  religion  has,  as  such,  other  principles  and  it  is 
reasonable  that  he  follow  them  even  though  he  does  not  yet  see 
clearly  that  they  are  conformable  to  reason.41  But  where  faith 
has  made  no  decision,  and  custom  prescribes  nothing  we  must 
adhere  only  to  what  we  clearly  and  evidently  see.41  And  if  we 
clearly  and  evidently  see  that  human  authority  and  custom  are 
mistaken,  we  must  renounce  everything  rather  than  reason.41 
Of  course,  the  infallible  authority  of  the  Church  cannot  contra- 
dict reason.41 

Force  of  Mind  is  to  the  search  for  truth  what  Liberty  of 
Mind  is  to  the  possession  of  truth,  or  at  least  to  exemption  from 
error.  For  by  the  exercise  that  we  make  of  Force  of  Mind  we 
discover  truth,  and  by  the  exercise  of  Liberty  of  Mind,  we  are 
exempt  from  error.41  Liberty  of  Mind  is  necessary  because  the 
mind  lacks  Force;  it  is  necessary  that  the  mind  may  suspend 
its  judgment  where  it  lacks  the  power  to  know  the  truth.41  The 
finite  mind  can  never  deliver  itself  from  ignorance  but  by  the 
exercise  of  Liberty  it  can  escape  error.42 

These  two  cardinal  virtues,  Force  and  Liberty  of  Mind,  are 
not  common  faculties  among  men ;  on  the  contrary,  nothing  is 
more  rare,  and  no  one  possesses  them  in  perfection.42  Man  is 
naturally  capable  of  some  mental  exertion,  but  he  cannot  be 
considered,  ordinarily,  to  be  of  a  strong  mind.42  These  virtues 
can  only  be  acquired  by  practice,  and  their  acquisition  is  a  re- 
turn of  the  soul  to  its  primary  state  before  the  original  sin.43  To 
acquire  them  is  not  to  change  or  destroy  one's  nature  but  to  re- 
pair it.43  Furthermore,  these  virtues  are  present  to  different 
individuals  to  different  extents  and  in  the  same  individual  at 
different  times  to  different  extents.43  If  they  are  not  increased 
in  extent  by  exercise  they  necessarily  diminish,  for  there  are 
no  virtues  more  contrary  to  concupiscence.43  We  can  scarcely 
medidate  without  pain  and  suspension  of  judgment  is  still  more 
difficult.43  There  are  very  few  who  undertake  the  search  for 
truth,  and  few  of  these  have  the  energy  and  courage  to  attain 
it.it.43  Weary  and  rebutted,  the  majority  of  those  who  undertook 
the  quest  try  to  console  themselves  with  what  they  have  at- 
tained.43 They  console  themselves,  perhaps,  with  a  ridiculous 
scorn  of  truth,  or  with  a  base  despair ;  or  they  become  deceivers, 
having  been  deceived  themselves.44 

To  acquire  Liberty  of  Mind  we  must  ceaselessly  reflect  on 
the  prejudices  of  men  and  on  the  causes  of  these  prejudices.44. 
We  believe  that  we  understand  things  when  we  cease  to  marvel 
at  them,  that  is,  when  we  have  become  familiar  with  them.44 

42  Morale,  p.  61. 

43  Morale,  p.  62. 
*4  Morale,  p.  63. 


SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS  91 

It  is  pleasant  to  judge  of  everything;  and  we  can  not  investi- 
gate without  at  least  some  pain.44  Hence  all  ordinary  language 
is  un  galimatias  perpetuel,  a  stream  of  nonsense.44  Everyone 
believes  that  he  understands  what  he  says  or  what  he  hears,  and 
only  rejects  new  terms  which  may,  nevertheless,  be  more  clear 
and  intelligible  than  the  old.44  From  the  failure  on  the  part  of 
mankind  to  exert  Liberty,  Malebranche  derives  all  those  false 
explanations  in  which  the  scholastic  philosophy  abounded,  such 
as,  humidity  and  heat  as  the  principles  of  generation  and  cor- 
ruption of  all  things,  and  the  seminales  and  vertus  prolifiques 
which  explain  how  species  run  true  to  type.45  And,  lastly,  the 
belief  in  Nature  as  an  explanatory  term  comes  from  the  same 
origin.46 

However  important  in  science  it  may  be  for  a  man  to  sus- 
pend his  judgment,  it  is  much  more  important  to  suspend  prop- 
erly one's  judgment  in  matters  of  morality.46  The  reason  is 
that  in  these  matters  exact  knowledge  is  difficult  because  our 
ideas  are  obscured  by  our  passions.47  We  are  often  obliged  to 
act  before  we  clearly  know  what  we  should  do;  but,  although 
we  must,  in  such  cases,  act,  we  must  not  believe  more  than  the 
evidence  compels  us  to  believe.47  This  must  not  be  understood 
to  mean  that  we  are  to  remain  in  perpetual  doubt ;  for  between 
doubt  and  belief  there  is  an  infinite  series  of  unnamed  states.47 
As  there  is  an  infinite  series  of  probabilities,  the  mind  must  put 
each  state  of  affairs  in  its  proper  place;  for  although  a  giveta, 
principle  may  not  be  evident,  it  may  be  evident  that  the  princi- 
ple is  probable.47  We  must  not  imagine  that  the  suspension  of 
judgment  involved  in  Liberty  of  Mind  is  easy.  "Let  a  man 
pass  but  one  year,"  exclaims  Malebranche,  "in  the  commerce 
of  the  world,  hearing  all  that  is  said  and  believing  nothing; 
entering  into  himself  at  all  times  to  find  whether  the  inner  truth 
uses  the  same  language  and  always  suspending  his  consent  until 
light  appears !  I  hold  him  much  wiser  than  Aristotle,  wiser  than 
Socrates,  more  enlightened  than  the  divine  Plato. '  '47 

Obedience  to  Order. 

The  third  great  fundamental  virtue,  according  to  Male- 
branche, is  Obedience  to  Order.  Facility  in  rendering  oneself 
attentive,  and  in  suspending  judgment,  although  necessary  for 
all  solid  virtue,  is  not  the  whole  of  virtue.48  There  is  necessary 
an  exact  obedience  to  divine  law,  a  stable  and  dominant  dispo- 
sition to  regulate  all  the  movements  of  the  heart  and  all  the 
steps  of  conduct  according  to  the  eternal  Order.48  For  what 
would  it  benefit  a  man  to  have  enough  Force  and  Liberty  of 

*  Morale,  p.  64. 
*"  Morale,  p.  65. 
*7  Morale,  p.  66. 
48  Morale,  p.  70. 


92  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBRANCHE 

Mind  to  discover  the  most  concealed  truths  and  avoid  even  the 
slightest  errors  if  he  did  not  live  according  to  his  lights  and 
withdrew  himself  from  the  obedience  which  he  owes  to  the  di- 
vine law?48 

How  can  we  acquire  this  dominant  disposition  ?  As  we  have 
seen,  habits  are  built  out  of  acts.49  We  must  often  make  firm 
and  constant  resolutions  to  obey  the  Order;  these  repeated  res- 
olutions will  gradually  give  us  the  disposition  we  are  seeking.49 
This  is  easy  to  conceive,  but  hard  to  do;  in  fact,  it  cannot  be 
achieved  without  the  aid  of  divine  grace.49  A  man  without  di- 
vine grace  and  consequently  without  faith  can  very  well  desire 
death  or  nothingness,  rather  than  life,  in  the  absence  of  what  he 
loves.  We  can  desire  not  to  exist,  but  we  cannot  desire  to  exist 
in  a  miserable  condition ;  for  we  have  an  irresistible  desire  to  be 
happy.49  Now  without  faith  that  we  shall  find  a  greater  happi- 
ness than  that  which  we  renounce,  we  shall  never  be  able  to  re- 
nounce our  dominant  passion.49  And  faith  is  the  effect  of  di- 
vine grace.  Nevertheless,  as  Malebranche  shows  in  some  detail, 
the  exercise  of  Force  and  Liberty  of  Mind  can  prepare  the  mind 
for  faith,  by  teaching  us  to  despise  the  passions  and  by  means 
of  the  purity  which  it  introduces  into  our  imaginations.50 

These  three  virtues,  Force  and  Liberty  of  Mind,  and  Obedi- 
ence to  Order  are  so  many  phases  of  the  original  love  of  the 
Order  of  Perfection  which  stands  at  the  center  of  Malebranche 's 
ethical  system.  To  know  the  truth  and  to  serve  it;  such,  for 
Malebranche,  constituted  the  essence  of  human  merit.  It  is  in- 
teresting to  compare  this  system  of  ethics  with  a  system  which 
Malebranche  would  certainly  have  regarded  as  the  diametrical 
opposite  of  his  system,  that  of  Spinoza.  Both  laid  an  equal 
stress  upon  clear  ideas  as  the  foundation  of  the  moral  life.  For 
Spinoza,  in  so  far  as  our  mind  has  adequate  ideas  it  is  active; 
in  so  far  as  it  has  inadequate  ideas  it  is  passive.51  In  fact,  in 
clear  ideas,  Spinoza  places  not  only  the  activity  of  the  mind, 
but  also  human  freedom  as  distinct  from  human  bondage,  as  well 
as  immortality  and  love  of  God.  In  so  far  as  we  know  we  are 
free  and  active.  In  so  far  as  we  are  free  and  active,  we  are 
eternal,  that  is,  we  know  and  love  God  with  his  own  eternal 
knowledge  and  love  of  himself.52  "The  intellectual  love  of  the 
mind  towards  God  is  that  very  love  of  himself,  not  in  so  far  as 
he  is  infinite,  but  in  so  far  as  he  can  be  explained  through  the 
essence  of  the  human  mind  regarded  under  the  form  of  eternity ; 
in  other  words,  the  intellectual  love  of  the  mind  towards  God 
is  part  of  the  infinite  love  wherewith  God  loves  himself. '  '53 

The  stress,  however,  which  both  of  these  great  seventeenth 

49  Morale,  p.  71. 

50  Morale,  pp.  72-79. 

51  Ethics,  Part  III,  Prop.  I. 

52  Ethics,  Part  III,  Defs.  I  and  II,  and  Part  V,  Prop.  XXXVI. 
»  Part  V,  Prop.  XXXVI,  trans.  Elwes. 


SYSTEM  OF  ETHICS  93 

century  rationalists  placed  upon  the  function  of  clear  ideas  in 
the  moral  and  religious  life  should  not  blind  us  to  the  essential 
diversity  of  their  systems.  For  Malebranche  the  ultimate  source 
of  good  lay  in  an  absolute  system  of  values  in  the  divine  mind 
which  possessed  an  absolute  authority  over  the  individual.  Spi- 
noza, as  is  well  known,  rejected  the  teleological  view  of  the 
world,54  and  denned  the  "good"  as  that  which  we  certainly 
know  to  be  useful  to  us ;  "  evil ' '  as  that  which  we  know  to  be  a 
hindrance  to  us.55  Spinoza  thus  regarded  good  and  evil  as  not 
inhering  in  the  world  itself,  but  as  based  upon  human  desires. 
For  Malebranche,  on  the  other  hand,  there  was,  as  we  have 
seen,  an  immutable  system  of  rationally  apprehended  values 
which  did  not  in  any  way  depend  upon  the  choice  of  the  indi- 
vidual. Malebranche  is  the  faithful  disciple  of  Plato  and  Augus- 
tine, while  Spinoza's  view  shows  the  stamp  of  modern  nat- 
uralism. 

In  the  doctrine  of  love  of  the  eternal  Order  we  have  the 
essential  point  of  Malebranche 's  ethics.  The  remainder  of  the 
Traite  de  Morale  deals  with  either  the  religious  and  theological 
side  of  morality  or  with  certain  practical  applications  which 
Malebranche  makes  of  his  doctrine.  He  thus  discusses  the  means 
that  religion  furnishes  to  the  acquisition  of  the  love  of  Order.56 
Jesus  Christ  is  the  occasional  cause  of  grace.57  When  we  ap- 
proach the  Sacraments  our  actual  love  of  Order  becomes  habitual 
in  consequence  of  the  permanent  desires  of  Jesus  Christ.58  The 
fear  of  hell  is  as  good  a  motive  as  the  desire  for  eternal  felicity, 
but  in  both  cases  we  must  distinguish  the  motive  from  the  end.59 
Chapter  IX  shows  why  we  must  pray  to  the  Virgin,  the  Angels 
and  the  Saints,  although  not  as  occasional  causes  of  grace.60 

The  Second  Part  of  the  Traite  de  Morale  is  concerned  with 
devoirs,  that  is  to  say,  with  particular  external  actions.  We 
have  obligations  to  each  of  the  divine  attributes,  to  the  divine 
power,61  to  the  divine  wisdom,62  and  to  the  divine  love.63  In  the 
Sixth  Chapter  of  Part  II  Malebranche  takes  up  the  problem  of 
our  duties  to  the  two  societies  of  which  we  are  members,  the 
"society  of  commerce,"  animated  by  passion,  consisting  of  a 
community  of  particular  and  transitory  goods,  with  the  com- 
fort and  conservation  of  the  life  of  the  body  as  its  end,  and  the 
"society  of  religion"  sustained  by  faith,  consisting  in  a  com- 

54  Cf.  Ethics,  Part  I,  Appendix. 

55  Op.  cit.,  Defs.  I  and  II,  Part  IV. 
66  Morale,  p.  81. 

57  Morale,  p.  88. 

58  Morale,  p.  8 Iff. 
58  Morale,  p.  89f . 

60  Morale,  p.  96f. 

61  Morale,  p.  147ff. 

62  Morale,  p.  159ff. 
88  Morale,  p.  167ff. 


94  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  MALEBEANCHE 

munity  of  true  goods  with  eternal  happiness  as  an  end.64  Every- 
thing should  be  related  to  the  eternal  spiritual  society,65  Our 
obligations  to  other  men  should  be  all  taken  as  external,  for  it 
is  very  dangerous  to  make  our  service  to  men  an  inner  con- 
cern.66 Intercourse  with  the  world  is  in  general  dangerous.67 
There  are  two  sovereign  powers,  the  Church  and  the  State,  which 
are  ruled  by  the  Prince  and  the  Bishop;  the  Prince  the  image 
of  Omnipotent  God,  the  Bishop  of  Jesus  Christ.68  To  these 
powers  the  individual  owes  an  absolute  allegiance.  "As  for  the 
subjects,"  says  Malebranche,  "it  seems  to  me  that  they  should 
obey  blindly,  when  only  their  interest  is  concerned."69  Mar- 
riage is  the  symbol  of  the  union  of  Jesus  Christ  and  his  Church 
and  is  a  natural  union  evidently  provided  for  by  the  Creator.70 
In  the  last  chapter,  Malebranche  discusses  the  duties  that  each 
person  owes  to  himself  and  which  consist  in  working  for  one's 
own  perfection  and  happiness.71 


84  Morale,  p.  184ff. 

85  Morale,  p.  185. 

86  Morale,  p.  187. 

87  Morale,  p.  189. 
68  Morale,  p.  211. 
"   Iforote,  p.  216. 


70  Morale,?.  219f. 

71  Morale,  p.  262f.     On  Malebranche's  ethics  as  a  whole  cf.  Olle-Laprune,  Vol.  I, 
p.  447f. 


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